Abstract
This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.
Majority–Dominant–Mixed Strategy Game Theory Model for Deregulated Generation Expansion Planning Problem