scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for Evaluating Socio-Economic Impacts of Different Water Diversion Quantity from Transboundary River Basins—A Case Study of Xinjiang

Author(s):  
Zhiying Shao ◽  
Fengping Wu ◽  
Fang Li ◽  
Yue Zhao ◽  
Xia Xu

With the rapid development of social economy and global climate warming, scarce transboundary water resources, as one of the basic resources for socio-economic development, have increasingly become the focus of basin countries. To investigate the socio-economic impacts of different water diversion quantity from transboundary river basins, we used a system dynamics (SD) model to reflect interactions between population, water resources, and socio-economic development, and applied it to a case study in Xinjiang to simulate its change tendency from 2011 to 2030 from the temporal dimension. Then, four water diversion quantity of transboundary river basins and four alternative socio-economic development patterns were designed to comprehensively evaluate these impacts of water diversion quantity change on the socio-economy of the region along the river under different socio-economic development patterns. The results indicate that (1) there was a positive correlation between water diversion quantity and the economic output value of the region along transboundary river basins, and the marginal benefit of transboundary water resources would decrease gradually; (2) considering the difficulty of water diversion from transboundary river basins and the protection of downstream water use and ecological health of transboundary river basins, we believe that increasing the transboundary water resources by 20% was more conducive to the sustainable development of Xinjiang’s socio-economy; (3) through the comparison of dynamic evolutions of socio-economic development and water impacts under four socio-economic development patterns, it is best for Xinjiang to plan its future development in the coordinated development of economic-resource scenario. Following this scenario, not only would the total output value of the socio-economy be better than other scenarios, but this also helps to alleviate the contradiction between the water supply and demand, which expected there would be a water shortage of 1.04 billion m3 in 2029 under 20% increase in water diversion quantity. Therefore, appropriate water diversion quantity, reasonable adjustment of industrial production growth rate, reduction of water consumption quotas of different industries and domestic water quota, and improvement of collection and treatment rate for sewage should be given priority in water resources management decision-making in Xinjiang or other arid regions along transboundary river basins.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chloé Meyer

This map presents 286 transboundary river basins (2016) and 592 transboundary aquifers (2015). 154 countries share river basins or aquifers with one or more of their neighbours. Some of this countries (30) lie entirely within one or more transboundary basins, making this shared resource a essential one. The extent of those transboundary resources highlights the importance for countries to cooperate with each other for the sound management of shared waters. Basin Groundwater Transboundary


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250002 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIM HANG PHAM DO ◽  
ARIEL DINAR ◽  
DAENE MCKINNEY

Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conflicts. This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes whether issue linkages can be used as a form of negotiations on sharing benefits and mitigating conflicts. It is shown that whenever opportunities for linkages exist, countries may indeed contribute towards cooperation. In particular, if the linked games are convex, the grand coalition is the only optimal level of social welfare.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrianirina Sedera Rajosoa ◽  
Chérifa Abdelbaki ◽  
Khaldoon A. Mourad

AbstractWater resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) face over-exploitation and over-pollution due to population growth, climate change and the lack of advanced water governance approaches. These challenges become more serious in transboundary river basins and may lead to conflict between riparian countries. The main objective of this paper is to assess water resources and needs at the Medjerda River Basin (MRB), shared by Tunisia and Algeria using the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) system between 2020 and 2050. Four scenarios were built to assess the current and future status of the water supply and demands in both countries. The results show that water demands, and shortages are increasing, and some demand sites will face real water scarcity in the future due to climate change and development practices. Therefore, new allocation and management plans should be examined at the regional level based on real collaboration among all stakeholders.


