How to promote prefabricated building projects through internet of things? A game theory-based analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 276 ◽  
pp. 124325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizi Luo ◽  
Xin Liang ◽  
Chao Fang ◽  
Zezhou Wu ◽  
Xia Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Building Projects ◽  
Prefabricated Building

scholarly journals A BIM-Based Study on the Comprehensive Benefit Analysis for Prefabricated Building Projects in China

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingbo Ji ◽  
Siwei Chang ◽  
Yuan Qi ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Evaluation ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Construction Technique ◽  
Building Projects ◽  
Comprehensive Benefit ◽  
Incentive Policies ◽  
Improved Performance ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Prefabricated construction has been widely accepted as an alternative to conventional cast-in-situ construction, given its improved performance. Great efforts have also been made to develop prefabricated construction technologies in China. However, there is a lack of an appropriate pattern for evaluating its comprehensive economic merits, and reasonable mathematical models for providing a comparative analysis of conventional cast-in-situ and prefabricated building projects have yet to be developed. Therefore, the research in this paper aims to comprehensively evaluate the economic benefits of implementing prefabricated construction techniques in order to surpass the economic barrier and promote the development of prefabricated buildings in China. The comprehensive economic evaluation is formulated in terms of resource-use efficiencies, project progress, and incentive policies. An apartment building in Shanghai is selected as a case study. Construction progress is simulated on the BIM platform when the same case study is rationally transformed from the prefabricated to the conventional cast-in-situ construction technique. The results reveal that the comprehensive economic merit can reach ¥739.6/m2 when selecting the prefabricated construction process. The economic benefit brought by shortening the construction period can be regarded as the most significant contributor. Yet, the current incentive policies only contribute 7.1% of the comprehensive economic evaluation. Overall, this research contributes an assessment framework for decision-making in the technique management of building construction. The BIM-based simulation approach can greatly help investors to identify the relevant economic factors and adopt the latest incentive policies.

Robust Decentralised Trust Management for the Internet of Things by Using Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 102308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Esposito ◽  
Oscar Tamburis ◽  
Xin Su ◽  
Chang Choi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Trust Management ◽  
The Internet ◽  
The Internet Of Things

scholarly journals Multistrategy Repeated Game-Based Mobile Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Edge Computing in Internet of Things

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Chuanxiu Chi ◽  
Yingjie Wang ◽  
Yingshu Li ◽  
Xiangrong Tong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Mobile Edge Computing ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing

With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, various application requirements have put forward higher requirements for data transmission bandwidth and real-time data processing. Mobile edge computing (MEC) can greatly alleviate the pressure on network bandwidth and improve the response speed by effectively using the device resources of mobile edge. Research on mobile crowdsourcing in edge computing has become a hot spot. Hence, we studied resource utilization issues between edge mobile devices, namely, crowdsourcing scenarios in mobile edge computing. We aimed to design an incentive mechanism to ensure the long-term participation of users and high quality of tasks. This paper designs a long-term incentive mechanism based on game theory. The long-term incentive mechanism is to encourage participants to provide long-term and continuous quality data for mobile crowdsourcing systems. The multistrategy repeated game-based incentive mechanism (MSRG incentive mechanism) is proposed to guide participants to provide long-term participation and high-quality data. The proposed mechanism regards the interaction between the worker and the requester as a repeated game and obtains a long-term incentive based on the historical information and discount factor. In addition, the evolutionary game theory and the Wright-Fisher model in biology are used to analyze the evolution of participants’ strategies. The optimal discount factor is found within the range of discount factors based on repeated games. Finally, simulation experiments verify the existing crowdsourcing dilemma and the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism. The results show that the proposed MSRG incentive mechanism has a long-term incentive effect for participants in mobile crowdsourcing systems.

scholarly journals Rational Protocols and Attacks in Blockchain System

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Yuling Chen ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Minghao Zhao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Emerging Technology ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Research Progress ◽  
Smart Contracts ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Game Theoretic

Blockchain has been an emerging technology, which comprises lots of fields such as distributed systems and Internet of Things (IoT). As is well known, blockchain is the underlying technology of bitcoin, whose initial motivation is derived from economic incentives. Therefore, lots of components of blockchain (e.g., consensus mechanism) can be constructed toward the view of game theory. In this paper, we highlight the combination of game theory and blockchain, including rational smart contracts, game theoretic attacks, and rational mining strategies. When put differently, the rational parties, who manage to maximize their utilities, involved in blockchain chose their strategies according to the economic incentives. Consequently, we focus on the influence of rational parties with respect to building blocks. More specifically, we investigate the research progress from the aspects of smart contract, rational attacks, and consensus mechanism, respectively. Finally, we present some future directions based on the brief survey with respect to game theory and blockchain.

Collusion-free for Cloud Verification toward the View of Game Theory

2022 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Hongyang Yan ◽  
Nan Jiang ◽  
Kang Li ◽  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Guoyu Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Verification Method ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Go Model ◽  
Trusted Platform ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

At present, clients can outsource lots of complex and abundant computation, e.g., Internet of things (IoT), tasks to clouds by the “pay as you go” model. Outsourcing computation can save costs for clients and fully utilize the existing cloud infrastructures. However, it is hard for clients to trust the clouds even if blockchain is used as the trusted platform. In this article, we utilize the verification method as SETI@home by only two rational clouds, who hope to maximize their utilities. Utilities are defined as the incomes of clouds when they provide computation results to clients. More specifically, one client outsources two jobs to two clouds and each job contains n tasks, which include k identical sentinels. Two clouds can either honestly compute each task or collude on the identical sentinel tasks by agreeing on random values. If the results of identical sentinels are identical, then client regards the jobs as correctly computed without verification. Obviously, rational clouds have incentives to deviate by collusion and provide identical random results for a higher income. We discuss how to prevent collusion by using deposits, e.g., bit-coins. Furthermore, utilities for each cloud can be automatically assigned by a smart contract. We prove that, given proper parameters, two rational clouds will honestly send correct results to the client without collusion.

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