scholarly journals Balancing Incentives Among Actors: A Carrots and Sticks Approach to Reputation in UN Peacekeeping Missions

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 228-232
Author(s):  
Sabrina M. Karim
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Police Officers ◽  
Member States ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
Competing Priorities ◽  
Mixed Motives

As Kristina Daugirdas points out in her article on the role of reputation in international organizations (IOs), peacekeeping operations include a multitude of actors with varying interests. These actors have competing priorities, which forces IOs to balance the needs of the actors involved in peacekeeping missions. Because IOs often depend on member states as implementing agents, this could cause IOs to suppress their own interests in favor of member states, which could ultimately negatively affect the communities in which the peacekeepers operate. This dynamic is present in UN peacekeeping operations. While Daugirdas seeks to align the incentives of the UN and the states that contribute peacekeepers so as to harness reputation as a force to encourage the good behavior of all involved, I argue that this alignment rarely happens because of IOs’ reliance on member states. Through the dynamics of UN peacekeeping operations, I show that the UN reliance on states to provide police officers and troops suppresses the UN's own interests in favor of the contributing states’ interests. I also identify a carrots and sticks approach to balancing incentives. As Paul Stephan does in his essay for this symposium, I draw on a rational-choice, actor-based theory to identify the mixed motives of the various actors who staff and operate peacekeeping missions. The framework proposed here, I contend, provides a way to better understand the sources of the tension that exist when evaluating reputation as a disciplinary tool for IOs.

scholarly journals Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332094076
Author(s):  
Magnus Lundgren ◽  
Kseniya Oksamytna ◽  
Katharina P Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Systematic Study ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Member States ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
Standing Army ◽  
Rapid Deployment

International organizations’ ability to respond promptly to crises is essential for their effectiveness and legitimacy. For the UN, which sends peacekeeping missions to some of the world’s most difficult conflicts, responsiveness can save lives and protect peace. Very often, however, the UN fails to deploy peacekeepers rapidly. Lacking a standing army, the UN relies on its member states to provide troops for peacekeeping operations. In the first systematic study of the determinants of deployment speed in UN peacekeeping, we theorize that this speed hinges on the incentives, capabilities, and constraints of the troop-contributing countries. Using duration modeling, we analyze novel data on the deployment speed in 28 peacekeeping operations between 1991 and 2015. Our data reveal three principal findings: All else equal, countries that depend on peacekeeping reimbursements by the UN, are exposed to negative externalities from a particular conflict, or lack parliamentary constraints on sending troops abroad deploy more swiftly than others. By underlining how member state characteristics affect aggregate outcomes, these findings have important implications for research on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, troop contribution dynamics, and rapid deployment initiatives.

Leadership Selection in United Nations Peacekeeping

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kseniya Oksamytna ◽  
Vincenzo Bove ◽  
Magnus Lundgren
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Geographic Proximity ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Leadership Selection ◽  
Member States ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
Civilian Leaders

Abstract States covet leadership and staff positions in international organizations. The posts of civilian leaders and force commanders of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are attractive to member states. In selecting peacekeeping leaders, the UN Secretariat balances three considerations: satisfying powerful member states by appointing their nationals; recognizing member states’ contribution to the work of the organization; and ensuring that leaders have the necessary skill set. We investigate appointments of more than 200 civilian and military leaders in 24 UN missions, 1990–2017. We find that contributing troops to a specific mission increases the chances of securing a peacekeeping leadership position. Geographic proximity between the leaders’ country and the conflict country is also a favorable factor whose importance has increased over time. Civilian leaders of UN peacekeeping operations tend to hail from institutionally powerful countries, while military commanders come from major, long-standing troop contributing countries. Despite some role that skills play in the appointment process, the UN's dependence on troop contributors, together with its reliance on institutionally powerful states, can be a source of dysfunction if it prevents the organization from selecting effective peacekeeping leaders. This dynamic affects other international organizations that have significant power disparities among members or rely on voluntary contributions.

Buying blue helmets: The role of foreign aid in the construction of UN peacekeeping missions

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Boutton ◽  
Vito D’Orazio
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Increasing Demand ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
Do So

While the evolving nature and proliferation of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period is well documented, we know less about how personnel are recruited for these missions. Furthermore, recent developments have rendered existing supply-side explanations for troop contributions less convincing. The increasing demand for personnel, along with stagnant UN reimbursement rates and the rising costs of participation that began during the 1990s, mean that it is less attractive than ever for developing countries to offer their own troops to what have become increasingly ambitious operations. Yet, we see a large pool of developing countries continuing to do so. To address this puzzle, we argue that UN member states with strong preferences for establishing peacekeeping missions have begun using foreign aid as an inducement to help potential contributors overcome the collective action problem inherent in multilateral peacekeeping operations. We uncover strong empirical evidence that these ‘pivotal states’ strategically allocate foreign aid to persuade contributing states to boost their contributions, and also to ensure that these missions continue to be staffed and maintained as costs rise, particularly during the post-1999 period. We also find that states are responsive to these financial inducements: foreign aid increases both the likelihood of contributing personnel and the size of a state’s contribution. Theoretically, this article advances the scholarly understanding of international organizations and cooperation by illuminating an informal, extra-organizational strategy by which IOs can facilitate cooperation.

scholarly journals Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110289
Author(s):  
Magnus Lundgren ◽  
Kseniya Oksamytna ◽  
Vincenzo Bove
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Member States ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Leadership Accountability ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
Do So

