scholarly journals Do Campaign Contributions from Farmers Influence Agricultural Policy? Evidence from a 2008 Farm Bill Amendment Vote to Curtail Cotton Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-433
Author(s):  
Scott Callahan
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Farm Bill ◽  
Vote Decision ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Cotton Farmers ◽  
Simultaneous Model

AbstractThis article studies the political activities of individual cotton farmers and cotton political action committees (PACs) by exploiting a vote to amend the 2008 Farm Bill. Using a simultaneous model, I estimate reduced form equations for donations from cotton farmers and cotton PACs using tobit models, which instrument donations in the probit vote equation to control for the hypothesized endogeneity between campaign contributions and legislative votes. I find evidence that cotton farmers, like cotton PACs, contribute to legislators representing a median cotton farming constituency. I find no evidence that contributions from cotton farmers or cotton PACs significantly affected the vote decision.

Political Action Committees

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Mutch
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Party Organizations

Non-party organizations form political action committees (PACs) to make the campaign contributions the FECA bans them from making themselves. The FEC defines every PAC as belonging to one of two broad categories: connected and nonconnected. Nearly all connected PACs were formed by corporations, trade...

Beyond the limits: involvement in illegal political activities

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Dahl ◽  
Håkan Stattin
Keyword(s):  
Goal Orientation ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Engagement ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Late Adolescents ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Simultaneous Model

The purpose of this study is to examine the adolescents who cross the boundaries of legality, also including illegal political means in their political action repertoire. The data comprised of questionnaire responses from middle and late adolescents in a Swedish city of around 130,000 citizens. Analyses of covariance, EXACON, and logistic regression were used to examine the extent to which adolescents including illegal political activities in their political activity repertoire compare with their legally oriented counterparts. Adolescents using illegal political activity reported higher levels of political interest and goal-orientation than adolescents involved solely in legal political activity. The major contrasts with legal political activism were that illegal political activism seemed to co-occur with (a) reluctance to accept authority, irrespective of the context (societal, school, or parental) and (b) approval of violent political means. In a simultaneous model, further analysis revealed that reluctance to accept authority reduced the predictive power of illegal political activities with regard to approval of political violence. This suggests that the tendencies to approve of political violence, among adolescents involved in illegal political activities, might be partially explained by challenges toward authority. To conclude, adolescents in illegal political activism seem to have similar resources for political engagement as their legally oriented counterparts. However, adolescents involved in illegal political activity seem more likely to let ends justify the means. Most likely, this position is related to authority challenges.

Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 891-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy L. Hansen ◽  
Neil J. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
Foreign Corporations

Corporate political activity is usually operationalized and analyzed as financial contributions to candidates or political parties through political action committees (PACs). Very little attention has been paid to other dimensions, such as lobbying, in a systematic way. On a theoretical level we address the issue of how to conceive of PAC contributions, lobbying, and other corporate activities, such as charitable giving, in terms of the strategic behavior of corporations and the implications of “foreignness” for the different types of corporate political activity. On an empirical level we examine the political activities of Fortune 500 firms, along with an oversampling of U.S. affiliates of large foreign investors for the 1987–88 election cycle.

scholarly journals Political Action Committees in State Elections

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 61-77
Author(s):  
James D. King ◽  
Helenan S. Robin
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Direct Mail ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
The Past

While the number o f state PACs and their campaign contributions have increased substantially over the past decade, much remains unknown regarding their organization and activities. From a survey o f PACs in three states we develop a portrait o f political action committees, which extends beyond contributions. State PACs form around both economic and ideological issues; have very modest organizational structures; solicit funds primarily by direct mail and personal contacts; typically delegate responsibility for making campaign contributions to committees, which adopt accommodationist strategies; and have extended their activities to include voter education and mobilization. A number o f differences among the various types o f PACs are also evident.

Lobbying and Opposition to SFAS No. 123(R): An Examination of Campaign Contributions from CEOs and PACs

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-124
Author(s):  
Cristi A. Gleason ◽  
Matthew Glendening
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Employee Stock Options ◽  
Shareholder Proposals

SYNOPSIS We examine the contributions of CEOs and company-affiliated political action committees (PACs) to members of Congress who supported a moratorium on the Financial Accounting Standards Board's 2003 proposed standard to require firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. Our evidence—based on a sample of firms targeted by shareholder proposals to voluntarily expense employee stock options—indicates that CEOs and PACs had different motivations for lobbying on this policy issue. Specifically, we find that opposition to shareholder proposals varies positively with CEOs' contributions to the moratorium co-sponsors. However, opposition varies positively with PAC contributions to co-sponsors only when the targeted CEO contributes to the PAC. These results suggest that CEO lobbying relates more to executives' interests to preserve excessive pay, whereas PAC lobbying relates more to interests in preserving the level of earnings.

Differences in Campaign Funds: A Racial Explanation

1986 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Theilmann ◽  
Al Wilhite
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Black Candidates ◽  
The U.S

Black candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives receive substantially lower levels of campaign contributions than non-black candidates. This article investigates the reason for this discrepancy. Are blacks discriminated against or do they receive less money because they are riskier candidates? The results suggest that blacks do receive less money because of their race and that the source of the funds is important. Political action committees and political parties tend to discriminate but individual contributors do not.

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