Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 575-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Moser ◽  
Ethan Scheiner
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
National Analysis ◽  
Cross National

Party Linkage, Public Justification and Mixed Electoral Systems

2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172097833
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
Democratic Life ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

In recent years, a number of political theorists have aimed to restore the central role of parties in democratic life. These theorists have especially highlighted two key normative functions of parties: linkage and public justification. In this article, I argue that these two functions are often in tension. First, I illustrate how this tension manifests itself in liberal democracies. Second, I explain that parties’ ability to fulfil each of the two functions is strongly affected by the electoral system under which they operate: while first-past-the-post encourages party linkage but hinders public justification, the opposite is true of proportional representation. Third, I argue that a mixed electoral system can best guarantee the balance between parties’ linkage and justificatory functions. Fourth, I suggest a number of proposals for party reforms that could help mixed electoral systems to balance party linkage and public justification while preventing the re-emergence of the tension between them within parties.

scholarly journals MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
V. А. Usova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
The Past ◽  
Electoral Authoritarianism ◽  
National Legislatures ◽  
Mixed Systems ◽  
Cross National

Over the past decade, the mixed system became the fastest growing variety of electoral systems used in elections for national legislatures. Opinions about the reasons for the popularity of mixed systems in the research literature still vary. There are no cross-national studies in political science that would link the use of a mixed independent electoral system with the consolidation of an authoritarian order. Under authoritarianism, elections perform three functions: imitation, control and signaling. These functions set the structure of incentives for choosing an electoral formula. The purpose of my study is to determine the structure of incentives for the employment of mixed independent electoral systems under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. One of the main results of the study is that, in comparison with democracies, mixed independent electoral systems are more often used in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that mixed independent electoral system provides an opportunity to effectively realize the imitation, control and signaling functions of elections under electoral authoritarianism.

Electoral Systems and Policy Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Cross National

Policies as diverse as tariffs, exchange rates, and unemployment insurance vary across democratic countries. In an attempt to explain this cross-national variation, scholars have turned to the institutions that govern countries’ elections. The institutions that regulate elections, also known as an electoral system, vary significantly across democracies. Can these varied electoral institutions explain the diversity of policies observed? This question remains unanswered. Despite a growing body of research, little consensus exists as to precisely how electoral institutions affect policy. Why is it so difficult to untangle the effects of electoral institutions on economic policy? One reason for the confusion may be the imprecise manner in which electoral institutions are often measured. Better measures of electoral systems may improve our understanding of their policy effects. Improved theories that clarify the causal mechanism(s) linking electoral systems to policy outcomes will also help to clarify the relationship between electoral systems and policies. To better understand the policy effects of electoral institutions, both theoretical and empirical work must take seriously contextual factors, such as geography, which likely mediate the effects of electoral institutions. Finally, different types of empirical evidence are needed to shed new light on the policy effects of electoral institutions. It is difficult to identify the effects of electoral systems in cross-national studies because of the many other factors that vary across countries. Examining within-country variations, such as changes in district magnitude, may provide useful new insights regarding the effects of electoral institutions on policy.

Feeling Represented

2020 ◽  
pp. 412-431
Author(s):  
Sören Holmberg
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
System Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Emerging Democracies ◽  
Institutional Learning ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
The Comparative Study ◽  
Political Groups

Institutional learning works. Citizens in older and more mature democracies feel represented to a larger extent than people in new and emerging democracies. And as normatively expected, feelings of being represented are reasonably well spread across different social and political groups. Electoral system design turns out not to be consequential. Majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral systems do about equally well when it comes to how well people feel they are being represented by a party or a party leader. The results are based on data from The Comparative Study of Electoral System’s (CSES) project covering forty-six countries and eighty-six elections between 2001 and 2011.

Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral Systems

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID J. SAMUELS
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Multiple Regression Analysis ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Studies ◽  
And Control ◽  
Collective Strategy ◽  
Brazilian Case ◽  
Cross National

A prominent question in comparative electoral studies concerns the so-called personal vote. Typically, scholars approach this question at a cross-national as opposed to a cross-party level. In this article, in contrast, the author focuses on the characteristics of parties, as opposed to the characteristics of electoral systems, as determinants of candidates' personal vote seeking. The author argues that a candidate's adoption of an individualistic or collective strategy depends largely on centralized or decentralized nomination control in his party, his party's alliance options, and his access to and control over funding and patronage. The author explores the Brazilian case, testing his claims at the national and district level using multiple regression analysis. Furthermore, he explains how one party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT), has overcome the incentives of the electoral system.

scholarly journals Mandate type, electoral safety, and defections from the party line: The conditional mandate divide in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013

2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881988163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Sieberer ◽  
Tamaki Ohmura
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Mixed Electoral Systems ◽  
German Bundestag

Research on mixed electoral systems provides inconclusive findings on the question whether members of parliament (MPs) elected in single-member districts are more likely to vote against the party line than MPs elected via closed party lists. This article rejects both the hypothesis of a general “mandate divide” and the competing claim that contamination effects completely wash out behavioral differences. Instead, we argue that electoral incentives to defect are stronger for a specific type of MP—those who run only in a district and are electorally insecure. Statistical analyses of roll call votes in the German Bundestag covering more than 60 years support this “conditional mandate divide” against alternative hypotheses. These findings suggest a more nuanced view on electoral system effects in mixed electoral systems and highlight the importance of electoral competition for incentivizing MPs to side with district demands if those conflict with the party line.

Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 1533-1556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Birch
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
National Study ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Cross National Study ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Cross National

This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.

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