Group vs individual rationality

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-172
Author(s):  
Tshilidzi Marwala
Keyword(s):  
Individual Rationality

COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN n-PERSON GAMES

2000 ◽  
Vol 08 (05) ◽  
pp. 503-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
SILVIU GUIASU
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Statistical Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Minimum Deviation ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Person Game

A solution of n-person games is proposed, based on the minimum deviation from statistical equilibrium subject to the constraints imposed by the group rationality and individual rationality. The new solution is compared with the Shapley value and von Neumann-Morgenstern's core of the game in the context of the 15-person game of passing and defeating resolutions in the UN Security Council involving five permanent members and ten nonpermanent members. A coalition classification, based on the minimum ramification cost induced by the characteristic function of the game, is also presented.

Altruismus, Moralität und Vertrauen

1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Braun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Social Efficiency ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Choice Approach

AbstractSuccessful trust-relations exist if the trustee reciprocates in accordance with his/her promises to the trustor’s unilateral cooperation. Using a parametric rational choice approach, Coleman shows that an egoist without a moral conscience may place trust in another unmoral egoist. Consequently, successful trust-relations between those actors are possible if strategic considerations play no role for individual decision-making. This paper focusses on such considerations for the emergence of those relations, given complete information (in the sense of common knowledge) of the players. Generally, trust-relations are hard to establish if unmoral egoists take into account their strategic interdependence. It is shown that two different motivations of the trustee, viz., altruism and morality, may suffice to overcome the characteristic conflict between individual rationality and social efficiency in situations with strategically deciding actors.

NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (03) ◽  
pp. 1250018 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN C. CESCO
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Additional Axiom ◽  
Game Property ◽  
Minimality Property ◽  
New Framework

In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the [Formula: see text]-core and the [Formula: see text]-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs [Formula: see text] where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and [Formula: see text] is a balanced family of coalitions, in the case of the [Formula: see text]-core, and a minimal balanced one, in the case of the [Formula: see text]-core, describing a plausible organization of the players to achieve the vector x. Both solutions extend the notion of classical core but, unlike it, they are always nonempty for any TU-game. For the [Formula: see text]-core, which also exhibits a certain kind of "minimality" property, we provide a nice axiomatic characterization in terms of the four axioms nonemptiness (NE), individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA) and a weak reduced game property (WRGP) (with appropriate modifications to adapt them to the new framework) used to characterize the classical core. However, an additional axiom, the axiom of equal opportunity is required. It roughly states that if [Formula: see text] belongs to the [Formula: see text]-core then, any other admissible element of the form [Formula: see text] should belong to the solution too.

scholarly journals COMMUTER BRIDGE

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugo Merlone ◽  
Angelo Romano
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Strategic Reasoning ◽  
Two Phases

Background. COMMUTER BRIDGE is a n-person social dilemma game that allows participants to experience situations in which individual rationality leads to collective disaster. Aim. Participants are asked to imagine they are commuters who must every day reach a place in the shortest possible time. Method. The game is divided in two phases: in the first phase, participants can choose between two routes whereas in the second phase they are given a third possibility by the construction of a bridge that, paradoxically, increases traffic. Results and conclusion. Participating in this activity will enhance understanding of social dilemmas, help discover the limitations of communications, and develop insights about personal fallacies in strategic reasoning.

scholarly journals Platform-Based Collaborative Routing using Dynamic Prices as Incentives

2020 ◽  
Vol 2674 (10) ◽  
pp. 670-679
Author(s):  
Bilge Atasoy ◽  
Frederik Schulte ◽  
Alex Steenkamp
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Time Windows ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Delivery Problem ◽  
Price Range ◽  
Decision Support Models ◽  
Collaborative Routing ◽  
Transportation Research

Over the last decade, platforms have emerged in numerous industries and often transformed them, posing new challenges for transportation research. Platform providers such as Uber, Uber Freight, Blackbuck, or Lyft mostly do not have immediate control over the physical resources needed to move people or goods. They often operate in a multi-sided market setting, where it is crucial to design clear incentives to motivate a third party to engage in collaboration. As a consequence, collaboration incentives become an integral part of decision support models for platform providers and they need to be developed at the operational level and applied dynamically. Naturally, this involves a trade-off between the interests of platform providers, shippers, and carriers. In this work, we investigate the real-world case of a platform provider operating as an intermediary between shippers and carriers in a less-than-truckload (LTL) business. We propose a new mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation for the underlying collaborative pickup and delivery problem with time windows (PDPTW) that minimizes the price the platform pays to the carriers and enforces collaboration incentives for carriers through individual rationality constraints. This is facilitated by a dynamic pricing approach which ensures that carriers are better off collaborating than working on their own. The pricing is bounded by the costs and market conditions to keep the price range reasonable. We explore possible policies to be implemented by the platform and find that their business remains profitable when individual rationality is enforced and the platform could even guarantee increased profit margins to the carriers as incentives.

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