Electoral Systems and Policy Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Cross National

Policies as diverse as tariffs, exchange rates, and unemployment insurance vary across democratic countries. In an attempt to explain this cross-national variation, scholars have turned to the institutions that govern countries’ elections. The institutions that regulate elections, also known as an electoral system, vary significantly across democracies. Can these varied electoral institutions explain the diversity of policies observed? This question remains unanswered. Despite a growing body of research, little consensus exists as to precisely how electoral institutions affect policy. Why is it so difficult to untangle the effects of electoral institutions on economic policy? One reason for the confusion may be the imprecise manner in which electoral institutions are often measured. Better measures of electoral systems may improve our understanding of their policy effects. Improved theories that clarify the causal mechanism(s) linking electoral systems to policy outcomes will also help to clarify the relationship between electoral systems and policies. To better understand the policy effects of electoral institutions, both theoretical and empirical work must take seriously contextual factors, such as geography, which likely mediate the effects of electoral institutions. Finally, different types of empirical evidence are needed to shed new light on the policy effects of electoral institutions. It is difficult to identify the effects of electoral systems in cross-national studies because of the many other factors that vary across countries. Examining within-country variations, such as changes in district magnitude, may provide useful new insights regarding the effects of electoral institutions on policy.

National Electoral Thresholds and Disproportionality

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-119
Author(s):  
Tasos Kalandrakis ◽  
Miguel R. Rueda
Keyword(s):  
Expectation Maximization ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Model Fit ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Proportional Allocation ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
System Configurations

We model the conditional distribution of seats given vote shares induced by national electoral systems using a stochastic threshold of representation and a disproportionality parameter that regulates allocation for parties above the threshold. We establish conditions for the parameters of this model to be identified from observed seats/votes data, and develop a Maximum a Posteriori Expectation-Maximization (MAP-EM) algorithm to estimate them. We apply the procedure to 116 electoral systems used in 417 elections to the lower house across 36 European countries since WWII. We reject a test of model fit in only 5 of those systems, while a simpler model without thresholds is rejected in favor of our estimated model in 49 electoral systems. We find that the two modal electoral system configurations involve higher thresholds with seat allocation for parties exceeding thresholds that does not statistically differ from perfectly proportional allocation (32.76% of all systems); and systems for which we cannot reject the absence of a national threshold but exhibit disproportional seat allocation for parties eligible for seats (38.79% of all systems). We also develop procedures to test for significant changes in electoral institutions and/or the distribution of seats.

scholarly journals Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Gelman ◽  
Gary King
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Methods ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
The Relationship

We demonstrate the surprising benefits of legislative redistricting (including partisan gerrymandering) for American representative democracy. In so doing, our analysis resolves two long-standing controversies in American politics. First, whereas some scholars believe that redistricting reduces electoral responsiveness by protecting incumbents, others, that the relationship is spurious, we demonstrate that both sides are wrong: redistricting increases responsiveness. Second, while some researchers believe that gerrymandering dramatically increases partisan bias and others deny this effect, we show both sides are in a sense correct. Gerrymandering biases electoral systems in favor of the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what would have happened if the other party controlled it, but any type of redistricting reduces partisan bias as compared to an electoral system without redistricting. Incorrect conclusions in both literatures resulted from misjudging the enormous uncertainties present during redistricting periods, making simplified assumptions about the redistricters' goals, and using inferior statistical methods.

scholarly journals MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
V. А. Usova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
The Past ◽  
Electoral Authoritarianism ◽  
National Legislatures ◽  
Mixed Systems ◽  
Cross National

Over the past decade, the mixed system became the fastest growing variety of electoral systems used in elections for national legislatures. Opinions about the reasons for the popularity of mixed systems in the research literature still vary. There are no cross-national studies in political science that would link the use of a mixed independent electoral system with the consolidation of an authoritarian order. Under authoritarianism, elections perform three functions: imitation, control and signaling. These functions set the structure of incentives for choosing an electoral formula. The purpose of my study is to determine the structure of incentives for the employment of mixed independent electoral systems under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. One of the main results of the study is that, in comparison with democracies, mixed independent electoral systems are more often used in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that mixed independent electoral system provides an opportunity to effectively realize the imitation, control and signaling functions of elections under electoral authoritarianism.

