Why there might not be an evolutionary explanation for psychological altruism

Author(s):  
Stephen Stich
2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malini Ratnasingam ◽  
Lee Ellis

Background. Nearly all of the research on sex differences in mass media utilization has been based on samples from the United States and a few other Western countries. Aim. The present study examines sex differences in mass media utilization in four Asian countries (Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore). Methods. College students self-reported the frequency with which they accessed the following five mass media outlets: television dramas, televised news and documentaries, music, newspapers and magazines, and the Internet. Results. Two significant sex differences were found when participants from the four countries were considered as a whole: Women watched television dramas more than did men; and in Japan, female students listened to music more than did their male counterparts. Limitations. A wider array of mass media outlets could have been explored. Conclusions. Findings were largely consistent with results from studies conducted elsewhere in the world, particularly regarding sex differences in television drama viewing. A neurohormonal evolutionary explanation is offered for the basic findings.


2021 ◽  
pp. 153-174
Author(s):  
L. Fernández–Badillo ◽  
I. Zuria ◽  
J. Sigala–Rodríguez ◽  
G. Sánchez–Rojas ◽  
G. Castañeda–Gaytán

Review of the human–snake conflict in Mexico: origin, mitigation and perspectives. The conflict between humans and snakes has existed since unmemorable times. Fear of and aversion towards these animals may have an evolutionary explanation and may be justified because venomous and deadly snakes cause thousands of deaths around the world each year. Furthermore, social perception, the media, myths, and even religion, increase and feed this fear, resulting in the intentional slaughter of snakes being a common practice in many places. As Mexico is a mega–diverse country with more species of snakes than any other country, it faces a particularly difficult situation with regard to snake bites. Here we revise this human–snake conflict from different perspectives in order to better understand it, to propose possible solutions to reduce it, and to contribute towards snake conservation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-300
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan ◽  
Russell Powell

Abstract Commentators on The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory raise a number of metaethical and moral concerns with our analysis, as well as some complaints regarding how we have interpreted and made use of the contemporary evolutionary and social sciences of morality. Some commentators assert that one must already presuppose a moral theory before one can even begin to theorize moral progress; others query whether the shift toward greater inclusion is really a case of moral progress, or whether our theory can be properly characterized as ‘naturalistic’. Other commentators worry that we have uncritically accepted the prevailing evolutionary explanation of morality, even though it gives short shrift to the role of women or presupposes an oversimplified view of the environment in which the core elements of human moral psychology are thought to have congealed. Another commentator laments that we did not make more extensive use of data from the social sciences. In this reply, we engage with all of these constructive criticisms and show that although some of them are well taken, none undermine the core thesis of our book.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Stewart-Williams

In this commentary, I consider Schmitt's cross-cultural investigation of sociosexuality from a comparative perspective. I argue that such a perspective lends support to an evolutionary explanation of a number of Schmitt's findings, including universal sex differences in sociosexuality and the sensitivity of mating behavior to contextual variables such as sex ratio.


2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Dowding

In a recent issue of this journal Peter John (1999) suggests we can use an evolutionary account to explain policy change. In particular he suggests we should see the battle of ideas about policy formation as an evolutionary process and gives as an example the introduction and abolition of the poll tax. John is correct in two claims in his article. First, traditional models of policy-generation tend to ignore the role of ideas, concentrating attention upon the bargaining and power struggles between different sets of competing interests. Secondly, he is right that evolutionary explanation has a place in the social sciences. But these two thoughts are best kept apart and the way he packages them suggests a poor understanding of evolutionary explanation and of the role ideas may play within it. There are at least three problems with his account. First, the object at which he directs explanation —in his example the poll tax—is misspecified. Secondly, he fails to specify a mechanism for the natural selection of ideas, leaving his claim about the promise of evolutionary accounts vague and unsatisfactory. Finally, he fails to distinguish learning as an intentional process from selection as an evolutionary one.


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