Spinoza and the Divine Attributes

1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Abstract Nouns ◽  
Individual Entity ◽  
Active Individual ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Take All ◽  
Do So

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account (I, prop. 10); being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods?That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute.

Spinoza and the Divine Attributes

1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Abstract Nouns ◽  
Individual Entity ◽  
Active Individual ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Take All ◽  
Do So

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account (I, prop. 10); being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods?That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute.

Emerson's Memory Loss

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hanlon
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
Memory Loss ◽  
Margaret Fuller ◽  
Final Phase ◽  
Important Work ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So ◽  
The Way

Emerson’s Memory Loss is about an archive of texts documenting Emerson’s intellectual state during the final phase of his life, as he underwent dementia. It is also about the way these texts provoke a rereading of the more familiar canon of Emerson’s thinking. Emerson’s memory loss, Hanlon argues, contributed to the shaping of a line of thought in America that emphasizes the social over the solipsistic, the affective over the distant, the many over the one. Emerson regarded his output during the time when his patterns of cognition transformed profoundly as a regathering of focus on the nature of memory and of thinking itself. His late texts theorize Emerson’s experience of senescence even as they disrupt his prior valorizations of the independent mind teeming with self-sufficient conviction. But still, these late writings have succumbed to a process of critical forgetting—either ignored by scholars or denied inclusion in Emerson’s oeuvre. Attending to a manuscript archive that reveals the extent to which Emerson collaborated with others—especially his daughter, Ellen Tucker Emerson—to articulate what he considered his most important work even as his ability to do so independently waned, Hanlon measures the resonance of these late texts across the stretch of Emerson’s thinking, including his writing about Margaret Fuller and his meditations on streams of thought that verge unto those of his godson, William James. Such ventures bring us toward a self defined less by its anxiety of overinfluence than by its communality, its very connectedness with myriad others.

Towards a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-62
Author(s):  
David Pietraszewski
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Group Representation ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Study Groups ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Mistaken Belief ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract We don't yet have adequate theories of what the human mind is representing when it represents a social group. Worse still, many people think we do. This mistaken belief is a consequence of the state of play: Until now, researchers have relied on their own intuitions to link up the concept social group on the one hand, and the results of particular studies or models on the other. While necessary, this reliance on intuition has been purchased at considerable cost. When looked at soberly, existing theories of social groups are either (i) literal, but not remotely adequate (such as models built atop economic games), or (ii) simply metaphorical (typically a subsumption or containment metaphor). Intuition is filling in the gaps of an explicit theory. This paper presents a computational theory of what, literally, a group representation is in the context of conflict: it is the assignment of agents to specific roles within a small number of triadic interaction types. This “mental definition” of a group paves the way for a computational theory of social groups—in that it provides a theory of what exactly the information-processing problem of representing and reasoning about a group is. For psychologists, this paper offers a different way to conceptualize and study groups, and suggests that a non-tautological definition of a social group is possible. For cognitive scientists, this paper provides a computational benchmark against which natural and artificial intelligences can be held.

Die Erklärbarkeit von Erfahrung

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Subject Theory

Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start. In this way, two intuitions are brought together that are often considered incompatible: on the one hand, the view that experience is something irreducibly subjective, and on the other hand, the assumption that there are better and worse explanations of experience.

scholarly journals A miniaturização como procedimento de escrita / Miniaturization as a Writing Procedure

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 203
Author(s):  
Francisco Camêlo
Keyword(s):  
Walter Benjamin ◽  
De Se ◽  
Elective Affinities ◽  
Robert Walser ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Short Essay ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Do So

