Life cycle environmental impacts of decommissioning Magnox nuclear power plants in the UK

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 990-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Wallbridge ◽  
Anthony Banford ◽  
Adisa Azapagic
Author(s):  
Steve Yang ◽  
Jun Ding ◽  
Huifang Miao ◽  
Jianxiang Zheng

All 1000 MW nuclear power plants currently in construction or projected to-be-built in China will use the digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Safety and reliability are the ultimate concern for the digital I&C systems. To obtain high confidence in the safety of digital I&C systems, rigorous software verification and validation (V&V) life-cycle methodologies are necessary. The V&V life-cycle process ensures that the requirements of the system and software are correct, complete, and traceable; that the requirements at the end of each life-cycle phase fulfill the requirements imposed by the previous phase; and the final product meets the user-specified requirements. The V&V process is best illustrated via the so-called V-model. This paper describes the V-model in detail by some examples. Through the examples demonstration, it is shown that the process detailed in the V-model is consistent with the IEEE Std 1012-1998, which is endorsed by the US Regulatory Guide 1.168-2004. The examples show that the V-model process detailed in this paper provides an effective V&V approach for digital I&C systems used in nuclear power plants. Additionally, in order to obtain a qualitative mathematical description of the V-model, we study its topological structure in graph theory. This study confirms the rationality of the V-model. Finally, the V&V approach affording protection against common-cause failure from design deficiencies, and manufacturing errors is explored. We conclude that rigorous V&V activities using the V-model are creditable in reducing the risk of common-cause failures.


2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-261
Author(s):  
Steve Thomas

In 1990, the privatisation of the British electricity supply industry revealed how uneconomic Britain's nuclear power plants were. The nuclear sector was withdrawn from privatisation and it seemed likely that by 2000, most of Britain's nuclear power plants would be closed. However, operating costs were dramatically reduced and in 1996, most of the nuclear plants were privatised in British Energy. Nuclear output made an important contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the future looked secure for the existing plants. However, the early success of British Energy was based on an inflated wholesale electricity price and by 2000, British Energy was struggling to cover its costs. The British government is now conducting a review of energy policy. The economic case for new nuclear power plants is poor but the need to meet greenhouse gas emission targets and the influence British Energy and BNFL may ensure the long-term future of the existing plants.


Author(s):  
H. Reece-Barkell ◽  
W. J. J. Vorster

Effective outage planning and implementation is critical to the efficient and safe operation of commercial nuclear power plants in the UK. Statutory outages are necessary for refuelling, for preventive and corrective maintenance when shutdown conditions are required, and for major modification and improvement projects. Outages involve the support of many companies and individuals working together and, as such, require high levels of coordination. Planning of activities before the outage is critical to the overall success of the outage. Establishing the integrity of power plant piping and pressure vessels is a key objective as part of any outage and the methodology and processes involved are the subject of this paper. Establishing the integrity of piping and pressure vessels requires an understanding of the specific threats, their relationship to the overall condition of the system, and the mitigating measures required to assure safe operation. Understanding the specific threats allows the engineering function of an organisation to advise on pipework and pressure vessel ‘Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses’ which can be used to assure integrity via comparison with thicknesses measured during outage inspections. Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses should be recorded in the outage management documentation so they are accessible during the outage implementation phase. Historically a variety of different methodologies have been used to advise on Minimum Acceptable Thickness requirements including design drawing specified minimum thicknesses, design code based required thicknesses and thicknesses calculated based on Fitness for Purpose methods. It is important that a robust procedure be applied to promote consistency of approach as regards the calculation of pipework and pressure vessel Minimum Acceptable Thickness requirements across all power station assets. An additional consideration is that of ensuring that the approach adopted is consistent with high level safety case guidance, i.e., the assessment is appropriate for the failure tolerability of the plant item. This paper provides an overview of the strategy, methodologies and processes employed to determine Minimum Acceptable Thicknesses for pipework components. These ensure that, over a specified inspection interval, were the weld/component to be defect free, it would not fail due to any of the relevant failure mechanisms, which typically are plastic collapse, creep rupture, fatigue, incremental collapse (ratcheting) or buckling. Readers of this paper will gain a valuable insight into the statutory outage process applicable to nuclear power plants in the UK. A particular focus of this paper is on the structural integrity assessments applied in a non-traditional sense prior to, during and after the statutory outage. As well as sharing a valuable insight into the assessment methodologies this paper highlights best industrial practice.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document