scholarly journals Dirty Hands and Moral Conflict – Lessons from the Philosophy of Evil

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Nick
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Difference ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Moral Conflicts ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Qualitative Distinction ◽  
Do So

Abstract According to one understanding of the problem of dirty hands, every case of dirty hands is an instance of moral conflict, but not every instance of moral conflict is a case of dirty hands. So, what sets the two apart? The dirty hands literature has offered widely different answers to this question but there has been relatively little discussion about their relative merits as well as challenges. In this paper I evaluate these different accounts by making clear which understanding of concept distinctness underlies them and which of them is, ultimately, the most plausible one in the case of dirty hands and ordinary moral conflict. In order to do so, I will borrow from the terminology employed in recent debates in the philosophy of evil which have tackled a similar problem to the one at hand, i.e. defining what sets evil apart from ordinary wrongdoing. Here it has been argued that concepts could be distinct in three ways: they can have a quantitative difference, a strong qualitative or a moderate qualitative difference. I conclude that the most convincing definition of dirty hands draws a moderate qualitative distinction between ordinary moral conflict according to which dirty hands are those moral conflicts that involve a serious violation or betrayal of a core moral value.

Caretaker or liberator?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allyn Fives
Keyword(s):  
Clear Distinction ◽  
Moral Conflicts ◽  
General Account ◽  
Role Of Parents ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Do So

Are parents caretakers or liberators? Is the role of parents to act in a paternalistic fashion so as to take care of their children or is it instead to set their children free? In this chapter, I argue that those who defend the caretaker thesis do so on the basis of assumptions characteristic of the liberal view on paternalism. It is assumed that paternalism entails interfering with another’s liberty, that it does not involve moral conflicts, and that it is justified treatment of those who lack the qualities of an agent. In addition, no clear distinction is made between children who lack the qualities of an agent and children who are merely incompetent. What is more, the same assumptions underlie the liberation thesis. Indeed, both the caretaker thesis and the liberation thesis are questionable because they operate with a definition of paternalism that is highly problematic. I also want to make one further argument here. Namely, even an adequate conceptualisation of paternalism is insufficient as a general account of parental power, as there are non-paternalistic forms of parental power as well.

Spinoza and the Divine Attributes

1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Abstract Nouns ◽  
Individual Entity ◽  
Active Individual ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Take All ◽  
Do So

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account (I, prop. 10); being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods?That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute.

Evolutionary continuity and the rate and curve of language evolution

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-226
Author(s):  
Gábor Győri
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Changes ◽  
Language Evolution ◽  
Quantitative Difference ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Constant Rate ◽  
The One ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Continuity

One of the most prominent questions in connection with language evolution is whether the human capacity for language can be related to any capacities found in animals. Evolutionary continuity in anatomical structures involved in language is obvious, but in the case of cognitive capacities and behavior it is rather controversial. A correlation has often been implied between quantitative difference and evolutionary continuity on the one hand and qualitative difference and evolutionary discontinuity on the other. Recently these two positions have even incorporated claims of gradualistic and punctuated evolution of language respectively. These suggested correlations can hardly be true because the question of the rate and curve of language evolution is only indirectly connected to the continuity-discontinuity debate. It is highly unlikely that there could be true discontinuity in language evolution due to the lack of any antecedent trait. Rather, seeming missing links can also occur in the case of continuous traits when there is enhanced selection pressure due to rapid or even sudden environmental changes and hence rapid evolutionary change takes place. This is more logical even from an adaptationist point of view than a constant rate evolution. Thus, while elements of the primate communication system, cognitive capacity and social behavior must have served as evolutionary forerunners of language in the form of preadaptations, the rate and curve of language evolution must have depended on the selection pressures driving it.

Spinoza and the Divine Attributes

1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Abstract Nouns ◽  
Individual Entity ◽  
Active Individual ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Take All ◽  
Do So

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account (I, prop. 10); being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods?That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute.

