Good Science

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua W. Clegg

Good Science is an account of psychological research emphasizing the moral foundations of inquiry. This volume brings together existing disciplinary critiques of scientism, objectivism, and instrumentalism, and then discusses how these contribute to institutionalized privilege and to less morally responsive research practices. The author draws on historical, critical, feminist, and science studies traditions to provide an alternative account of psychological science and to highlight the irreducibly moral foundations of everyday scientific practice. This work outlines a theoretical framework for thinking about and practicing psychology in ways that center moral responsibility, collective commitment, and justice. The book then applies this framework, describing psychological research practices in terms of the their moral dilemmas. Also included are materials meant to aid in methods instruction and mentoring.

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 382-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamin Asay

In their 2012 article, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, make equally good sense of scientific practice as the correspondence theory, but at a lesser theoretical cost. I also argue that the considerations Haig and Borsboom draw on are better thought of as issues relevant to realism, and thus separate from the theory of truth. I conclude that while they are correct to engage questions about what makes true the various claims that arise in psychological research, they may do so without saddling themselves with a correspondence theory.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian A. Nosek ◽  
Tom Elis Hardwicke ◽  
Hannah Moshontz ◽  
Aurélien Allard ◽  
Katherine S. Corker ◽  
...  

Replication, an important, uncommon, and misunderstood practice, is gaining appreciation in psychology. Achieving replicability is important for making research progress. If findings are not replicable, then prediction and theory development are stifled. If findings are replicable, then interrogation of their meaning and validity can advance knowledge. Assessing replicability can be productive for generating and testing hypotheses by actively confronting current understanding to identify weaknesses and spur innovation. For psychology, the 2010s might be characterized as a decade of active confrontation. Systematic and multi-site replication projects assessed current understanding and observed surprising failures to replicate many published findings. Replication efforts highlighted sociocultural challenges, such as disincentives to conduct replications, framing of replication as personal attack rather than healthy scientific practice, and headwinds for replication contributing to self-correction. Nevertheless, innovation in doing and understanding replication, and its cousins, reproducibility and robustness, have positioned psychology to improve research practices and accelerate progress.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Ramsey

The credibility of psychological science has been questioned recently, due to low levels of reproducibility and the routine use of inadequate research practices (Chambers, 2017; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). In response, wide-ranging reform to scientific practice has been proposed (e.g., Munafò et al., 2017), which has been dubbed a “credibility revolution” (Vazire, 2018). My aim here is to advocate why and how we should embrace such reform, and discuss the likely implications.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 556-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Davis ◽  
Roger Giner-Sorolla ◽  
D. Stephen Lindsay ◽  
Jessica P. Lougheed ◽  
Matthew C. Makel ◽  
...  

More and more psychological researchers have come to appreciate the perils of common but poorly justified research practices and are rethinking commonly held standards for evaluating research. As this methodological reform expresses itself in psychological research, peer reviewers of such work must also adapt their practices to remain relevant. Reviewers of journal submissions wield considerable power to promote methodological reform, and thereby contribute to the advancement of a more robust psychological literature. We describe concrete practices that reviewers can use to encourage transparency, intellectual humility, and more valid assessments of the methods and statistics reported in articles.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
scott lilienfeld ◽  
Josh Miller ◽  
Donald Lynam

When, if ever, should psychological scientists be permitted to offer professional opinions concerning the mental health of public figures they have never directly examined? This contentious question, which attracted widespread public attention during the 1964 U.S. presidential election involving Barry Goldwater, received renewed scrutiny during and after the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, when many mental health professionals raised pointed questions concerning the psychiatric status of Donald Trump. Although the Goldwater Rule prohibits psychiatrists from offering diagnostic opinions on individuals they have never examined, no comparable rule exists for psychologists. We contend that, owing largely to the Goldwater Rule’s origins in psychiatry, a substantial body of psychological research on assessment and clinical judgment, including work on the questionable validity of unstructured interviews, the psychology of cognitive biases, and the validity of informant reports and of L (lifetime) data, has been overlooked in discussions of its merits. We conclude that although the Goldwater Rule may have been defensible several decades ago, it is outdated and premised on dubious scientific assumptions. We further contend that there are select cases in which psychological scientists with suitable expertise may harbor a “duty to inform,” allowing them to offer informed opinions concerning public figures’ mental health with appropriate caveats.


