scholarly journals Reflexivity Without Noticing: Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Walter Chatton, Brentano

Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Girard

AbstractAccording to Franz Brentano, every mental act includes a representation of itself. Hence, Brentano can be described as maintaining that: (T1) reflexivity, when it occurs, is included as a part in mental acts; and (T2) reflexivity always occurs. Brentano’s way of understanding the inclusion of reflexivity in mental acts (T1) entails double intentionality in mental acts. The aim of this paper is to show that the conjunction of (T1) and (T2) is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. To that end, the theories of two medieval thinkers, namely, Walter Chatton and Durand of Saint-Pourçain, are presented. The repeated conjunction of (T1) and (T2) paves the way for a more general distinction than that between subjectivist and objectivist theories of reflexivity, namely, one between automatic theories of reflexivity (where noticing is not required for reflexivity) and apperceptive theories of reflexivity (where noticing is required for reflexivity).

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1331-1362
Author(s):  
Alexander Maar

Father Frederick Copleston is best known for his carefully crafted works History of Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. Copleston’s most notable metaphysical thesis is his interpretation of the argument from contingency, which he sees as the superior choice for theists. He draws on Aquinas and distinguishes between causa fieri and causa esse to argue that God is a higher order (vertical) cause of contingent causal series (horizontal). Copleston presents God not as a temporal first cause, but an ontologically ultimate cause necessary to explain a contingent universe. His contribution changed the way we read Aquinas. Copleston’s willingness to debate his thesis with different philosophical perspectives is illustrated by his acceptance to discuss God’s existence with Bertrand Russell, in 1948. This BBC radio debate epitomises the dispute between theists and atheists from the 1940s onwards. I undertake to expound and comment Copleston’s contribution to metaphysics, present relevant parts of the debate and provide criticism.


SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-116
Author(s):  
Paolo Parrini

AbstractToday’s critical state of philosophy is examined by considering two of its aspects: the way in which philosophy presently is ever more typically practised (increasing professionalism and specialisation) and the new challenges it has to face to keep up with the changed scientific, and more generally cultural and social context. The essay outlines some prospects of progress in the light of those which still now can be considered the proper tasks of philosophical inquiry. Such tasks are singled out through an historical survey of the original characters of philosophy and an appraisal of its theoretical motivations. The importance of the history of philosophy and the necessity of achieving a virtuous relation among the various philosophical disciplines are stressed to contrast the dangers of excess specialisation and professionalism.


Philosophy ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 33 (126) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Morris Lazerowitz

Occasionally there has appeared in the history of philosophy a thinker who has become aware of the chaotic condition of philosophy and of the intellectual anarchy that exists in all of its branches, and has attempted to remedy the situation. Descartes cast about for a guiding principle, a compass which would show him the way through the treacherous terrain of philosophy. As is well known he devised the method of systematic doubt, by means of which he hoped to discover an axiom on which he could securely erect a system of basic and reassuring beliefs. Leibniz had before his mind the notion of an ideal language which would by calculation solve problems with certainty. With this he thought we “should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as in geometry and analysis.” Descartes' attempt was a failure; and nothing came of Leibniz's ideal, even with the development of modern symbolic logic. Russell's claim that “logic is the essence of philosophy” frightened many philosophers and gave new hope to others; but his claim was as empty as the proverbial political promise. With G. E. Moore we have a further attempt to introduce sobriety and certainty into philosophy and to make fruitful research possible in it. He has made prominent a method for obtaining results in philosophy; and he has also formulated a philosophical platform, i.e., set out a list of Common-sense propositions which he says are known to be true by everyone, philosopher as well as non-philosopher, and are not, therefore, open to debate. The method, which he used extensively and with great skill, is the method of analysing concepts.


2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER BROOKE

In the middle of the seventeenth century, scholarship on ancient Stoicism generally understood it to be a form of theism. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Stoicism was widely (though not universally) reckoned a variety of atheism, both by its critics and by those more favourably disposed to its claims. This article describes this transition, the catalyst for which was the controversy surrounding Spinoza's philosophy, and which was shaped above all by contemporary transformations in the historiography of philosophy. Particular attention is paid to the roles in this story played by Thomas Gataker, Ralph Cudworth, J. F. Buddeus, Jean Barbeyrac, and J. L. Mosheim, whose contributions collectively helped to shape the way in which Stoicism was presented in two of the leading reference works of the Enlightenment, J. J. Brucker's Critical History of Philosophy and the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert.


