Note on Excess Capacity in a Monopoly Market with Network Externalities

Author(s):  
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
Author(s):  
Marcel Thum

SummaryThis paper shows - in contrast to the literature on excess capacity - that capacity commitment can improve market allocations, if network externalities are present. Intertemporal network externalities can lead to a large degree of misallocation in simple markets. However, the attempt of firms to appropriate the potential surplus from standardization generates new market strategies as e.g. capacity commitment that can mitigate the standardization problem. In this context, capacity does not incorporate the detrimental effects stated in the excess capacity literature, but guarantees the functioning of markets in the interest of collective rationality. The relevance of this strategy in markets with network externalities is illustrated by the emergence of VCR standards.


2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Dye ◽  
Shyam Sunder

This paper discusses arguments for and against introducing competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue financial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or IASB rules. The paper examines several arguments supporting the status quo, including (1) the FASB's experience and world leadership in making accounting rules; (2) the increased risk of a “race to the bottom” under regulatory competition; (3) the inability of most users of financial reports to understand the complex technical issues underlying accounting standards; (4) the possibility that IASB's standards will be diluted to gain international acceptance, allowing additional opportunities for earnings management; (5) the risks of the IASB being deadlocked or captured by interests hostile to business; (6) the costs of experimentation in standard setting; and (7) economies from network externalities. Arguments examined on the other side include how competition will (1) help meet the needs of globalized businesses; (2) increase the likelihood that the accounting standards will be efficient; (3) help protect standard setters from undue pressure from interest groups; (4) allow different standards to develop for different corporate clienteles; (5) allow corporations to send more informative signals by their choice of accounting standards; (6) protect corporations against capture of regulatory body by narrow interests; and (7) not affect network externalities at national or global scales.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1432
Author(s):  
Huifang Jiao ◽  
Xuan Wang ◽  
Chi To Ng ◽  
Lijun Ma

In this study, we develop a series of consumer-valuation-based models to investigate the pricing and return policies of the sellers in a competitive e-commerce market. Differing from the competition models in literature, a novel two-dimensional valuation structure is built, which considers the valuations of a consumer on two products and the valuation differentiation of all consumers on each product. We consider both monopoly and duopoly (competitive) markets. In each market, two models are respectively developed, one with and one without the return policies. We derive the solutions for the four models, and conduct some analytical and numerical investigations. The results show that return policy with a partial refund is always chosen by the sellers in both monopoly and duopoly markets. Return policy benefits the seller in a monopoly market, but may not benefit the sellers in a duopoly market. In the duopoly models, one seller can be considered as a monopoly seller who meets a new competitor. Our results show that the monopoly seller will reduce its price by no more than 20% when there comes a competitor, and, counter-intuitively, it will meanwhile adopt a severer return policy to the consumers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Filippo Belloc

AbstractWe study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards working time of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal working time vanishes. Our model helps identifying which is the pay scheme that best remunerates longer working times and offers insights to regulators seeking to improve the intensive margin of coverage by taxi services.


Author(s):  
Yumei Luo ◽  
Guiping Wang ◽  
Yuwei Li ◽  
Qiongwei Ye

M-health apps have developed rapidly and are widely accepted, but users’ continued intention to use m-health apps has not been fully explored. This study was designed to obtain a better understanding of users’ continued intention to use m-health apps. We developed a theoretical model by incorporating the protection motivation theory and network externalities and conducted an empirical study of a 368-respondent sample. The results showed that: (1) perceived vulnerability has a direct impact on users’ self-efficacy and response efficacy; (2) self-efficacy and response efficacy have a direct impact on users’ attitudes and continued intention; (3) network externalities affect users’ attitudes and continued intention, among which direct network externalities have an indirect impact on users’ continued intention through attitude; and (4) the impacts of self-efficacy, response efficacy, and indirect network externalities on continued intention are partially meditated by attitudes.


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