scholarly journals The Paradox of Predictability

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Gijsbers

AbstractScriven’s paradox of predictability arises from the combination of two ideas: first, that everything in a deterministic universe is, in principle, predictable; second, that it is possible to create a system that falsifies any prediction that is made of it. Recently, the paradox has been used by Rummens and Cuypers to argue that there is a fundamental difference between embedded and external predictors; and by Ismael to argue against a governing conception of laws. The present paper defends a new diagnosis of the roots of the paradox. First, it is argued that the unpredictability has to be understood in the light of Turing’s famous results about computability, in particular his proof that there is no solution to the ‘halting problem.’ This allows us to see that previous analyses of the paradox were either mistaken or not fully adequate. Second, the sense of paradox that nevertheless remains is traced to the idea that rational behaviour is not dependent on contingent environmental circumstances: that it is always up to us to engage in activities such as rational prediction or rational belief. The paradox of predictability teaches us that this idea, natural though it may be, is mistaken.

A critical comparison between the traditional algorithmic approach and the semantic-like one is made. The comparison include topics such as causality, correlations, halting problem, shortest algorithm, intuition, Zipf`s law, and absolute information. The purpose of making this comparison is to delineate neatly the fundamental difference between both approaches and to make clear that, although they are different, they still are counterparts which coexist peacefully. One of the major differences between them turns out to be that whilst the semantic-like approach permits autonomous discrimination between “true” and “false” statement by an intelligent complex system, the traditional algorithmic theory does not allow any autonomous discrimination between a “true” and a “false” statement. On the other hand, their common property turns out to be that it is impossible to acquire absolute knowledge: for example, even the famous “super-minded” Maxwell demon can be deceived.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-423
Author(s):  
NEIL TENNANT

Peter Gärdenfors proved a theorem purporting to show that it is impossible to adjoin to the AGM-postulates for belief-revision a principle of monotonicity for revisions. The principle of monotonicity in question is implied by the Ramsey test for conditionals. So Gärdenfors’ result has been interpreted as demonstrating that it is impossible to combine the Ramsey test for conditionals with the basic postulates for rational belief-revision. It is shown here that this interpretation of Gärdenfors’ result is unwarranted. A new diagnosis is offered of a methodological error made in the statement of the key principle of monotonicity. Crucial applications of this principle in Gärdenfors’ proof require one to regard as revisions what are really expansions. If monotonicity is stated only for genuine revisions, then Gärdenfors’ proof does not go through. Nor can it; for, when the monotonicity principle for revisions is correctly formulated, one can actually establish a contrary consistency result. This requires only a slight adjustment to the postulates of AGM-theory, in order to ensure that the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision trichotomize the domain of theory-changes. It is further shown that being careful in this way about the proper domains of definition of the three operations of expansion, contraction, and revision also disposes of another, more direct, impossibility result, due to Arló-Costa, that targets the Ramsey test.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-290
Author(s):  
Colm Peter McGrath ◽  
◽  
Helmut Koziol ◽  

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 149-155
Author(s):  
Alexey B. Panchenko

Yu. F. Samarin’s works are traditionally viewed through the prism of his affiliation with Slavophilism. His view of the state is opposed to the idea of the complex empire based on unequal interaction of the central power with the elite of national districts. At the same time it was important for Samarin to see the nation not as an ethnocultural community, but as classless community of equal citizens, who were in identical position in the face of the emperor. Samarin’s attitude to religion and nationality had pragmatic character and were understood as means for the creation of the uniform communicative space inside the state. This position for the most part conformed with the framework of the national state basic model, however there still existed one fundamental difference. Samarin considered not an individual, but the rural community that owned the land, to be the basic unit of the national state. As the result the model of national state was viewed as the synthesis of modernistic (classlessness, pragmatism, equality) and archaic (communality) features.


1970 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-333
Author(s):  
Sarno Hanipudin

This paper is intended to describe how the integration of religion and science is done through the practice of PAI learning. This was done because there is a strong presumption in the wider community who say that religion and science are the two entities that can not be met. Both have their respective territories, separated from each other, in terms of formal-material objects, research methods, criteria of truth, the role played by scientists. There is also a view that science and religion stand at their respective position, because science rely on empirically supported data to ascertain what is real and what is not, contrary religion ready to accept the supernatural and certainly not only be based on tangible variables of faith and the belief that religion and science must coexist independently of each other, because even though there are similarities in their mission, the fundamental difference between the two present a conflict that will resonate on each core. Tulisan ini ditujukan untuk mendeskripsikan bagaimana integrasi agama dan sains dilakukan melalui praktik pembelajaran PAI. Hal itu dilakukan karena ada anggapan yang kuat dalam masyarakat luas yang mengatakan bahwa agama dan ilmu adalah dua entitas yang tidak dapat dipertemukan. Keduanya mempunyai wilayah masing-masing, terpisah antara satu dan lainnya, baik dari segi objek formalmaterial, metode penelitian, kriteria kebenaran, peran yang dimainkan oleh ilmuwan. Ada juga yang memandang bahwa sains dan agama berdiri pada posisinya masingmasing, karena bidang ilmu mengandalkan data yang didukung secara empiris untuk memastikan apa yang nyata dan apa yang tidak, agama sebaliknya siap menerima yang gaib dan tidak pasti hanya didasarkan pada variabel berwujud dari iman dan kepercayaan bahwa agama dan sains harus hidup berdampingan independen satu sama lain, sebab meskipun ada kesamaan dalam misi mereka, perbedaan mendasar antarakeduanya menyajikan sebuah konflik yang akan beresonansi pada inti masingmasing.


Author(s):  
Puji Kurniawan

Humans are social creatures who need each other to socialize or to fulfill their needs, such as primary, secondary and tertiary needs. In this life there are 2 (two) groups of people, namely groups of people who are overfunded and those who are underfunded. Therefore, banks and non-bank financial institutions have emerged as intermediaries between the 2 (two) groups of the people so that the balance can occur in meeting the needs of each life. In Indonesia, there are many conventional and sharia bank and non-bank financial institutions that provide financing services to meet human needs. The fundamental difference between conventional and Islamic financial institutions is the use of the interest system which is usury in conventional financial institutions and the use of profit sharing systems in Islamic financial institutions.


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