A local flexibility market mechanism with capacity limitation services

Energy Policy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 156 ◽  
pp. 112335
Author(s):  
Carsten Heinrich ◽  
Charalampos Ziras ◽  
Tue V. Jensen ◽  
Henrik W. Bindner ◽  
Jalal Kazempour
Keyword(s):  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Capacity Limitation ◽  
Local Flexibility

scholarly journals Leisure and farmers’ welfare in changing conditions

1994 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Jukka Kola ◽  
Sanna Sihvola
Keyword(s):  
Time Allocation ◽  
Agricultural Production ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Price Formation ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Structural Development ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Local Flexibility ◽  
Direct Government

This paper examines the background for leisure-labour decisions in agriculture and evaluates welfare effects of a shift in farmers’ relief services from a state-led subsidised system to a market mechanism. Leisure provided by relief services in agriculture contributes to well-being, but the leisure-labour choice also influences the revenue. Besides conventional economic and demographic factors, we emphasize the importance of special biological bindings and continuity, as well as risk and uncertainty affecting farmers’ time allocation in agricultural production. We consider structural development as an aggregate factor to explain the demand for farmers’ relief services. In Finland the organisation of the services is more centralized than in the other Nordic countries or the European Union. If government subsidies for relief services were removed and a market mechanism with free price formation adopted, direct government savings would be more than enough to compensate for substantial losses to farmers. Moreover, market forces could produce economic efficiency and local flexibility of a higher degree. State subsidization may still be needed to some extent in changing conditions in order to enable the relief services to develop and serve as a support system of a social, de-coupled, and less distorting nature.

Perspectives and Regulation of the Russian Market for Project-based Transactions under the Kyoto Protocol

2008 ◽  
pp. 108-125
Author(s):  
K. Zavodov
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Russian Market ◽  
Increase Energy Efficiency ◽  
New Form ◽  
Contract Structure ◽  
Carbon Fund

Project-based transactions (PBTs) are a market mechanism of attracting foreign investments in order to abate greenhouse gas emissions and increase energy efficiency of the country’s enterprises. The article provides a classification and analyzes advantages and drawbacks of PBTs from the point of view of a host country. The main trends and factors determining the dynamics of the PBT market are described. Given that Russia currently lags behind the leaders of the PBT market, an incorporation of a state carbon fund is put forward with an aim of channelling PBTs through it. This paper proposes a form of PBT market regulation by incorporating an option mechanism into the contract structure of a transaction. A comparison of the new form of regulation with the tools that are currently in use in Russia and other countries demonstrates its greater economic efficiency under uncertainty.

Vertical Boilerplate

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Real World ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Law School ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

Exploiting Local Flexibility during Execution of Pre-Computed Schedules

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen F. Smith ◽  
Naiping Keng ◽  
Karl Kempf
Keyword(s):  
Local Flexibility

Culture and Commerce

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mukti Khaire
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Change ◽  
Cultural Production ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Creative Industries ◽  
Royal Patronage ◽  
Commerce Building ◽  
Production And Distribution ◽  
Necessary Evil ◽  
The Relationship

This book describes how commercial ventures in creative industries have cultural impact. Since royal patronage of arts ended, firms in the creative industries, working within the market mechanism, have been responsible for the production and distribution of the cultural goods—art, books, films, fashion, and music—that enrich our lives. This book counters the popular perception that this marriage of art and business is a necessary evil, proposing instead that entrepreneurs who introduce radically new cultural works to the market must bring about a change in society’s beliefs about what is appropriate and valuable to encourage consumption of these goods. In so doing, these pioneer entrepreneurs change minds, not just lives; the seeds of cultural change are embedded in the world of commerce. Building on theories of value construction and cultural production, integrated with field research on pioneer firms (like Chanel and the Sundance Institute) and new market categories (like modern art and high fashion in India), the author develops conceptual frameworks that explain the structure and functioning of creative industries. Through a systematic exposition of the roles and functions of the players in this space—creators, producers, and intermediaries—the book proposes a new way to understand the relationship among markets, entrepreneurship, and culture. Khaire also discusses challenges inherent in being entrepreneurial in the creative industries, paying special attention to the implications of digitalization and globalization, and suggests prescriptive directions for individuals and firms wishing to balance pecuniary motivations with cultural convictions in this rapidly changing world.

THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340016 ◽  
Author(s):  
SYLVAIN BEAL ◽  
AMANDINE GHINTRAN ◽  
ERIC REMILA ◽  
PHILIPPE SOLAL
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Cooperative Tu Game ◽  
Fair Distribution

The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism.

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