scholarly journals The differential impact of friendship on cooperative and competitive coordination

2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-452
Author(s):  
Gabriele Chierchia ◽  
Fabio Tufano ◽  
Giorgio Coricelli
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Differential Impact ◽  
Safe Alternative ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Competitive Coordination ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Tacit Coordination ◽  
Entry Games

Abstract Friendship is commonly assumed to reduce strategic uncertainty and enhance tacit coordination. However, this assumption has never been tested across two opposite poles of coordination involving either strategic complementarity or substitutability. We had participants interact with friends or strangers in two classic coordination games: the stag-hunt game, which exhibits strategic complementarity and may foster “cooperation”, and the entry game, which exhibits strategic substitutability and may foster “competition”. Both games capture a frequent trade-off between a potentially high paying but uncertain option and a low paying but safe alternative. We find that, relative to strangers, friends are more likely to choose options involving uncertainty in stag-hunt games, but the opposite is true in entry games. Furthermore, in stag-hunt games, friends “tremble” less between options, coordinate better and earn more, but these advantages are largely decreased or lost in entry games. We further investigate how these effects are modulated by risk attitudes, friendship qualities, and interpersonal similarities.

scholarly journals Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Competitive Coordination

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

scholarly journals Using a Stochastic Agent Model to Optimize Performance in Divergent Interest Tacit Coordination Games

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (24) ◽  
pp. 7026
Author(s):  
Dor Mizrahi ◽  
Inon Zuckerman ◽  
Ilan Laufer
Keyword(s):  
Focal Point ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Mean Value ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Autonomous Agent ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Tacit Coordination ◽  
Better Than

In recent years collaborative robots have become major market drivers in industry 5.0, which aims to incorporate them alongside humans in a wide array of settings ranging from welding to rehabilitation. Improving human–machine collaboration entails using computational algorithms that will save processing as well as communication cost. In this study we have constructed an agent that can choose when to cooperate using an optimal strategy. The agent was designed to operate in the context of divergent interest tacit coordination games in which communication between the players is not possible and the payoff is not symmetric. The agent’s model was based on a behavioral model that can predict the probability of a player converging on prominent solutions with salient features (e.g., focal points) based on the player’s Social Value Orientation (SVO) and the specific game features. The SVO theory pertains to the preferences of decision makers when allocating joint resources between themselves and another player in the context of behavioral game theory. The agent selected stochastically between one of two possible policies, a greedy or a cooperative policy, based on the probability of a player to converge on a focal point. The distribution of the number of points obtained by the autonomous agent incorporating the SVO in the model was better than the results obtained by the human players who played against each other (i.e., the distribution associated with the agent had a higher mean value). Moreover, the distribution of points gained by the agent was better than any of the separate strategies the agent could choose from, namely, always choosing a greedy or a focal point solution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct an intelligent agent that maximizes its utility by incorporating the belief system of the player in the context of tacit bargaining. This reward-maximizing strategy selection process based on the SVO can also be potentially applied in other human–machine contexts, including multiagent systems.

scholarly journals Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 946-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Group Communication ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Competitive Coordination

scholarly journals Coordination and growth: the Stag Hunt game on evolutionary networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (05) ◽  
pp. P05008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Starnini ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Julia Poncela ◽  
Yamir Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Evolutionary Networks

scholarly journals Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toko Kiyonari
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Monetary Gain

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.

scholarly journals Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianna Belloc ◽  
Ennio Bilancini ◽  
Leonardo Boncinelli ◽  
Simone D’Alessandro
Keyword(s):  
Time Pressure ◽  
Time Constraints ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Pressure Treatment ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Social Conventions ◽  
Time Limits ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Stag Hunt Game

Abstract We present an incentivized laboratory experiment where a random sample of individuals playing a series of stag hunt games are forced to make their choices under time constraints, while the rest of the players have no time limits to decide. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag-hunters as opposed to 52.32% when no time limits are imposed. These results offer the first experimental evidence on the role of intuition and deliberation in strategic situations that entail social coordination. In interpreting our findings, we provide a discussion on ruling social conventions in daily-life interactions.

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