scholarly journals Pay for Performance Where Output is Hard to Measure: The Case of Performance Pay for School Teachers

Author(s):  
David Marsden ◽  
Richard Belfield
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Uriesi

Abstract The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual – level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team – level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pooyan Khashabi ◽  
Matthias Heinz ◽  
Nick Zubanov ◽  
Tobias Kretschmer ◽  
Guido Friebel

It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and organization-specific factors. However, less is known about the moderating role of external forces such as market competition. Our theory posits that competition generates two counteracting effects—the residual market and competitor response effects—that vary with competition and jointly generate a curvilinear relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition discourages effort response to PfP because there is little residual market to gain from rivals, whereas strong competition weakens incentives because an offsetting response from competitors becomes more likely. PfP hence has the strongest effect under moderate competition. Field data from a bakery chain and its competitive environment confirm our theory and let us refute several alternative interpretations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaehoon Lee ◽  
Michael Strong ◽  
Doug Hamman ◽  
Yifang Zeng

Teacher buy-in is a critical component for the success of any educational reform, especially one involving evaluation and compensation. We report on an instrument developed to measure teacher buy-in for district-developed designation plans associated with a state pay-for-performance (PFP) program, and teacher responses. We used modern test theory to investigate the instrument’s psychometric properties, a procedure often missing from research reports of self-designed surveys. A sample of 3,001 elementary, middle school, and high school teachers in Texas school districts participated in the survey. Our results suggest satisfactory reliability of the instrument and adequate discriminant validity in measuring distinct but related aspects of teacher buy-in. In addition, we found that teacher support for PFP as instantiated in their particular districts was generally high, but still buy-in levels varied significantly among different teacher groupings, pointing the way for future developers of pay-for-performance schemes to improve or maximize their acceptance.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-56
Author(s):  
Eliot Halparin ◽  
Dave Davis

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Uriesi

Abstract The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual - level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team - level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Michele Fioretti ◽  
Hongming Wang

Abstract Public procurement bodies increasingly resort to pay-for-performance contracts to promote efficient spending. We show that firm responses to pay-for-performance can widen the inequality in accessing social services. Focusing on the quality bonus payment initiative in Medicare Advantage, we find that higher quality-rated insurers responded to bonus payments by selecting healthier enrollees with premium differences across counties. Selection is profitable because the quality rating fails to adjust for differences in enrollee health. Selection inflated the bonus payments and shifted the supply of highrated insurance to the healthiest counties, reducing access to lower-priced, higher-rated insurance in the riskiest counties.


Author(s):  
Rosaria Addamo ◽  
Bruno S. Sergi ◽  
Mark Esposito

Purpose This paper aims to draw on data from a survey research study conducted in Italy that explored the effects of performance-related pay (PRP) among 500 high school teachers. Design/methodology/approach Survey responses studies were conducted. Findings The results are consistent with theoretical predictions that monetary incentives for activities with a strong social impact may crowd out employee image motivation. This study documents that the use of monetary incentives is neither necessary nor desirable and the pay-for-performance does not affect the intrinsic motivation of teaching staff employees. Originality/value This work advances the conversation on relative pay in the field of higher education in Italy.


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