Water-food-energy nexus for transboundary cooperation in Eastern Africa

Establishing cooperation in transboundary rivers is challenging especially with the weak or non-existent river basin institutions. A nexus-based approach is developed to explore cooperation opportunities in transboundary river basins while considering system operation and coordination under uncertain hydrologic river regimes. The proposed approach is applied to the Nile river basin with a special focus on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), assuming two possible governance positions: with or without cooperation. A cooperation mechanism is developed to allocate additional releases from the GERD when necessary, while a unilateral position assumes that the GERD is operated to maximize hydropower generation regardless of downstream users' needs. The GERD operation modes were analysed considering operation of downstream reservoirs and varying demands in Egypt. Results show that average basin-wide hydropower generation is likely to increase by about 547 GWh/year (1%) if cooperation is adopted when compared to the unilateral position. In Sudan, hydropower generation and water supply are expected to enhance in the unilateral position and would improve further with cooperation. Furthermore, elevated low flows by the GERD are likely to improve the WFE nexus outcomes in Egypt under full cooperation governance scenario with a small reduction in GERD hydropower generation (2,000 GWh/year (19%)).

Theory of Institutional Peace and Peacebuilding in Transboundary River Basins

ABSTRACT Social developments have led to prompt the significance of concentrating on peace and the factors influencing it throughout history. In order to analyze this concept, various theories have been proposed in the field of international relations and peace and conflict studies. Institutional peace theory is one of the prominent theories that emphasizes the role of international institutions to achieve meaningful change and cooperation among governments at the international level. Most researchers in the field of environmental challenges in general and water challenges in particular have also based liberal institutionalism in their research at the international level. Attention to the role of institutions in dealing with water conflicts and peacebuilding in transboundary river basins has led to the need to analyze the theory of institutional peace in the management of water conflicts. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to analyze the capacity of institutional peace theory in dealing with water conflicts in transboundary river basins. With this goal in view, while using library resources, the effectiveness of institutional peace theory in the management of water conflicts is analyzed. Based on the analyses, it can be acknowledged that despite the positive effect of water institutions in relieving water conflicts in some river basins, there are significant criticisms of this theory. KEYWORDS: Water Conflicts, Institutional Peace, Transboundary river basins, Institutionalism

Game Theory and Dealing with Water Conflict

In the last century, water conflicts have increased in many parts of the world for reasons such as a strong desire for rapid development and poor governance. The impact of these conflicts on various sectors of society such as economic, political and legal subsystems has led researchers to focus on providing solutions and practical methods to deal with water conflicts. Game theory is one of the most common methods used by researchers to manage water conflicts and water allocation in shared and transboundary river basins. Despite the special place of game theory in reductionist sciences, the application of this theory to dealing with conflicts in complex water systems faces challenges. Whereas, the critique of the effectiveness of the game theory method in water conflict management has been neglected. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate and analyze the capacity to apply the game theory to deal with water conflicts. In order to achieve this purpose, while using library resources, the basics of game theory and the capacity to apply it in the management of water conflicts are analyzed. The results reveal that following the theory of rational choice and rationalism in the game theory method has led to ignore many dimensions and factors affecting the water conflict formation and the way to deal with complex water conflicts. Keywords: Water Conflicts, Game Theory, Peacebuilding, Shared and Transboundary River Basins

Water assessment in transboundary river basins: the case of the Medjerda River Basin

Water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) face over-exploitation and over-pollution due to population growth, climate change and the lack of advanced water governance approaches. These challenges become more serious in transboundary river basins and may lead to conflict between riparian countries. The main objective of this paper is to assess water resources and needs at the Medjerda River Basin (MRB), shared by Tunisia and Algeria using the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) system between 2020 and 2050. Four scenarios were built to assess the current and future status of the water supply and demands in both countries. The results show that water demands, and shortages are increasing, and some demand sites will face real water scarcity in the future due to climate change and development practices. Therefore, new allocation and management plans should be examined at the regional level based on real collaboration among all stakeholders.

Analysis of long-term strategies of riparian countries in transboundary river basins

Transboundary river basins give rise to complex water-sharing decision making that can be analyzed as a game in the sense of dynamic game theory, as done in this work. The sharing of transboundary water resources depends on the long-term shifting interactions between upstream and downstream countries, which has received limited research attention in the past. The water-sharing strategy of a riparian country depends on the strategies of other countries over time. This paper presents an evolutionary game method to analyze the long-term water-sharing strategies of countries encompassing transboundary river basins over time. The method analyzes the evolutionary strategies of riparian countries and investigates evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) considering the payoff matrix. The evolutionary game method is applied to a river basin shared by three countries assuming two types of benefits and one type of cost to countries as decision variables of a game that reflects water use, economic and political gains, and socio-economic losses of countries. Numerical examples illustrate the strategies resulting from the evolutionary game processes and the role of several parameters on the interaction between riparian countries. The countries’ strategies are analyzed for several levels of benefits and costs, and the convergence of the strategies to a stable point is assessed. Results demonstrate the role that the upstream country’s potential benefits and the cost of conflict (i.e., non-cooperation) to other countries has on reaching a stable point in the game. This work’s results show the potential benefit to the upstream country under cooperative strategy must exceed its benefits from water use under non-cooperative strategy to gain the full stable cooperation of downstream countries. This work provides a method to resolve water-sharing strategies by countries sharing transboundary river basins and to evaluate the implications of cooperation or non-cooperation.

Water resources management and dynamic changes in water politics in the transboundary river basins of Central Asia

The growing water crisis in Central Asia (CA) and the complex water politics over the region's transboundary rivers have attracted considerable attention; however, they are yet to be studied in depth. Here, we used the Gini coefficient, water political events, and social network analysis to assess the matching degree between water and socio-economic elements and analyze the dynamics of water politics in the transboundary river basins of CA. Results indicate that the mismatch between water and land resources is a precondition for conflict, with the average Gini coefficient between water and population, gross domestic product (GDP), and cropland measuring 0.19 (highly matched), 0.47 (relatively mismatched), and 0.61 (highly mismatched), respectively. Moreover, the Gini coefficient between water and cropland increased by 0.07 from 1997 to 2016, indicating an increasing mismatch. In general, a total of 591 water political events occurred in CA, with cooperation accounting for 89 % of all events. Water events have increased slightly over the past 70 years and shown three distinct stages, namely a stable period (1951–1991), a rapid increase and decline period (1991–2001), and a second stable period (2001–2018). Overall, water conflicts mainly occurred in summer and winter. Among the region's transboundary river basins, the Aral Sea basin experienced the strongest conflicts due to the competitive utilization of the Syr and Amu Darya rivers. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the density of water conflictive and cooperative networks in CA increased by 0.18 and 0.36, respectively. Uzbekistan has the highest degree centrality in the conflictive network (6), while Kazakhstan has the highest degree centrality in the cooperative network (15), indicating that these two countries are the most interconnected with other countries. Our findings suggest that improving the water and land allocation systems and strengthening the water cooperative networks among countries will contribute to the elimination of conflicts and promotion of cooperation in CA.