Water-food-energy nexus for transboundary cooperation in Eastern Africa

Establishing cooperation in transboundary rivers is challenging especially with the weak or non-existent river basin institutions. A nexus-based approach is developed to explore cooperation opportunities in transboundary river basins while considering system operation and coordination under uncertain hydrologic river regimes. The proposed approach is applied to the Nile river basin with a special focus on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), assuming two possible governance positions: with or without cooperation. A cooperation mechanism is developed to allocate additional releases from the GERD when necessary, while a unilateral position assumes that the GERD is operated to maximize hydropower generation regardless of downstream users' needs. The GERD operation modes were analysed considering operation of downstream reservoirs and varying demands in Egypt. Results show that average basin-wide hydropower generation is likely to increase by about 547 GWh/year (1%) if cooperation is adopted when compared to the unilateral position. In Sudan, hydropower generation and water supply are expected to enhance in the unilateral position and would improve further with cooperation. Furthermore, elevated low flows by the GERD are likely to improve the WFE nexus outcomes in Egypt under full cooperation governance scenario with a small reduction in GERD hydropower generation (2,000 GWh/year (19%)).

Theory of Institutional Peace and Peacebuilding in Transboundary River Basins

ABSTRACT Social developments have led to prompt the significance of concentrating on peace and the factors influencing it throughout history. In order to analyze this concept, various theories have been proposed in the field of international relations and peace and conflict studies. Institutional peace theory is one of the prominent theories that emphasizes the role of international institutions to achieve meaningful change and cooperation among governments at the international level. Most researchers in the field of environmental challenges in general and water challenges in particular have also based liberal institutionalism in their research at the international level. Attention to the role of institutions in dealing with water conflicts and peacebuilding in transboundary river basins has led to the need to analyze the theory of institutional peace in the management of water conflicts. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to analyze the capacity of institutional peace theory in dealing with water conflicts in transboundary river basins. With this goal in view, while using library resources, the effectiveness of institutional peace theory in the management of water conflicts is analyzed. Based on the analyses, it can be acknowledged that despite the positive effect of water institutions in relieving water conflicts in some river basins, there are significant criticisms of this theory. KEYWORDS: Water Conflicts, Institutional Peace, Transboundary river basins, Institutionalism

Game Theory and Dealing with Water Conflict

In the last century, water conflicts have increased in many parts of the world for reasons such as a strong desire for rapid development and poor governance. The impact of these conflicts on various sectors of society such as economic, political and legal subsystems has led researchers to focus on providing solutions and practical methods to deal with water conflicts. Game theory is one of the most common methods used by researchers to manage water conflicts and water allocation in shared and transboundary river basins. Despite the special place of game theory in reductionist sciences, the application of this theory to dealing with conflicts in complex water systems faces challenges. Whereas, the critique of the effectiveness of the game theory method in water conflict management has been neglected. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate and analyze the capacity to apply the game theory to deal with water conflicts. In order to achieve this purpose, while using library resources, the basics of game theory and the capacity to apply it in the management of water conflicts are analyzed. The results reveal that following the theory of rational choice and rationalism in the game theory method has led to ignore many dimensions and factors affecting the water conflict formation and the way to deal with complex water conflicts. Keywords: Water Conflicts, Game Theory, Peacebuilding, Shared and Transboundary River Basins

A socio-hydrologic framework for understanding conflict and cooperation in transboundary rivers

Increasing hydrologic variability, accelerating population growth, and resurgence of water resources development projects have all indicated increasing tensions among the riparian countries of transboundary rivers. This article aims to review the existing knowledge on conflict and cooperation in transboundary rivers from a multidisciplinary perspective and propose a socio-hydrological framework that integrates the slow and less visible societal processes with existing hydrological-economic models, revealing the hidden feedbacks between changes in societal processes and hydrological changes. This framework contributes to understanding the mechanism that drives conflict and cooperation in transboundary river management.

Review of hydro-economic models (HEMs) which focus on transboundary river water sharing disputes

Hydro-economic models (HEMs) are powerful tools to analyze water scarcity, drought, and water management problems. Though several HEMs reviews have been conducted in the recent past, none of them focused on the management of transboundary river water disputes, benefit sharing, or trade-offs. Therefore, this review explored how HEMs can suggest mitigating water sharing disputes on transboundary rivers. Though more than 300 HEMs have been developed worldwide, very few focused on transboundary river water disputes. After vigorous screening at Google Scholar, only 25 articles were found which focused on transboundary river water disputes. Most HEMs that were reviewed proposed to share benefits such as sharing hydropower produced from the river, reallocating water from low-value agriculture to high-value agriculture or managed operation of the dam, or other monetary compensation. But no study assessed non-water sector benefit sharing such as trade or transit. Most HEMs focused on irrigation and hydropower which are benefits from the river and very few studies focused on fisheries, environment, and wetland which are benefits to the river. International rivers can act as a catalyst among the riparian countries and promote cooperation in trade, commerce, exchange of technologies, and other fields. HEMs can play an important role in this regard. It is to be mentioned that HEMs cannot resolve water conflicts in a shared basin, they only can propose for the options of solution.