The Impact of Mixed-member Districts on Legislators' Behavior: The Case of Bolivia

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita Corral ◽  
Francisco Sánchez ◽  
Cristina Rivas Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Personal Assistants ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractMany studies suggest that mixed-member electoral systems produce different attitudes and behaviors among representatives. This article assesses how this type of electoral system shapes Bolivian legislators' perceptions of their roles as representatives, their district activities, and their relationships with their political parties. It examines these dimensions using elite survey data and interviews with legislators and their personal assistants. The results show that the electoral system does not produce a uniform impact. It shapes how legislators perceive their role as representatives and the nature of the relationship they build with their political parties, but it does not produce differences in the kinds of activities that both types of legislators carry out in their districts.

Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral Systems

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID J. SAMUELS
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Multiple Regression Analysis ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Studies ◽  
And Control ◽  
Collective Strategy ◽  
Brazilian Case ◽  
Cross National

A prominent question in comparative electoral studies concerns the so-called personal vote. Typically, scholars approach this question at a cross-national as opposed to a cross-party level. In this article, in contrast, the author focuses on the characteristics of parties, as opposed to the characteristics of electoral systems, as determinants of candidates' personal vote seeking. The author argues that a candidate's adoption of an individualistic or collective strategy depends largely on centralized or decentralized nomination control in his party, his party's alliance options, and his access to and control over funding and patronage. The author explores the Brazilian case, testing his claims at the national and district level using multiple regression analysis. Furthermore, he explains how one party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT), has overcome the incentives of the electoral system.

The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 540-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward R. Tufte
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Relationship

An enduring fact of life in democratic electoral systems is that the party winning the largest share of the votes almost always receives a still larger share of the seats. This paper tests three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develops explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system. The “cube law” is rejected as a description, since it assumes uniformity (which is not observed in the data) across electoral systems. Explanations for differences in swing ratio and bias are found in variations in turnout over districts, the extent of the “nationalization” of politics, and, most importantly, in who does the districting or reapportionment. The measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for the judicial evaluation of redistricting schemes and may contribute to the reduction of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering.

Elections Activate Partisanship across Countries

2018 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 248-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHANE P. SINGH ◽  
JUDD R. THORNTON
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Comparative Study ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Causal Effects ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Party Attachment ◽  
The Comparative Study ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Cross National

It has long been argued that elections amplify partisan predispositions. We take advantage of the timing of the cross-national post-election surveys included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to explore the effects that elections have on individuals’ attachments to political parties. Within these surveys, under the assumption that the dates on which respondents are interviewed are assigned independent of factors known to affect partisanship, we are able to identify the causal effects of election salience on partisan attachments. We find strong evidence that election salience increases the probability of one having a party attachment, increases the strength of attachments, and heightens the relationship between partisanship and evaluations of political actors. Empirical explorations of our identifying assumption bolster its validity. Our results substantiate the causal role that elections play in activating partisanship.

scholarly journals Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament

2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
European Union Member State ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Selection Rules ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Despite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of electoral institutions on macrolevel political behavior, little is known about the relationship between these institutions and microlevel legislative behavior. This article reviews existing claims about this relationship and develops a model for predicting how electoral institutions affect the relationship between parliamentarians and their party principals in the context of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is an ideal laboratory for investigating these effects, because in each European Union member state, different institutions are used to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). The results of this model, tested on four hundred thousand individual MEP vote decisions, show that candidate-centered electoral systems (such as open-list proportional representation or single-transferable-vote systems) and decentralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians independent from their party principals. By contrast, party-centered electoral systems (such as closed-list proportional representation systems) and centralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians beholden to the parties that fight elections and choose candidates: in the case of the European Parliament, the national parties.

Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (7) ◽  
pp. 905-927 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames ◽  
Martin S. Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Government Expenditures ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Institutional Differences

The increasing use of mixed-member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects. Yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems, even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems. An analysis of mixed-member system policy effects is problematic, given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems. This article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems lead to differences in policy outputs. The political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality. Our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed-member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that MMP systems, which are more proportional than MMM systems, are correlated with higher levels of government spending. Thus the MMM-MMP distinction produces significant policy differences.

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