Evolutionary game analysis on industrial pollution control of local government in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 298 ◽  
pp. 113499
Author(s):  
Wei Fan ◽  
Su Wang ◽  
Xuan Gu ◽  
Ziqi Zhou ◽  
Yue Zhao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Ecological Poverty Alleviation Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 01052
Author(s):  
Haoyue Peng ◽  
Yao Xing
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Game Situation ◽  
Ecological Industry

Ecological poverty alleviation is a new idea that combines environmental protection and poverty alleviation, and the ecological industry poverty alleviation is an important part of it. The ecological poverty alleviation industry involves multiple bodies. Since different bodies have different strategic choices, there is a complex game relationship between them. From the perspective of evolutionary game, this article explores the game situation between local government and enterprises in the ecological poverty alleviation industry, and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations based on the results of game analysis.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Behavioral Strategies of Multiple Stakeholders in Inclusive Green Growth

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Qu ◽  
Yaodong Cang ◽  
Lingling Guo ◽  
Yue Liu
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Green Growth ◽  
Monitoring Cost ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Income Inequity ◽  
Public Monitoring

Abstract Inclusive green growth has been set as an important initiative to solve the severe problems of environmental degradation and severe income inequality. It requires the joint participation of local government, enterprise and public. However, these stakeholders are not enthusiasm enough as there are divergences among their interest goals. Hence, this paper analyses how to balance the stakeholders’ interest goals based on the central supervision and local regulation in environmental protection and income inequity alleviation. Therefore, an evolutionary game model between central and local government, and an evolutionary game model among local government and enterprise and public are conducted. The conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) The local government should play a leading role in promoting IGG, and the decrease of the economy proportion in the assessment on local government will significantly promote its enthusiasm; (2) When the penalty on enterprise increase, both enterprise and the public will choose positive participate behavior faster; (3) The high public monitoring cost will hinder both enterprise and public’s participation. Finally, some recommendations are put forward.

scholarly journals Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou ◽  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Xinmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (15) ◽  
pp. 2775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wang ◽  
Shi
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Trajectory ◽  
Evolution Path ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

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