Resumo: Propõe-se uma reflexão cruzada entre Walter Benjamin e Robert Walser, a partir de suas micrografias. Dentre os muitos objetos que colecionou durante a vida, Benjamin tinha especial apreço por livros infantis, miniaturas e brinquedos. Esse interesse pelo diminuto também se manifestava na extrema pequenez de sua letra e no desejo de chegar a cem linhas numa folha de carta de tamanho convencional, feito conseguido por Walser, que escrevia microtextos com uma grafia minúscula e sobre quem o próprio Benjamin redigiu um curtíssimo ensaio em 1929. Se, por um lado, a letra miniaturizada de Benjamin e de Walser aponta para um gesto de escrita que parece cifrar o conteúdo do texto, por outro lado, a micrografia de ambos diz do interesse mútuo de se esconder nas malhas textuais através de um apequenamento do eu pela escrita. Pode-se, ainda, aproximar a miniaturização da letra de uma estreita vinculação com o universo da infância, seja pelos personagens crianças e fracassados presentes na obra de Walser; seja pelo protagonismo que a infância como Denkbild (imagem de pensamento) assume nos escritos de Benjamin. A partir dessas afinidades eletivas, o artigo procura mostrar a miniaturização como um procedimento de escrita de Benjamin e de Walser através de paralelos entre suas micrografias e de comentários analítico-especulativos de ensaios de Benjamin e de contos de Walser.Palavras-chave: Walter Benjamin; Robert Walser; escrita; miniaturização, infância.Abstract: The article proposes a cross-reflection between Walter Benjamin and Robert Walser and finds its first intersection in the micrographs produced by them. Among the many objects collected during his lifetime, Benjamin seems to have had a special appreciation for children’s books, miniatures and toys. This interest in small items was also manifested in the extreme smallness of his handwriting and in the desire to write one hundred lines in a conventional-size paper – this last one achieved by Walser, who wrote microtexts in a miniscule handwriting and was also the subject of a short essay Benjamin wrote in 1929. If, on the one hand, the miniaturized handwritings of both Benjamin and Walser point to a manner of writing that seems to encrypt the content of texts, on the other hand, the micrographies constructed by both men state a mutual interest in hiding amongst the textual mesh through the suppression of the self in writing. One can, still, liken the miniaturized handwriting with the universe of childhood, be it by the character of the child or the character of the so-called underdog (both present in the works of Walser) or by the protagonism that a childhood-as-Denkbird (image of thought) assumes in Benjamin’s work. Based on these elective affinities, the article seeks to show the miniaturization as a writing procedure employed by both Benjamin and Walser, and it will do so by establishing parallels between the micrographs of the latter and the analytical-speculative commentaries present in Benjamin’s essays and in Walser’s tales.Keywords: Walter Benjamin; Robert Walser; writing; miniaturization; childhood.

ПСИХОЛОГІЧНІ РАКУРСИ ОБГРУНТУВАННЯ ТА АНАЛІЗУ ПОНЯТТЯ "РЕЛІГІЙНА ДИСКУРСИВНА ОСОБИСТІСТЬ"

1970 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-107
Author(s):  
Наталія Савелюк
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Religious Experience ◽  
The Other ◽  
Life Situation ◽  
Working Definition ◽  
The World ◽  
Active Individual ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Religious Image

У статті обґрунтовується поняття "релігійної дискурсивної особистості" через послідовний теоретичний аналіз трьох основних його семантичних складників – "релігійності", "особистості", "дискурсу" та виокремлення їх психологічних аспектів. Зокрема, пропонується робоче визначення дискурсу із зазначеними аспектами: з одного боку, когнітивно-мовленнєвої активності у конкретній соціально-комунікативній ситуації, що передбачає рецепцію, передавання та/або творення (співтворення) певних текстів у певному їх контексті; з іншого боку – процесу і результату мотиваційно-смислового вибору (сукупності таких виборів) кожного його суб’єкта у поточній життєвій ситуації. На основі проведеного теоретичного аналізу й узагальнення його результатів релігійна дискурсивна особистість розглядається як людина, котра вірить у Бога або, щонайменше, внутрішньо приймає ідею Його буття і відповідним чином розуміє (як реципієнт) та/або конструює (як автор) релігійні дискурси, а вже через них – і саму себе, весь навколишній світ чи окремі його складники. Обґрунтовується, що релігійна дискурсивна особистість – це не просто носій колективного релігійного досвіду, зокрема в етно-національних його форматах (як мовна особистість), а активний індивідуальний співАвтор, що динамічно відтворює, конструює і презентує власну мовно-релігійну картину світу. In the article the concept of a "religious discursive personality" through consistent theoretical analysis of its three main semantic components ("religiosity", "personality", "discourse") is substantiated and their psychological aspects are singled out. In particular, the author proposes a working definition of discourse through distinguishing the following aspects: on one hand, a cognitive-verbal activity in a particular social and communicative situation, involving the reception, transferring and / or creation (co-creation) of certain texts in their particular context; and on the other hand, the process and result of motivational-semantic choice (the set of such choices) of each individual in the current life situation. On the basis of the theoretical analysis and the generalization of its results a religious discursive personality is considered to be a person who believes in God, or at least inwardly accepts the idea of his entity and properly comprehends (as a recipient) and / or constructs (as an author) various religious discourses, and through them a person comprehends himself/herself, the surrounding world or some of its components. It is substantiated that a religious discursive personality is not just the one that has a collective religious experience, in particular in its ethno-national spheres (as a linguistic personality does), but it is treated as an active individual co-author, that dynamically recreates, constructs and represents his/her own linguistic and religious image of the world.

