Pay for Performance: Pay More or Pay Less?

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
pp. 777-781 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Swayne
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Uriesi

Abstract The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual – level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team – level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pooyan Khashabi ◽  
Matthias Heinz ◽  
Nick Zubanov ◽  
Tobias Kretschmer ◽  
Guido Friebel

It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and organization-specific factors. However, less is known about the moderating role of external forces such as market competition. Our theory posits that competition generates two counteracting effects—the residual market and competitor response effects—that vary with competition and jointly generate a curvilinear relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition discourages effort response to PfP because there is little residual market to gain from rivals, whereas strong competition weakens incentives because an offsetting response from competitors becomes more likely. PfP hence has the strongest effect under moderate competition. Field data from a bakery chain and its competitive environment confirm our theory and let us refute several alternative interpretations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-56
Author(s):  
Eliot Halparin ◽  
Dave Davis

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Uriesi

Abstract The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual - level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team - level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Michele Fioretti ◽  
Hongming Wang

Abstract Public procurement bodies increasingly resort to pay-for-performance contracts to promote efficient spending. We show that firm responses to pay-for-performance can widen the inequality in accessing social services. Focusing on the quality bonus payment initiative in Medicare Advantage, we find that higher quality-rated insurers responded to bonus payments by selecting healthier enrollees with premium differences across counties. Selection is profitable because the quality rating fails to adjust for differences in enrollee health. Selection inflated the bonus payments and shifted the supply of highrated insurance to the healthiest counties, reducing access to lower-priced, higher-rated insurance in the riskiest counties.


Ob Gyn News ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (20) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
JEFF EVANS
Keyword(s):  

Ob Gyn News ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 40 (8) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
JENNIFER SILVERMAN

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