Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?

2015 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 48-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherina Kinzel
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
History Of

scholarly journals Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.

Confrontation and Its Problems: Can the History of Science Provide Evidence for the Philosophy of Science?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Thodoris Dimitrakos
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
History Of ◽  
Theories Of Science

Abstract In this paper I am concerned with the relation between the history of science and the philosophy of science from the perspective of philosophy. In particular, I examine two philosophical objections against the idea that the history of science can provide evidences to the philosophy of science. The first objection is metaphysical and suggests that given Hume’s law, i.e. that norms cannot be derived from facts and given that the history of science is a descriptive enterprise while the philosophy of science is a normative endeavor, the former cannot be informative for the latter. The second is epistemological and is often called the ‘case studies dilemma’. According to this dilemma, we can neither deduce general philosophical theories from particular historical cases nor test the former through the latter. I argue that although those objections fail to be fatal for the idea that the historical data can provide evidence for the philosophical theories of science, they can help us draw a proper image of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. I conclude that this picture presupposes the constant epistemic iteration between the two disciplines.

What is a scientific instrument, now?

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Smithsonian Institution ◽  
Scientific Instrument ◽  
Scientific Instruments ◽  
Classic Article ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.

scholarly journals The Origins of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Enros
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
University Of Toronto ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Programs Of Study ◽  
The University ◽  
Phd Programs

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.

scholarly journals REFORMATION AND THE DISTRUST OF THE PROJECTOR IN THE HARTLIB CIRCLE

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
KOJI YAMAMOTO
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Shared Experience ◽  
Useful Knowledge ◽  
New Synthesis ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
History Of

ABSTRACTCase-studies of the circle of Samuel Hartlib, one of the most prolific groups of reformers in post-Reformation Europe, are flourishing. The uncovering of rich details has, however, made it difficult to draw a meaningful generalization about the circle's bewilderingly wide range of activities. Focusing on the circle's promotion of ‘useful knowledge’, this article offers an analytical framework for building a new synthesis. The eclectic and seemingly chaotic pursuit of useful knowledge emerged, it will be shown, as differing responses to, and interpretations of, pervasive distrust and the pursuit of reformation. The article thus explores how loosely-shared experience shaped the circle's ambivalent practices of collaboration and exclusion. The study thereby contributes not only to studies of the Hartlib circle, but also to the historiography of post-Reformation culture and burgeoning studies of trust and credibility in the history of science and technology.

Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anouk Barberousse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
General Question ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
History Of ◽  
Dynamics Of Science

How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).

„Gentlemen in, Genuine Knowledge out“? Zum Status wissenschaftlicher Normen für die Erkenntnissicherung

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Huber
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Engineering ◽  
Transgenic Mice ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Scientific Practices ◽  
History Of ◽  
Genuine Knowledge

ZusammenfassungCase studies in the history of science and technology have shown that scientific norms, so called standards, contribute significantly to the evolution of scientific practices. They arise predominantly, but not exclusively, on the basis of interactions with instruments of measurement and other technical devices. As regards experimental practices standards are mandatory preparatory procedures in a variety of designs, including the inbreeding and genetic engineering of experimental organisms (e.g. transgenic mice). I claim that scientific norms not only regulate mere technical preconditions of research but also guide experimental practices, for example with regard to the stabilisation and validation of phenomena. Against this background, the paper introduces different kinds of scientific norms and elaborates on the question if they are means to epistemic ends (e.g. stability).

Science and Medicine

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tita Chico
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Critical Race Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Literary Studies ◽  
Critical Race ◽  
Race Theory ◽  
History Of

Abstract Abstract The titles reviewed in this chapter concern science and medicine studies. They represent work drawn from a variety of contexts and disciplinary perspectives, including science and technology, the history of science, literary studies, critical race theory, public health, the philosophy of science, law, ethnography, anthropology, architecture, and geology. The chapter has five sections: 1. Histories and Historicity; 2. Epistemology and Dissemination; 3. Institutions and Praxis; 4. Bodies and Subjectivities; and 5. Conversations (Journals).

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