Author(s):  
Leah R. Warner ◽  
Stephanie A. Shields

Intersectionality theory concerns the interdependence of systems of inequality and implications for psychological research. Social identities cannot be studied independently of one another nor separately from the societal processes that maintain inequality. In this chapter we provide a brief overview of the history of intersectionality theory and then address how intersectionality theory challenges the way psychological theories typically conceive of the person, as well as the methods of data gathering and analysis customarily used by many psychologists. We specifically address two concerns often expressed by feminist researchers. First, how to reconcile the use of an intersectionality framework with currently-valued psychological science practices. Second, how intersectionality transforms psychology’s concern with individual experience by shifting the focus to the individual’s position within sociostructural frameworks and their social and political underpinnings. In a concluding section we identify two future directions for intersectionality theory: how psychological research on intersectionality can facilitate social activism, and current developments in intersectionality theory.


Author(s):  
Kristin A. Hancock ◽  
Douglas C. Haldeman

Psychology’s understanding of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people has evolved, become more refined, and impacted the lives of LGB people in profound ways. This chapter traces the history of LGB psychology from the nineteenth century to the present and focuses on major events and the intersections of theory, psychological science, politics, and activism in the history of this field. It explores various facets of cultural and psychological history that include the pathologizing of homosexuality, the rise of psychological science and the political movements in the mid-twentieth century, and the major shifts in policy that ensued. The toll of the AIDS epidemic on the field is discussed as is the impact of psychological research on national and international policy and legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 251524592110181
Author(s):  
Manikya Alister ◽  
Raine Vickers-Jones ◽  
David K. Sewell ◽  
Timothy Ballard

Judgments regarding replicability are vital to scientific progress. The metaphor of “standing on the shoulders of giants” encapsulates the notion that progress is made when new discoveries build on previous findings. Yet attempts to build on findings that are not replicable could mean a great deal of time, effort, and money wasted. In light of the recent “crisis of confidence” in psychological science, the ability to accurately judge the replicability of findings may be more important than ever. In this Registered Report, we examine the factors that influence psychological scientists’ confidence in the replicability of findings. We recruited corresponding authors of articles published in psychology journals between 2014 and 2018 to complete a brief survey in which they were asked to consider 76 specific study attributes that might bear on the replicability of a finding (e.g., preregistration, sample size, statistical methods). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which information regarding each attribute increased or decreased their confidence in the finding being replicated. We examined the extent to which each research attribute influenced average confidence in replicability. We found evidence for six reasonably distinct underlying factors that influenced these judgments and individual differences in the degree to which people’s judgments were influenced by these factors. The conclusions reveal how certain research practices affect other researchers’ perceptions of robustness. We hope our findings will help encourage the use of practices that promote replicability and, by extension, the cumulative progress of psychological science.


Hypatia ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-773 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Giordano

Feminist science studies scholars have documented the historical and cultural contingency of scientific knowledge production. It follows that political and social activism has impacted the practice of science today; however, little has been done to examine the current cultures of science in light of feminist critiques and activism. In this article, I argue that, although critiques have changed the cultures of science both directly and indirectly, fundamental epistemological questions have largely been ignored and neutralized through these policy reforms. I provide an auto‐ethnography of my doctoral work in a neuroscience program to a) demonstrate how the culture of science has incorporated critiques into its practices and b) identify how we might use these changes in scientific practices to advance feminist science agendas. I critically analyze three areas in current scientific practice in which I see obstacles and opportunities: 1) research ethics, 2) diversity of research subjects and scientists, and 3) identification of a project's significance for funding. I argue that an understanding of the complicated and changing cultures of science is necessary for future feminist interventions into the sciences that directly challenge science's claim to epistemic authority.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Stephen Lindsay

Psychological scientists strive to advance understanding of how and why we animals do and think and feel as we do. This is difficult, in part because flukes of chance and measurement error obscure researchers’ perceptions. Many psychologists use inferential statistical tests to peer through the murk of chance and discern relationships between variables. Those tests are powerful tools, but they must be wielded with skill. Moreover, research reports must convey to readers a detailed and accurate understanding of how the data were obtained and analyzed. Research psychologists often fall short in those regards. This paper attempts to motivate and explain ways to enhance the transparency and replicability of psychological science. Specifically, I speak to how publication bias and p hacking contribute to effect-size exaggeration in the published literature, and how effect-size exaggeration contributes, in turn, to replication failures. Then I present seven steps toward addressing these problems: Telling the truth; upgrading statistical knowledge; standardizing aspects of research practices; documenting lab procedures in a lab manual; making materials, data, and analysis scripts transparent; addressing constraints on generality; and collaborating.


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