Water Resources Allocation in Transboundary River Basins Based on a Game Model Considering Inflow Forecasting Errors

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (8) ◽  
pp. 2809-2825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jisi Fu ◽  
Ping-an Zhong ◽  
Juan Chen ◽  
Bin Xu ◽  
Feilin Zhu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
River Basins ◽  
Resources Allocation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Water Resources Allocation ◽  
Transboundary River ◽  
Transboundary River Basins ◽  
Inflow Forecasting ◽  
Forecasting Errors

scholarly journals Water Resources Allocation in Transboundary River Based on Asymmetric Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower Game Model

Water ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jisi Fu ◽  
Ping-An Zhong ◽  
Feilin Zhu ◽  
Juan Chen ◽  
Ye-nan Wu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
Resources Allocation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Water Resources Allocation ◽  
Transboundary River

scholarly journals Water assessment in transboundary river basins: the case of the Medjerda River Basin

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrianirina Sedera Rajosoa ◽  
Chérifa Abdelbaki ◽  
Khaldoon A. Mourad
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Water Governance ◽  
River Basins ◽  
Mena Region ◽  
Transboundary River ◽  
Transboundary River Basins ◽  
Management Plans ◽  
Over Exploitation

AbstractWater resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) face over-exploitation and over-pollution due to population growth, climate change and the lack of advanced water governance approaches. These challenges become more serious in transboundary river basins and may lead to conflict between riparian countries. The main objective of this paper is to assess water resources and needs at the Medjerda River Basin (MRB), shared by Tunisia and Algeria using the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) system between 2020 and 2050. Four scenarios were built to assess the current and future status of the water supply and demands in both countries. The results show that water demands, and shortages are increasing, and some demand sites will face real water scarcity in the future due to climate change and development practices. Therefore, new allocation and management plans should be examined at the regional level based on real collaboration among all stakeholders.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for Evaluating Socio-Economic Impacts of Different Water Diversion Quantity from Transboundary River Basins—A Case Study of Xinjiang

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (23) ◽  
pp. 9091
Author(s):  
Zhiying Shao ◽  
Fengping Wu ◽  
Fang Li ◽  
Yue Zhao ◽  
Xia Xu
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
River Basins ◽  
Water Diversion ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Development Patterns ◽  
Transboundary River ◽  
Transboundary Water Resources ◽  
Transboundary River Basins ◽  
Socio Economic Development

With the rapid development of social economy and global climate warming, scarce transboundary water resources, as one of the basic resources for socio-economic development, have increasingly become the focus of basin countries. To investigate the socio-economic impacts of different water diversion quantity from transboundary river basins, we used a system dynamics (SD) model to reflect interactions between population, water resources, and socio-economic development, and applied it to a case study in Xinjiang to simulate its change tendency from 2011 to 2030 from the temporal dimension. Then, four water diversion quantity of transboundary river basins and four alternative socio-economic development patterns were designed to comprehensively evaluate these impacts of water diversion quantity change on the socio-economy of the region along the river under different socio-economic development patterns. The results indicate that (1) there was a positive correlation between water diversion quantity and the economic output value of the region along transboundary river basins, and the marginal benefit of transboundary water resources would decrease gradually; (2) considering the difficulty of water diversion from transboundary river basins and the protection of downstream water use and ecological health of transboundary river basins, we believe that increasing the transboundary water resources by 20% was more conducive to the sustainable development of Xinjiang’s socio-economy; (3) through the comparison of dynamic evolutions of socio-economic development and water impacts under four socio-economic development patterns, it is best for Xinjiang to plan its future development in the coordinated development of economic-resource scenario. Following this scenario, not only would the total output value of the socio-economy be better than other scenarios, but this also helps to alleviate the contradiction between the water supply and demand, which expected there would be a water shortage of 1.04 billion m3 in 2029 under 20% increase in water diversion quantity. Therefore, appropriate water diversion quantity, reasonable adjustment of industrial production growth rate, reduction of water consumption quotas of different industries and domestic water quota, and improvement of collection and treatment rate for sewage should be given priority in water resources management decision-making in Xinjiang or other arid regions along transboundary river basins.

scholarly journals Evolutionary cooperation in transboundary river basins

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Yu ◽  
Pngzhong Tang ◽  
Jianshi Zhao ◽  
Bo Liu ◽  
Dennis Mclaughlin
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Research Effort ◽  
River Basins ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Transboundary Cooperation ◽  
Transboundary River ◽  
Transboundary River Basins ◽  
Wide Range

<p>Cooperation in transboundary river basins can make water resources systems more efficient and benefit riparian stakeholders. However, in a basin with upstream and downstream stakeholders that have different interests, non-cooperative outcomes have often been observed. These can be described by a one shot prisoners’ dilemma game where non-cooperation (defection) is a dominant equilibrium strategy. However, cooperative outcomes have also been observed in several transboundary settings, such as the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB) in Asia. Such cooperation motivates our research effort to refine relevant game theoretic descriptions to account for the evolution of players’ behaviors, from conflict to cooperation. In this study, a repeated game model is proposed to analyze evolutionary transboundary cooperation. A generalized evolutionary cooperation pattern with four stages is summarized, starting with non-cooperation and ending with in-depth cooperation. The LMRB and three other typical transboundary river management case studies are chosen to validate our theoretical findings. Upstream and downstream stakeholder behaviors are analyzed for these case studies, in accordance with a game payoff matrix that accounts for incentives to cooperate. The results indicate that patience and incremental benefits can lead stakeholders to adopt a cooperative equilibrium strategy if appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place. Such mechanisms can be developed through negotiations that recognize the wide range of stakeholder interests that may influence the decision to cooperate. Our analysis suggests that game theory can provide useful insights into the conditions and institutional mechanisms that foster cooperative strategies for managing transboundary water resources.</p>

scholarly journals Comparison of Transboundary Water Resources Allocation Models Based on Game Theory and Multi-Objective Optimization

Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 1421
Author(s):  
Jisi Fu ◽  
Ping-An Zhong ◽  
Bin Xu ◽  
Feilin Zhu ◽  
Juan Chen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
Pareto Front ◽  
Resources Allocation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Water Resources Allocation ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Transboundary Water ◽  
Nsga Ii ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Transboundary Water Resources

Transboundary water resources allocation is an effective measure to resolve water-related conflicts. Aiming at the problem of water conflicts, we constructed water resources allocation models based on game theory and multi-objective optimization, and revealed the differences between the two models. We compare the Pareto front solved by the AR-MOEA method and the NSGA-II method, and analyzed the difference between the Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower game model and the multi-objective optimization model. The Huaihe River basin was selected as a case study. The results show that: (1) The AR-MOEA method is better than the NSGA-II method in terms of the diversity metric (Δ); (2) the solution of the asymmetric Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower game model is a non-dominated solution, and the asymmetric game model can obtain the same water resources allocation scheme of the multi-objective optimal allocation model under a specific preference structure; (3) after the multi-objective optimization model obtains the Pareto front, it still needs to construct the preference information of the Pareto front for a second time to make the optimal solution of a multi-objective decision, while the game model can directly obtain the water resources allocation scheme at one time by participating in the negotiation. The results expand the solution method of water resources allocation models and provide support for rational water resources allocation.

A Game Model of River Eco-hydrological Evolution under Big Data Water Resources Allocation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing Hai ◽  
Hongwei Jia ◽  
Changshou Wang ◽  
Tonglega Tonglega ◽  
Lili
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
Resources Allocation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Water Resources Allocation
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