Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries

2004 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra F. Joireman
2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Ruth Levush

The Israeli legal system belongs to the Western legal culture which is based on the rule of law and takes secular, liberal and rational approach that puts the individual at the center. The Israeli legal system has been classified as a “mixed jurisdiction” in that it has traits of both common law as well as civil law systems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-302
Author(s):  
David F. Forte

In the American system of justice, based on the common law method, the judge enjoys greater independence than do the judges in Civil Law systems. Independence of the judiciary is essential in a system of checks and balances where the more powerful elements of the legislature and the executive must be limited by legally enforced principles. At the same time, judicial independence is constrained within moral limits by a system of positive law rules that direct the judge to make reasoned judgments that he must justify by open opinions.


2001 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Fullerton Joireman

The question of whether particular types of legal institutions influence the effectiveness of the rule of law has long been answered with conjecture. Common law lawyers and judges tend to believe that the common law system is superior. This opinion is based on the idea that the common law system inherited from the British is more able to protect the rights of the individual than civil law judicial systems. Quite the opposite point of view can be found in lawyers from civil law countries, who may view the common law system as capricious and disorganised. This paper compares the effectiveness of the rule of law in common law and civil law countries in Africa, through a cross-national statistical comparison using Freedom House and Political Risk Services data. The comparison reveals that common law countries in Africa are generally better at providing ‘rule of law’ than are civil law countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Achmad Hariri

Pancasila legal system in Indonesia does not seem to have found a final formulation, it is still abstracted from the dominant legal system, namely civil law / rechstaat. In the 1945 Constitution it is clear that Indonesia promulgates as a legal state, although there is no implicit explanation of the legal system which is adopted (rechstaat, the rule of law or the Pancasila legal system), on the other hand Pancasila becomes the ideology and basis of the state, therefore there needs to be a formulation of the Indonesian legal system by deconstructing (reading; dismantling) the Pancasila ideology, so that the Pancasila is not only an ideology, but also as a legal system adopted in Indonesia. Pancasila can be placed in a prismatic postulate, where Pancasila is placed as a counterweight between existing legal systems, the Pancasila legal system can be used as an alternative legal system originating from noble values, legal systems relevant to plural societies are legal pluralism, namely common law configurations who uphold substantive justice, civil law that knows procedural justice, and the Pancasila legal system that upholds social justice. so that the substance of prismatic Pancasila law can be realized, namely justice as its purpose.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA

AbstractCan citizens’ interest in non-domination be satisfied by the principle of legality and the guarantee of non-arbitrariness? This comment argues that the rule of law requires an internal organization of law that entails an additional positive law, through conventions, common law, judicial precedents or constitutions, which the sovereign cannot legally override. In the supranational context, the rule of law requires an equilibrium of consideration and respect between different legalities by avoiding a legal monopoly of a supreme authority and fostering the interaction among orders based on content-dependent reasons. The same applies to the relations between the ECtHR and member states. The margin of appreciation, taken as a reminder of the complexities of international institutional relationships, embodies a non-domination caveat to consider (the reasons from) the ‘normativities’ of different orders. Nonetheless, as an argumentative tool of the Court, it allows for an often-disputed discretion. Accordingly, better refined guidelines and justifications are required.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (37) ◽  
Author(s):  
Murilo Strätz
Keyword(s):  

O presente trabalho destaca o papel da jurisprudência na interpretação / aplicação do Direito, tanto no sistema da Common Law, onde o precedente judicial sempre ostentou função primordial na resolução dos casos concretos, quanto no Civil Law, em que este fenômeno, embora não tivesse o menor prestígio na formação da tradição romanista, vem gradativamente assumindo um maior protagonismo, sobretudo após a proliferação, observada a partir da Segunda Guerra Mundial, do modelo kelseniano de Corte Constitucional. propõe-se, para tanto, uma reconciliação entre o “caráter argumentativo” do Direito - que explora a “derrotabilidade” (defeasibility) e as “certezas provisórias” do Direito -, de um lado, e o ideal colimado pelo Estado de Direito (Rule of Law), a exigir, de outro lado, previsibilidade e certeza do fenômeno jurídico. A jurisprudência servirá, por conseguinte, como instrumento prático e vivo, à disposição da Teoria da Argumentação Jurídica (TAJ), para atenuar os inconvenientes que decorrem da falta de certeza e de previsibilidade do Direito, bem como para assegurar a “universalizabilidade” da ratio que constitui os precedentes.


Author(s):  
Stuart Sime

This chapter considers the modern scope and limitations on the use of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in common law jurisdictions. It considers the underlying juridical basis for the jurisdiction, and the underlying theories, namely that residuary powers were vested in the High Court in England and Wales by the Judicature Acts, and that all courts have inherent powers to prevent abuse of process. It considers the ramifications of the distinction between inherent jurisdiction and inherent powers. Changes in the legal landscape since the seminal articles by Master Jacob and Professor Dockray, including the codification of civil procedure in many common law jurisdictions, and modern understanding of the rule of law and the separation of powers, are considered. It is argued that while existing applications of the inherent jurisdiction should be retained, it is no longer acceptable for the English High Court, and equivalent courts in other jurisdictions, to generate new procedural law by resorting to the inherent jurisdiction.


2019 ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Henk Addink

The concept of the rule of law has different—common law and continental—historical roots and traditional perspectives. The common law tradition is more focused on limiting the powers of the state, whereas the continental tradition focuses on not just to limit but also to empower the government. But both systems have a focus on the rule of law. The rule of law in the classical liberal tradition is based on four elements: legality, division and balance of powers, independent judicial control, and protection of fundamental rights. The differences between rule of law and rechtsstaat are: different concepts of the state, mixed legal systems and different approaches of a constitution, and different perspectives on human rights. There are two levels of development: a model in which law is a way of structuring and restricting the power of the state, the second level is more subjective and has important individual positions. The concept of good governance related to these developments makes clear the need to broaden the concept of the rule of law.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter examines the ways in which criminal law treats conspiracies. Some of the controversies examined include: whether it is necessary and/or desirable to criminalize conspiracies; the extent to which there can be a conspiracy under the Criminal Law Act 1977 if the parties have only agreed to commit the substantive offence subject to some condition; what must be agreed and who must intend what to happen for a crime of conspiracy; the mens rea of statutory conspiracies; and whether common law conspiracies are so vague as to infringe the rule of law.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 595-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles F. Abernathy

Most European and American attorneys and judges think the U.S.A. has its legal roots in English common law, and that is probably true for the many areas of U.S. law that are still controlled by the traditional common-law process of simultaneously making and applying law. Yet, with respect to constitutional law – America's greatest legal contribution to modern respect for the rule of law, the roots of the U.S. legal system are firmly planted in Europe, not England. The U.S. Constitution was inspired by French revolutionary ideas of rationalism in law; it was intended as an integrated document just like codes; and it has been interpreted by American judges to be not just a political document but binding law – law that is binding on all three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary. In fact that was the holding in Marbury v. Madison, the case decided exactly two hundred years ago.


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