2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (68) ◽  
Author(s):  
W.J.T. Mitchell

W.J.T. Mitchell: "Den billedlige vending"AbstractW.J.T. Mitchell: “The Pictorial Turn”Taking as a point of departure Richard Rorty’s idea of the history of philosophy as a series of “turns”, Mitchell’s essay from 1992 argues that the so-called ‘linguistic turn’, predominant in the 20th century, has been superseded by a ‘pictorial turn’. The essay thus, in Mitchells own words, “looks at the way modern thought has reoriented itself around visual paradigms that seem to threathen and overwhelm any possibility of discursive mastery.” Analysing theories by e.g. Panofsky and Althusser, the essay “looks at pictures ‘in theory’ – and at theory in itself as a form ofpicturing”.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-146
Author(s):  
Stepan Ivanyk

This article ponders, for the first time, the question of whether Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1917) influenced the development of the school of Ukrainian philosophy. It employs Anna Brożek’s methodology to identify philosophers’ influence on one another (distinctions between direct and indirect influence, active and passive contact, etc.); concepts of institutional and ideological conditions of this influence are also considered. The article establishes, first, that many Ukrainian academics had institutional bonds with Brentano’s students, especially Kazimierz Twardowski at the University of Lviv. Second, it identifies an ideological bond between Brentano and his hypothetical Ukrainian “academic grandsons.” Particularly, a comparative analysis of works on the history of philosophy of Brentano and the Ukrainian Ilarion Svientsits'kyi (1876-1956) reveals that the latter took over Brentano’sa posteriori constructive method. These results allow to draw a conclusion about the existence of Ukrainian Brentanism, that not only brings new arguments into the discussion about the tradition of and prospects for the development of analytic (scientific) philosophy on Ukrainian ground, but also opens new aspects of the modernization of Ukrainian society in general (from the end of the nineteenth century to the present day).


2021 ◽  
pp. 44-54
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter evaluates the historical history of philosophy. Given the very strong philosophical assumptions underlying the early philosophical histories of philosophy, and given in particular the fact that they tended to be written from the point of view of some kind of idealism, it is not surprising that they should have met with some resistance, in particular outside philosophy. Thus, one finds Albert Schwegler criticizing Hegel’s method of treating the history of philosophy, rejecting any kind of philosophical history of philosophy as history. He insists that the systematical study of the history of philosophy is the task of a historian and has to be pursued in precisely the way one studies any other kind of history or history in general. Zeller therefore advocates a purely historical approach to the history of philosophy, a historian’s history of philosophy, and his own monumental work on the history of Greek philosophy is inspired by this conception, just as it, in turn, inspires a lot of work, at least on ancient philosophy of the same kind. The chapter then presents a systematical consideration of the historical history of philosophy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 76-84
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter addresses the internal history of philosophy. This is the history of philosophy explained in terms of the philosophical enterprise itself, as it is conceived and pursued at each time; that is, the history of philosophy explained in terms of the actual philosophical considerations that made philosophy evolve the way it did, to the extent that the history can be explained this way. It can be called ‘internal’ because it tries, as far as possible, to explain the course of development in terms of considerations internal to philosophy, as opposed to factors outside philosophy; for instance, social pressures of some kind or another. In contrast to the internal history of philosophy, one may call a history of philosophy ‘external’ if it describes and explains the history of philosophy insofar as it is shaped by social factors outside philosophy. This distinction is not supposed to be exhaustive of all work on the history of philosophy, though it could easily be redefined to be exhaustive by just subsuming everything that does not belong to the internal history (e.g. psychological or biological studies) under the heading of ‘external history’.


Author(s):  
Pedro Calafate ◽  

We analyze the criticism of Vasco de Magalhães-Vilhena to the idealist conception of the history of philosophy, exercised from his own conception of philosophy as a form of social consciousness and ideology, submitted to the processual dynamics of time and history. In this sense, it is important to underline the way in which the conception of history is rejected as a discipline that deals with the contingent and the accidental, in opposition to which the ideal of a perennial philosophy would rise and the consequent valorization of immutability, removing what is historical of the essence of the philosophical.


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