Tightening up the performance–pay linkage: Roles of contingent reward leadership and profit-sharing in the cross-level influence of individual pay-for-performance.

2015 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joo Hun Han ◽  
Kathryn M. Bartol ◽  
Seongsu Kim
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Uriesi

Abstract The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual – level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team – level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pooyan Khashabi ◽  
Matthias Heinz ◽  
Nick Zubanov ◽  
Tobias Kretschmer ◽  
Guido Friebel

It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and organization-specific factors. However, less is known about the moderating role of external forces such as market competition. Our theory posits that competition generates two counteracting effects—the residual market and competitor response effects—that vary with competition and jointly generate a curvilinear relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition discourages effort response to PfP because there is little residual market to gain from rivals, whereas strong competition weakens incentives because an offsetting response from competitors becomes more likely. PfP hence has the strongest effect under moderate competition. Field data from a bakery chain and its competitive environment confirm our theory and let us refute several alternative interpretations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-56
Author(s):  
Eliot Halparin ◽  
Dave Davis

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helene L. Caudill ◽  
Constance D. Porter

This paper reveals how similar the reward systems prevalent during the scientific management era are to the rewards systems in use today. Systems popular today, such as profit sharing, gain sharing, skill/knowledge-based pay, merit-based pay/pay for performance, and variable-based pay, were also advocated during the reign of scientific management. The ideas expressed by several key scientific management contributors, including Frederick W. Taylor, Henry L. Gantt, Harrington Emerson, and Frank B and Lillian M. Gilbreth, are detailed. These ideas are compared and contrasted with existing reward systems and their underlying premises.  In addition, the lessons learned from the scientific management era as they relate to reward system philosophies of today are presented.


1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin R. Patton ◽  
Dennis M. Daley

Gainsharing, an instrument for implementing pay for performance, is a synthesis of participatory management and profit sharing.1 With increased interest in both pay-for-performance and total quality management (TQM), gainsharing programs have attracted the attention of public sector organizations. Gainsharing is a means for encouraging and motivating employees through extrinsic expectancy rewards within a group or organizational framework. It combines TQM's emphasis on the advantages derived from team work (and away from the distractions of individual competition) with the motivational effect of a strong individual reward system.2 This study examines employees' attitudes and perceptions about one local government's gainsharing plan. The employees' perceived ability to affect the savings on which the gainsharing award is based, their influence over the components included in the gainsharing calculations, control over the criteria used in determining individual eligibility for a gainsharing award and an employee ranking of individual actor influence on the gainsharing plan are measured.


Author(s):  
Fulya AYDINLI KULAK ◽  
Sevgi ELMAS ATAY

This study intends to determine the current situation regarding the prevalence of pay for performance systems established for managers. Examining performance-related pay, we focus on individual, team and organizational performance and explore how widespread several pay components are in 23 countries. The research consists of the firm-level data of 5217 large companies from 23 countries from the Cranfield Network on Comparative Human Resource Management database. The data has been presented descriptively via frequencies and percentages and then analyzed via cluster analysis. In this way, diverging country clusters have been determined regarding the prevalence of pay for performance. Findings show that individual bonus is the most frequently used variable pay component provided to managers in general. Following that, paying for organizational performance is highly prevalent, whereas team-based bonuses are rarely used as a whole. On the other hand, long term incentives are rarely used except profit sharing. The results are descriptive in nature. This study addresses how widespread performance-related pay in various countries. Evidence regarding the use and prevalence of pay for performance systems across countries is quite limited. So this research, reflecting the current scene regarding variable pay in various countries, contributes to current literature by presenting recent comparable data.


2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Uriesi

Abstract The present research examined the influences of pay for performance programs on employee performance in the Romanian context, by comparing a sample of employees in companies in which such programs are implemented to a sample of employees in organizations in which performance is not used as a criterion in deciding financial rewards. Results show that the work performances of the former, as evaluated by the direct supervisors of each employee, are significantly higher than those of the latter, and that this effect of performance pay is partly mediated by its positive effects on employee perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. Furthermore, results indicate that the individual - level financial incentive systems are more efficient in fostering work performance than the team - level performance pay programs in the Romanian employee sample, and that they also have stronger effects on the two dimensions of organizational justice.


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