Water Policy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (S2) ◽  
pp. 13-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Elisa Cascão

The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (described by Zeitoun & Warner, in Water Policy8, pp 435–460, 2006) challenges mainstream analyses of hydro-political relations in transboundary river basins and highlights the role of power. The approach asserts that asymmetric power relations represent the cornerstone of the analysis of hydro-political relations. Varying hegemonic configurations and the unequal control of water resources among riparian states are characteristic of these relations. The hegemonic riparian in a given international transboundary water setting deploys several strategies to attain and maintain control, sometimes unilaterally, over the shared water resources. But is the control always as deep and entrenched as it sometimes seems to be? The starting point of this paper is that hydro-hegemony is not incontestable. An established hegemonic order may often be challenged and resisted through a variety of counter-hegemonic strategies. Through examination of Ethiopian contest and consent of Egyptian hydro-hegemony, this study attempts to provide insights into the condition of counter hydro-hegemony and to provide a framework for further analysis in the field of transboundary water relations. The approach explores the options available for non-hegemonic riparians to challenge a particular hydro-hegemony and finds that these come from unexpected or unacknowledged sources. An assessment of these strategies shows how non-hegemonic riparians might challenge unequal hydro-political configurations and eventually contribute towards a more sustainable and equitable water and benefit-sharing regime.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Yu ◽  
Pngzhong Tang ◽  
Jianshi Zhao ◽  
Bo Liu ◽  
Dennis Mclaughlin

<p>Cooperation in transboundary river basins can make water resources systems more efficient and benefit riparian stakeholders. However, in a basin with upstream and downstream stakeholders that have different interests, non-cooperative outcomes have often been observed. These can be described by a one shot prisoners’ dilemma game where non-cooperation (defection) is a dominant equilibrium strategy. However, cooperative outcomes have also been observed in several transboundary settings, such as the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB) in Asia. Such cooperation motivates our research effort to refine relevant game theoretic descriptions to account for the evolution of players’ behaviors, from conflict to cooperation. In this study, a repeated game model is proposed to analyze evolutionary transboundary cooperation. A generalized evolutionary cooperation pattern with four stages is summarized, starting with non-cooperation and ending with in-depth cooperation. The LMRB and three other typical transboundary river management case studies are chosen to validate our theoretical findings. Upstream and downstream stakeholder behaviors are analyzed for these case studies, in accordance with a game payoff matrix that accounts for incentives to cooperate. The results indicate that patience and incremental benefits can lead stakeholders to adopt a cooperative equilibrium strategy if appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place. Such mechanisms can be developed through negotiations that recognize the wide range of stakeholder interests that may influence the decision to cooperate. Our analysis suggests that game theory can provide useful insights into the conditions and institutional mechanisms that foster cooperative strategies for managing transboundary water resources.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose M. Gonzalez ◽  
Evgenii S. Matrosov ◽  
Emmanuel Obuobie ◽  
Marloes Mul ◽  
Laetitia Pettinotti ◽  
...  

New dams impact downstream ecosystems and water infrastructure; without cooperative and adaptive management, negative impacts can manifest. In large complex transboundary river basins without well codified operating rules and extensive historical data, it can be difficult to assess the benefits of cooperating, in particular in relation to new dams. This constitutes a barrier to harmonious development of river basins and could contribute to water conflict. This study proposes a generalised framework to assess the benefits of cooperation on the management of new dams in water resource systems that do not have formal sharing arrangements. Benefits are estimated via multi-criteria comparison of historical reservoir operations (usually relatively uncooperative) vs. adopting new cooperative rules which would achieve the best results for riparian countries as evaluated by a water resources simulator and its performance metrics. The approach is applied to the Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam (PMD), which is being built in Ghana in the Volta river basin. The PMD could impact downstream ecosystems and infrastructure in Ghana and could itself be impacted by how the existing upstream Bagre Dam is managed in Burkina Faso. Results show that with cooperation Ghana and Burkina Faso could both increase energy production although some ecosystem services loss would need to be mitigated. The study confirms that cooperative rules achieve higher overall benefits compared to seeking benefits only for individual dams or countries.


Author(s):  
Phimthong Kouangpalath ◽  
Karen Meijer

AbstractThe construction of hydropower plants on transboundary rivers is seldom done with equal benefits to all riparians, and therefore presents coordination and cooperation challenges. Without a supra-national authority in charge of transboundary river basins, coordination between sectors (water, energy and environment) and cooperation between countries largely depends on willingness of the individual nation states and the power relations between these countries. This paper discusses how the interests and relative power positions of actors in transboundary water management shape the outcomes, and what roles are played by River Basin Organisations and foreign investors (especially in hydropower development). These issues are illustrated with examples from the Mekong river in Southeast Asia (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), the Euphrates-Tigris (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait) and the Çoruh in Turkey and Georgia.


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