scholarly journals THE JUDGE AND THE RULE OF LAW

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-302
Author(s):  
David F. Forte

In the American system of justice, based on the common law method, the judge enjoys greater independence than do the judges in Civil Law systems. Independence of the judiciary is essential in a system of checks and balances where the more powerful elements of the legislature and the executive must be limited by legally enforced principles. At the same time, judicial independence is constrained within moral limits by a system of positive law rules that direct the judge to make reasoned judgments that he must justify by open opinions.

2001 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Fullerton Joireman

The question of whether particular types of legal institutions influence the effectiveness of the rule of law has long been answered with conjecture. Common law lawyers and judges tend to believe that the common law system is superior. This opinion is based on the idea that the common law system inherited from the British is more able to protect the rights of the individual than civil law judicial systems. Quite the opposite point of view can be found in lawyers from civil law countries, who may view the common law system as capricious and disorganised. This paper compares the effectiveness of the rule of law in common law and civil law countries in Africa, through a cross-national statistical comparison using Freedom House and Political Risk Services data. The comparison reveals that common law countries in Africa are generally better at providing ‘rule of law’ than are civil law countries.


Author(s):  
Sossin Lorne

This chapter sets out the constitutional foundation for courts and administrative agencies in Canada. It examines the constitutional foundations for Canadian courts, including Canada’s constitutional texts; unwritten constitutional principles such as judicial independence, access to justice, and the rule of law; quasi-constitutional statutes such as the Supreme Court Act; and the common law Constitution. The chapter next considers the constitutional foundations for administrative agencies, particularly around the extent to which agencies can implement and are subject to the Constitution. Finally, the chapter situates the discussion of administrative agencies against the backdrop of Canada’s separation of powers, including emerging dynamics flowing from Indigenous self-government.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA

AbstractCan citizens’ interest in non-domination be satisfied by the principle of legality and the guarantee of non-arbitrariness? This comment argues that the rule of law requires an internal organization of law that entails an additional positive law, through conventions, common law, judicial precedents or constitutions, which the sovereign cannot legally override. In the supranational context, the rule of law requires an equilibrium of consideration and respect between different legalities by avoiding a legal monopoly of a supreme authority and fostering the interaction among orders based on content-dependent reasons. The same applies to the relations between the ECtHR and member states. The margin of appreciation, taken as a reminder of the complexities of international institutional relationships, embodies a non-domination caveat to consider (the reasons from) the ‘normativities’ of different orders. Nonetheless, as an argumentative tool of the Court, it allows for an often-disputed discretion. Accordingly, better refined guidelines and justifications are required.


2019 ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Henk Addink

The concept of the rule of law has different—common law and continental—historical roots and traditional perspectives. The common law tradition is more focused on limiting the powers of the state, whereas the continental tradition focuses on not just to limit but also to empower the government. But both systems have a focus on the rule of law. The rule of law in the classical liberal tradition is based on four elements: legality, division and balance of powers, independent judicial control, and protection of fundamental rights. The differences between rule of law and rechtsstaat are: different concepts of the state, mixed legal systems and different approaches of a constitution, and different perspectives on human rights. There are two levels of development: a model in which law is a way of structuring and restricting the power of the state, the second level is more subjective and has important individual positions. The concept of good governance related to these developments makes clear the need to broaden the concept of the rule of law.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-483
Author(s):  
Jamie Cameron

What the rule of law means and how it constrains the exercise of state power raise issues which have been debated-without resolution-over the ages. Times of emergency bring fresh energy to the discussion, and David Dyzenhaus is one of many who have entered the fray to debate the balance between liberty and national security in the post 9/11 period. It has not been easy for those who place their trust in written constitutions to account for the way textual guarantees are diluted when the state is under threat. Rather than address that dilemma, Dyzenhaus sets his ideas apart by proposing a theory which maximizes the protection of rights in emergency circumstances, without straining the institutional capacities or legitimacy of the judiciary. This theory invokes the pedigree of the common law-and “common law constitutionalism”-and is grounded in the constitutive properties of the rule of law, or principle of legality. Dyzenhaus may not have answered the questions readers will want to ask, but he has opened up the middle ground between the competing supremacies yet more, by drawing common law constitutionalism and its rule-of-law pedigree into constitutional theories of review. More to the point, he has challenged the judiciary to draw on the moral resources of the law to make executive and legislative action as accountable as possible at all times, in emergencies as well as in normal times. Readers can and should engage, at many levels, with the complexity of his thought in this important book.


2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Ruth Levush

The Israeli legal system belongs to the Western legal culture which is based on the rule of law and takes secular, liberal and rational approach that puts the individual at the center. The Israeli legal system has been classified as a “mixed jurisdiction” in that it has traits of both common law as well as civil law systems.


Author(s):  
Cristina E. Parau

This chapter analyses Network Community discourses in order to better expose the causal role of its hegemonic norms. Key assumptions held by the Community about the qualities of their agenda are brought to light. Classical Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial independence, and the rule of law, the utility of which has stood the test of time, are compared to the theory and practice of the Network Community’s Judiciary institutional design Template. The Network conceives of the separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial independence, and the rule of law as emanating from the autonomy and supremacy of a Judiciary so empowered as invariably to subordinate all other contestants in case of conflict with itself over constitutional meaning. The chapter ends with a systematic catalogue and critical examination of those few acts of state which the Network Community conceive as legitimate checks and balances on their Judiciary design.


2015 ◽  
Vol 79 (5) ◽  
pp. 330-343
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott

The Crime and Courts Act 2013 has amended s. 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 on the amount of force a person can use in self-defence. The amended provision poses a dilemma for the courts: it states that only reasonable force can be used by a householder against a trespasser, but adds that force is unreasonable if it is grossly disproportionate. Until now, the courts have treated reasonable force and proportionate force as synonyms. This article suggests that the amended s. 76 should be interpreted to comply with the rule of law, incorporating the idea of equality before the law and legality. The courts should respect the traditional common law concept of reasonableness which is an impartial, objective concept that plays an important role across the whole of the criminal legal system. In addition, the article points out that the Act must be interpreted, where possible, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights to avoid the problems that arose with the defence of lawful chastisement.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianlan Wu

The rule of law as a globally recognised concept is multi-faceted (Chesterman, 2008). In the common-law tradition, it is conceived through a formal and substantive framework. In essence, it centres on the supremacy of the law over the arbitrary exercise of power and the formal legality of the law (Tamanaha, 2004, p. 115; Cotterrell, 1992, p. 157). The rule-of-law concept has been criticised as being of unique European origin, where plural social organisation and universal natural law constitute its two preconditions (Unger, 1977, pp. 80–110). It has, however, been advocated around the world as one essential principle leading to modernity, where the legitimacy of the law based on the formal and substantive rule of law serves as a strong symbol for a modern society (Deflem, 1996, p. 5).


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