From Disclosure to Decision

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Carl E. Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Informed Consent ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Cognitive Problems

This chapter argues that even if the (essentially) cognitive problems with information could be overcome—even if disclosees were offered, accepted, understood, and remembered disclosures—people might not make better decisions. First, much of the information disclosed is not needed and cannot improve decisions. Rational people make many decisions without the guidance that mandated disclosures offer. Evidence shows that people's choices systematically diverge from rationality. This includes ways that people interpret, reinterpret, and misinterpret information. Decisions are shaped by how information is framed, with implications for informed consent. Another problem is the one explored by the literature in social psychology and behavioral economics—that the human mind distorts information and reasoning. The chapter suggests that nobody can write mandates that account for the many unexpected ways people read disclosures.

Hesiod's Myth of the five (or three or four) races

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 104-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn W. Most
Keyword(s):  
World History ◽  
Literary Form ◽  
Greek Literature ◽  
Human History ◽  
Physical Deterioration ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
First Time ◽  
Better Than

Few passages in Greek literature are as familiar, and as perplexing, as the story of the various races of men in Hesiod'sWorks and Days. On the one hand, thismythseems perfectly to fulfill Italo Calvino's definition of a classic: somehow we seem always already to know it even when we come upon it for the very first time. For the conception of a golden age, when life was easier and men were better than now, has become so basic a motif of western culture that it is familiar even to the many who have never read or even heard of theWorks and Days; moreover, Hesiod seems at first glance to deploy such widespread notions as those of a succession of ages of world history and of a steady moral and physical deterioration from the beginning of human history to the present. But on the other hand, the specific literary form which this myth assumes in thetextin which it is embodied here seems strangely at odds with these familiar ideas. For Hesiod's text has a richness and complexity far in excess of what would be needed to communicate them, and in certain crucial respects seems to be at variance or even in contradiction with them. Instead of simply distinguishing between past and present, Hesiod apparently constructs a complicated scheme juxtaposing four metals in descending order of value, from gold through silver and bronze to iron; but he then goes on to confuse this pattern by inserting between the bronze and iron races a race of heroes who not only are not associated with any metal but also interrupt the steady decline by being better than their immediate predecessors. Without Hesiod, we probably would not even have this myth; yet his own version of it seems oddly defective.

scholarly journals Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research

1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Collier ◽  
Steven Levitsky
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Recent Trend ◽  
Complex Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Conceptual Innovation ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Do So

The recent trend toward democratization in countries across the globe has challenged scholars to pursue two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, they seek to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, they are concerned with conceptual validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate. This article argues that the pursuit of these two goals has led to a proliferation of conceptual innovations, including numerous subtypes of democracy—that is to say, democracy “with adjectives.” The article explores the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged: descending and climbing Sartori's ladder of generality, generating “diminished” subtypes of democracy, “precising” the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated. The goal of the analysis is to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies, as well as to explore trade-offs among the strategies. Even when scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure. Yet it is far more desirable for them to do so selfconsciously, with a full awareness of these trade-offs.

scholarly journals Porous Kirkenes: Crumbling Mining Town or Dynamic Port Cityscape?

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-209
Author(s):  
Lukas Höller
Keyword(s):  
The Arctic ◽  
Port City ◽  
Port Cities ◽  
Mining Town ◽  
Port Authorities ◽  
City Regions ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Design Fiction

The great number of actors in port city regions, such as port authorities, municipalities, national governments, private companies, societal groups, and flora and fauna, need to develop shared visions. Collaborative approaches that focus on combined values can help achieve long-term resilience and enable a sustainable and just coexistence of port and city actors within the same territory. However, the sheer focus on economic profit generated by port activities overshadows and ignores equally essential cultural, societal, and environmental values and needs. The lack of pluralities in planning and decision-making processes creates challenges for the cohabitation of the many actors and their interests within port-city regions. On the one hand, contemporary spaces in port cities cannot be classified and defined by traditional dichotomies anymore. On the other hand, the perception of spatial and institutional boundaries between port and city leads to a positivistic-driven definition of a rigid and inflexible, line-like interface physically and mentally separating the port from the urban activities and stakeholders, neglecting the inseparable character of many parts of our society. By investigating and re-imagining the future port-development plans within the historic mining town of Kirkenes, located around 400 km above the Arctic Circle in Northern Norway, the aim of this article is to explore and combine the concepts of negative and positive porosity and liminality and arrive at a renewed perception of the port cityscape, which can function as dynamic thresholds inbetween the multiple dualities and realities of various port and city actors. The article bridges the theoretical/conceptual sphere of urban porosity and the practical approaches of liminal design. By using Design Fiction as a tool for creating new, innovative, and pluralistic port city narratives, the article contributes to contemporary research that aims for imaginary, value-based, and history-informed approaches to designing future-proof, resilient, just, and sustainable port cities.

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