Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anouk Barberousse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
General Question ◽  
Scientific Enterprise ◽  
History Of ◽  
Dynamics Of Science

How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).

Marketing, Scientific Progress, and Scientific Method

1983 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 18-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Ultimate Source ◽  
History Of

It is argued that the long debate concerning the scientific credentials of marketing has been couched in terms of an idealized notion of science as the ultimate source of objectively certified knowledge. A review of contemporary literature in the philosophy, sociology, and history of science reveals that this canonical conception of science cannot be supported. The implications of this literature for the marketing–as–science debate are developed, and practical measures for the enhancement of scientific practice in marketing are discussed.

Kuhn, Normativiy and History and Philosophy of Science

EPISTEMOLOGIA ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Value Judgements ◽  
History Of ◽  
Naturalistic Account

The paper addresses the relation between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. Historical evidence of change of scientific method may seem to support epistemic relativism. But this does not entail that epistemic justification varies with methods employed by scientists. An argument is required that justification depends on such methods. Following discussion of Kuhn, the paper considers treatment of epistemic normativity by Lakatos, Laudan and Worrall. Lakatos and Laudan propose that the history of science may adjudicate between theories of method. Historical episodes are selected on the basis of value judgements or pre-analytic intuitions, which are themselves problematic. Laudan proposed the naturalist view that a rule of method be evaluated empirically on the basis of reliability in conducing to cognitive aims. Against this, Worrall argued that the normative force of appeal to past reliability requires an a priori inductive principle. In my view, the problem of normativity is solved by combining a particularist focus on specific episodes in the history of science with a naturalistic account of the reliability of method.

What is a scientific instrument, now?

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Smithsonian Institution ◽  
Scientific Instrument ◽  
Scientific Instruments ◽  
Classic Article ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.

scholarly journals The Origins of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Enros
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
University Of Toronto ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Programs Of Study ◽  
The University ◽  
Phd Programs

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.

scholarly journals Using History as Evidence in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Qualitative Approaches ◽  
History Of

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.

Does Popper Explain Historical Explanation?

1995 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
Kenneth Minogue
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Historical Explanation ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of

It is one of Karl Popper's great distinctions that he has an intense—some would say too intense—awareness of the history of philosophy within which he works. He knows not only its patterns, but also its comedies, and sometimes he plays rhetorically against their grain. He knows, for example, that the drive to consistency tends to turn philosophy into compositions of related doctrines, each seeming to involve the others. Religious belief, for example, tends to go with idealism and free will, religious scepticism with materialism and determinism. Popper does not believe in a religion, was for long some kind of a socialist, and takes his bearings from the philosophy of science. Aha! it seems we have located him. Here is a positivist, a materialist, probably a determinist. But of course he denies he is any of these things. Again, like many modern thinkers, he wants to extend scientific method not only to the social sciences but also to history. So far so familiar, until we discover that he regards nature as no less ‘cloudy’ than human societies.

Scientific Progress

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Bird
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
History Of ◽  
Disruptive Change

What constitutes scientific progress? This article considers and evaluates three competing answers to this question. These seek to understand scientific progress in terms of problem-solving, of truthlikeness/verisimilitude, and of knowledge, respectively. How does each fare, taking into consideration the fact that the history of science involves disruptive change, not merely the addition of new beliefs to old beliefs, and the fact that sometimes the history of such changes involves a sequence of theories, all of which are believed to be false, even by scientific realists? The three answers are also evaluated with regard to how they assess certain real and hypothetical scientific changes. Also considered are the three views of the goal of science implicit in the three answers. The view that the goal of science is knowledge and that progress is constituted by the accumulation of knowledge is argued to be preferable to its competitors.

Science and Medicine

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tita Chico
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Critical Race Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Literary Studies ◽  
Critical Race ◽  
Race Theory ◽  
History Of

Abstract Abstract The titles reviewed in this chapter concern science and medicine studies. They represent work drawn from a variety of contexts and disciplinary perspectives, including science and technology, the history of science, literary studies, critical race theory, public health, the philosophy of science, law, ethnography, anthropology, architecture, and geology. The chapter has five sections: 1. Histories and Historicity; 2. Epistemology and Dissemination; 3. Institutions and Praxis; 4. Bodies and Subjectivities; and 5. Conversations (Journals).

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