Moral dilemmas

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allyn Fives
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Conflicts ◽  
Do So

The argument of this chapter is that we can be faced with genuine, real moral dilemmas, that is, moral conflicts for which there is no general rule for their resolution and conflicts that leave us with moral regret at the item not acted upon. For example, there is a moral conflict involved in every act of parental paternalism. When I, as a parent, act paternalistically, in attempting to do what is best for my child I violate a moral rule in regard to my child. In making this argument, I reject Philippa Foot’s counter arguments claiming to show the moral dilemmas are a logical contradiction. If we cannot identify a general rule for their resolution, how can we resolve moral conflicts? In this chapter I try to show that we can do so through practical reasoning and practical judgement. In doing so, I will borrow from John Rawls and his account of reasonableness and Thomas Nagel’s account of public justification in a context of actual disagreement. However, we must be cognisant of a number of possible dangers here. In particular, we must ensure that we do not impose a ‘liberal’ political solution on moral conflicts and in that way ourselves become guilty of the moral simplification we have been critical of in others.

scholarly journals Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research

1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Collier ◽  
Steven Levitsky
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Recent Trend ◽  
Complex Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Conceptual Innovation ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Do So

The recent trend toward democratization in countries across the globe has challenged scholars to pursue two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, they seek to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, they are concerned with conceptual validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate. This article argues that the pursuit of these two goals has led to a proliferation of conceptual innovations, including numerous subtypes of democracy—that is to say, democracy “with adjectives.” The article explores the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged: descending and climbing Sartori's ladder of generality, generating “diminished” subtypes of democracy, “precising” the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated. The goal of the analysis is to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies, as well as to explore trade-offs among the strategies. Even when scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure. Yet it is far more desirable for them to do so selfconsciously, with a full awareness of these trade-offs.

scholarly journals The Staging of Examinations: A Student Response to the Institutional Perspective

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-81
Author(s):  
Daniel Albas ◽  
Cheryl Albas
Keyword(s):  
Student Response ◽  
The Other ◽  
Institutional Perspective ◽  
Societal Values ◽  
Definition Of The Situation ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The University ◽  
Do So

When universities administer examinations, they do so dramaturgically. That is, they use spaces, props, equipment, and bodies to convey specific messages (that examinations are important, serious, formal affairs which reflect the larger societal values of universalism and individualism) to students. Drama and dramaturgy require both actors and an audience; the interaction consists of the effect that the one has on the other, that the other has on the one and both of these. The focus of this paper is on the interaction between the message and students' response to it, that is, the students' definition of the situation. In particular, emphasis is upon the notion that the dramaturgical messages given by the university will be interpreted largely as they were intended to be, that in some cases the effect of the message is dysfunctional, either because it is misinterpreted or because it is challenged.

Understanding functional illiteracy from a policy, adult education, and cognition point of view: Towards a joint referent framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bulajić ◽  
Miomir Despotović ◽  
Thomas Lachmann
Keyword(s):  
Adult Education ◽  
Operational Definition ◽  
Literacy Skills ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Functional Illiteracy ◽  
Scale Levels ◽  
Components Of Reading ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract. The article discusses the emergence of a functional literacy construct and the rediscovery of illiteracy in industrialized countries during the second half of the 20th century. It offers a short explanation of how the construct evolved over time. In addition, it explores how functional (il)literacy is conceived differently by research discourses of cognitive and neural studies, on the one hand, and by prescriptive and normative international policy documents and adult education, on the other hand. Furthermore, it analyses how literacy skills surveys such as the Level One Study (leo.) or the PIAAC may help to bridge the gap between cognitive and more practical and educational approaches to literacy, the goal being to place the functional illiteracy (FI) construct within its existing scale levels. It also sheds more light on the way in which FI can be perceived in terms of different cognitive processes and underlying components of reading. By building on the previous work of other authors and previous definitions, the article brings together different views of FI and offers a perspective for a needed operational definition of the concept, which would be an appropriate reference point for future educational, political, and scientific utilization.

Challenging Gender Hierarchies in Narratives of the Nation: Representations of Women in Zintgraff and the Battle of Mankon and Hard Choice

Imbizo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Epongse Nkealah ◽  
Olutoba Gboyega Oluwasuji
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Literary Texts ◽  
Gender Differentiation ◽  
Hard Choice ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Gender Hierarchies ◽  
The Face ◽  
The One ◽  
Representations Of Women ◽  
Do So

Ideas of nationalisms as masculine projects dominate literary texts by African male writers. The texts mirror the ways in which gender differentiation sanctions nationalist discourses and in turn how nationalist discourses reinforce gender hierarchies. This article draws on theoretical insights from the work of Anne McClintock and Elleke Boehmer to analyse two plays: Zintgraff and the Battle of Mankon by Bole Butake and Gilbert Doho and Hard Choice by Sunnie Ododo. The article argues that women are represented in these two plays as having an ambiguous relationship to nationalism. On the one hand, women are seen actively changing the face of politics in their societies, but on the other hand, the means by which they do so reduces them to stereotypes of their gender.

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