A Security Defense Model for Ubiquitous Electric Internet of Things Based on Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Li ◽  
Yanzhu Liu ◽  
Di Liu ◽  
Nan Zhang ◽  
Dawei Lu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Defense Model

scholarly journals MAIAD: A Multistage Asymmetric Information Attack and Defense Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Yang ◽  
Bichen Che ◽  
Yang Zeng ◽  
Yang Cheng ◽  
Chenyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Systems Simulation

With the rapid development and widespread applications of Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the corresponding security issues are getting more and more serious. This paper proposes a multistage asymmetric information attack and defense model (MAIAD) for IoT systems. Under the premise of asymmetric information, MAIAD extends the single-stage game model with dynamic and evolutionary game theory. By quantifying the benefits for both the attack and defense, MAIAD can determine the optimal defense strategy for IoT systems. Simulation results show that the model can select the optimal security defense strategy for various IoT systems.

Robust Decentralised Trust Management for the Internet of Things by Using Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 102308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Esposito ◽  
Oscar Tamburis ◽  
Xin Su ◽  
Chang Choi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Trust Management ◽  
The Internet ◽  
The Internet Of Things

scholarly journals Multistrategy Repeated Game-Based Mobile Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Edge Computing in Internet of Things

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Chuanxiu Chi ◽  
Yingjie Wang ◽  
Yingshu Li ◽  
Xiangrong Tong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Mobile Edge Computing ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing

With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, various application requirements have put forward higher requirements for data transmission bandwidth and real-time data processing. Mobile edge computing (MEC) can greatly alleviate the pressure on network bandwidth and improve the response speed by effectively using the device resources of mobile edge. Research on mobile crowdsourcing in edge computing has become a hot spot. Hence, we studied resource utilization issues between edge mobile devices, namely, crowdsourcing scenarios in mobile edge computing. We aimed to design an incentive mechanism to ensure the long-term participation of users and high quality of tasks. This paper designs a long-term incentive mechanism based on game theory. The long-term incentive mechanism is to encourage participants to provide long-term and continuous quality data for mobile crowdsourcing systems. The multistrategy repeated game-based incentive mechanism (MSRG incentive mechanism) is proposed to guide participants to provide long-term participation and high-quality data. The proposed mechanism regards the interaction between the worker and the requester as a repeated game and obtains a long-term incentive based on the historical information and discount factor. In addition, the evolutionary game theory and the Wright-Fisher model in biology are used to analyze the evolution of participants’ strategies. The optimal discount factor is found within the range of discount factors based on repeated games. Finally, simulation experiments verify the existing crowdsourcing dilemma and the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism. The results show that the proposed MSRG incentive mechanism has a long-term incentive effect for participants in mobile crowdsourcing systems.

scholarly journals Rational Protocols and Attacks in Blockchain System

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Yuling Chen ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Minghao Zhao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Emerging Technology ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Research Progress ◽  
Smart Contracts ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Game Theoretic

Blockchain has been an emerging technology, which comprises lots of fields such as distributed systems and Internet of Things (IoT). As is well known, blockchain is the underlying technology of bitcoin, whose initial motivation is derived from economic incentives. Therefore, lots of components of blockchain (e.g., consensus mechanism) can be constructed toward the view of game theory. In this paper, we highlight the combination of game theory and blockchain, including rational smart contracts, game theoretic attacks, and rational mining strategies. When put differently, the rational parties, who manage to maximize their utilities, involved in blockchain chose their strategies according to the economic incentives. Consequently, we focus on the influence of rational parties with respect to building blocks. More specifically, we investigate the research progress from the aspects of smart contract, rational attacks, and consensus mechanism, respectively. Finally, we present some future directions based on the brief survey with respect to game theory and blockchain.

Collusion-free for Cloud Verification toward the View of Game Theory

2022 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Hongyang Yan ◽  
Nan Jiang ◽  
Kang Li ◽  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Guoyu Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Verification Method ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Go Model ◽  
Trusted Platform ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

At present, clients can outsource lots of complex and abundant computation, e.g., Internet of things (IoT), tasks to clouds by the “pay as you go” model. Outsourcing computation can save costs for clients and fully utilize the existing cloud infrastructures. However, it is hard for clients to trust the clouds even if blockchain is used as the trusted platform. In this article, we utilize the verification method as SETI@home by only two rational clouds, who hope to maximize their utilities. Utilities are defined as the incomes of clouds when they provide computation results to clients. More specifically, one client outsources two jobs to two clouds and each job contains n tasks, which include k identical sentinels. Two clouds can either honestly compute each task or collude on the identical sentinel tasks by agreeing on random values. If the results of identical sentinels are identical, then client regards the jobs as correctly computed without verification. Obviously, rational clouds have incentives to deviate by collusion and provide identical random results for a higher income. We discuss how to prevent collusion by using deposits, e.g., bit-coins. Furthermore, utilities for each cloud can be automatically assigned by a smart contract. We prove that, given proper parameters, two rational clouds will honestly send correct results to the client without collusion.

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