scholarly journals Detecting Defectors When They Have Incentives to Manipulate Their Impressions

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toko Kiyonari
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
The Other ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Monetary Gain

We examined if naive observers can distinguish defectors from cooperators even when defectors may be motivated to present themselves positively. In Study 1, 150 participants played a “semi-sequential” Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) with real monetary incentives, half as first players and half as second players. First players decided to cooperate or defect, and second players made the same decision without knowing the first player’s choice. The first player was given a chance to present a video message to the second player before the latter made their decision. After the PDG, players played a separate one-shot, semi-sequential Stag Hunt Game (SHG), a coordination game where cooperation is the best choice insofar as the other also cooperates. In this game, the first player was not given a chance to send a video message. When the players had incentives to hide intentions or manipulate impressions of themselves, even motivated judges (whose monetary gain depended on the accuracy of cheater/cooperator detection) could not distinguish defectors from cooperators in either the PDG or SHG. However, they were able to discriminate “hard-core defectors” who defected in both games. In Study 2, however, in which judges had no monetary incentives to detect targets’ choices, participants were unable to discern even hard-core defectors. The contents of the messages did not provide help discerning defectors.

scholarly journals Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Dario Madeo ◽  
Chiara Mocenni
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Balanced Development ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Partial Cooperation ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.

scholarly journals A single ‘weight-lifting’ game covers all kinds of games

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 191602
Author(s):  
Tatsuki Yamamoto ◽  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Momoka Nii ◽  
Takuya Okabe ◽  
Satoru Morita ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Weight Lifting ◽  
Unified Framework ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
Probability Of Success ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Animal Societies

Game theory has been studied extensively to answer why cooperation is promoted in human and animal societies. All games are classified into five games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, chicken game (including hawk–dove game), stag hunt game and two trivial games of either all cooperation or all defect, which are studied separately. Here, we propose a new game that covers all five game categories: the weight-lifting game. The player choose either to (1) carry a weight (cooperate: pay a cost) or (2) pretend to carry it (defect: pay no cost). The probability of success in carrying the weight depends on the number of cooperators, and the players either gain the success reward or pay the failure penalty. All five game categories appear in this game depending on the success probabilities for the number of cooperators. We prove that this game is exactly equivalent to the combination of all five games in terms of a pay-off matrix. This game thus provides a unified framework for studying all five types of games.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

scholarly journals Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Equity And Efficiency

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

scholarly journals Niṣkāmakarma: A Philosophical Analysis in Light of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Concept of Degrowth

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Tommi Lehtonen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Personal Benefit ◽  
The Common ◽  
Harmful Effects

The prisoner's dilemma famously shows that individuals seeking their own benefit end up with a worse outcome than could be achieved through cooperation. This dilemma provides an effective but neglected method for the study of the Hindu principle of "desireless action" (niṣkāmakarma). In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, one or the other of the following decision-making strategies is feasible for prisoners who want to follow the principle of "desireless action": (1) to be indifferent and to leave the decision to chance (e.g. by arbitrarily drawing lots) or (2) to pursue the common good or the benefit of the other (by remaining silent) instead of seeking primarily to benefit oneself (by confessing). The second strategy is more appropriate assuming the following: the followers of the principle of "desireless action" can be goal-oriented and target-driven, as long as unselfish goals are considered, while remaining indifferent and non-attached in terms of personal benefit. This interpretation is tested and further discussed in this article in light of the values of the modem environmental and anti-consumerist degrowth movement. A non-profit orientation and the emphasis on duties are shared by the concepts of degrowth and niṣkāmakarma. Social- or reality-centredness rather than self-centredness is also common to both concepts. The degrowth movement focuses on economic contraction and deceleration, and thus its scope is narrower and more specific than that of niṣkāmakarma. Moreover, the degrowth movement rejects economic grovrth because of its ecologically and socially harmful effects, such as pollution and income inequality, but it is - at least in theory - indifferent to the harmless results of economic activities. On the contrary, the principle of niṣkāmakarma involves a critical stance toward both good and bad results of actions, insofar as they are pursued because of self-regarding desires.

Attributed Power, Response Strategies and Non-Zero Sum Game Behavior

1972 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 821-822
Author(s):  
Knud S. Larsen
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Response Strategies ◽  
Competitive Game ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Males And Females ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Power Response

43 female Ss and 46 male Ss played three Prisoner's Dilemma games. The three games were 100% cooperative, 100% competitive, and 50% random cooperative. The other independent variable was attributed power. The results showed that neither type of game nor attributed power had an effect on game behavior. Small but significant correlations were, however, found between attributed power and type of game when analyzed separately for males and females. Men high on attributed power are more cooperative in an invariable cooperative game whereas high-scoring women are more competitive in an invariable competitive game.

PIGEONS' CHOICE BETWEEN SHARED AND UNSHARED FEEDING SITES IN GAME SITUATIONS.

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-453
Author(s):  
Shoko Kitano ◽  
Tetsuo Yamaguchi ◽  
Daisuke Saeki ◽  
Masato Ito
Keyword(s):  
Present Experiment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Feeding Site ◽  
Feeding Sites ◽  
Choice Strategy ◽  
Tit For Tat

Cooperative behavior in nonhuman animals has been studied within the framework of game theory, typically by using the prisoner’s dilemma game. Previous studies on cooperation by pigeons using this game have revealed that, under these conditions, the animals did not learn the tit-for-tat strategy played by their opponents. In many cases, animals fail to choose cooperation and in so doing do not maximize their gains. The present experiment examined pigeons’ cooperative choices in the prisoner’s dilemma game situation by using a different type of apparatus than that used in previous studies: Subjects moved to choose one of two feeding sites, one of which was shared by another, stooge, pigeon whose choices were controlled by a computer and the other of which was not shared by other pigeons. In this choice situation, the presence of the stooge pigeon increased the subjects’ choices of the shared feeding site significantly. Further, the pigeons learned the other player’s choice strategy (tit-for-tat and random), showing that choice proportions for the shared feeding site were significantly higher in the tit-for-tat condition than in the random condition. These results suggest that the presence of a conspecific at the feeding site is a reinforcer for choosing it and that the choice situation constituted by the apparatus used in the present experiment could promote learning of the opponent’s choice strategy.

The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 330-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Harrison Wagner
Keyword(s):  
International Cooperation ◽  
General Problem ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Global Level ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of anarchy at the global level rather than the aggressive intentions of governments. This article argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt are usually inadequate models of the problem they have been used to illuminate, and that a security dilemma as commonly defined need not have the implications that are ascribed to it. It also argues that developing more adequate models of the general problem of enforcing agreements in a condition of anarchy will help us to understand better why international cooperation is more easily achieved in some areas than in others.

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