International organizations face a trade-off between the need to replace poorly performing leaders and the imperative of preserving the loyalty of influential or pivotal member states. This performance-politics dilemma is particularly acute in UN peacekeeping. Leaders of peacekeeping operations are responsible for ensuring that peacekeepers implement mandates, maintain discipline, and stay safe. Yet, if leaders fail to do so, is the UN Secretariat able and willing to replace them? We investigate newly collected data on the tenure of 238 civilian and military leaders in thirty-eight peacekeeping operations, 1978 to 2017. We find that the tenures of civilian leaders are insensitive to performance, but that military leaders in poorly performing missions are more likely to be replaced. We also find evidence that political considerations complicate the UN’s efforts at accountability. Holding mission performance constant, military leaders from countries that are powerful or contribute large numbers of troops stay longer in post.

scholarly journals Indonesian Female Police Officer’s Deployment as International Police Officers in United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (2016-2018)

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-235
Author(s):  
Witri Elvianti ◽  
Meilisa Rusli
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Police Officers ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Scholarly Publications ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Strategic Role ◽  
Human Rights Advocacy ◽  
Building Activities ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions

The main purpose is to analyze the role of Indonesian female police deployed as Individual Police Officers in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur from 2016 to 2018. This research was designed as a qualitative case study that triangulated data from previously published researches, institutional documents, and semi-structured qualitative interviews. Previous scholarly publications were used to observe gender deficit – which is the lack of female personnel in UN peacekeeping missions. Institutional documents, particularly ex-Indonesian female police reports, were analyzed to contribute to data enrichment in this research. Lastly, the authors conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with some ex-female police who have completed their deployment in UNAMID (2016-2018). Concerning the gender equality and counterinsurgency concepts, this research figured out that Indonesian female police could demonstrate their strategic role to provide skill-building activities, trust-building with refugees, and human rights advocacy. The numbers of Indonesian female police in this mission remained higher than other Southeast Asian contributing countries, but the Indonesian female police were also functional in line with the UN gendering peace and security agenda.

Monitoring Accountability for un Peacekeeping under iccpr

2017 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika Nakamura
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Potential Role ◽  
International Organisations ◽  
Member States ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping

This article aims to reveal the implications and significance of recent practices of the Human Rights Committee (hrc) in monitoring the human rights situation pertaining to peacekeeping operations; it also seeks to highlight the hrc’s roles in relation to either United Nations (un) member states’ or the un’s accountability over peacekeeping operations. The contribution is inspired by the current study and development of the accountability of international organisations. Empirical analysis shows the potential role of the hrc as one of the monitoring bodies of human rights situations in peacekeeping operations. A parallel question arises: what are the legal bases for the hrc monitoring of un member states’ or the un’s accountability with regard to peacekeeping operations? Considering the matter from various angles based on the concept of accountability reveals the background to and implication of the legal bases in question.

UN Peacekeeping Operations and Successful Military Diplomacy: A Case Study of Pakistan

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bakare Najimdeen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Policy Objective ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
Military Diplomacy

Few years following its creation, the United Nations (UN) with the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), as a multilateral mechanism geared at fulfilling the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which empowered the Security Council to enforce measurement to maintain or restore international peace and security. Since its creation, the multilateral mechanism has recorded several successes and failures to its credit. While it is essentially not like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years and have emerged as a new form of diplomacy. Besides, theoretically underscoring the differences between diplomacy and foreign policy, which often appear as conflated, the paper demonstrates how diplomacy is an expression of foreign policy. Meanwhile, putting in context the change and transformation in global politics, particularly global conflict, the paper argues that traditional diplomacy has ceased to be the preoccupation and exclusive business of the foreign ministry and career diplomats, it now involves foot soldiers who are not necessarily diplomats but act as diplomats in terms of peacekeeping, negotiating between warring parties, carrying their countries’ emblems and representing the latter in resolving global conflict, and increasingly becoming the representation of their countries’ foreign policy objective, hence peacekeeping military diplomacy. The paper uses decades of Pakistan’s peacekeeping missions as a reference point to establish how a nation’s peacekeeping efforts represent and qualifies as military diplomacy. It also presented the lessons and good practices Pakistan can sell to the rest of the world vis-à-vis peacekeeping and lastly how well Pakistan can consolidate its peacekeeping diplomacy.

The Involvement of UN in Palestine and the Possibility of a Global Protection Force

2021 ◽  
pp. 105-112
Author(s):  
Kainat Kamal
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Sustainable Peace ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are mandated to help nations torn by conflict and create conditions for sustainable peace. These peacekeeping operations hold legitimacy under international law and the ability to deploy troops to advance multidimensional domains. Peacekeeping operations are called upon to maintain peace and security, promote human rights, assist in restoring the rule of law, and help conflict-prone areas create conditions for sustainable peace ("What is Peacekeeping", n.d.). These missions are formed and mandated according to individual cases. The evolution of the global security environment and developing situations in conflictridden areas requires these missions to transform from 'traditional' to 'robust' to 'hybrid', accordingly (e.g., Ishaque, 2021). So why is it that no such model can be seen in restoring peace and protection of Palestinian civilians in one of the most protracted and deadly conflicts in history?

scholarly journals Rallying the troops

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy JA Passmore ◽  
Megan Shannon ◽  
Andrew F Hart
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Member States ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions

Is the acquisition of personnel for UN peacekeeping missions susceptible to free-riding by UN member states? If so, what drives this behavior and what impact does this have on obtaining required personnel for the mission? Using data from 21 missions in 13 African countries between 1990 and 2010, this article addresses whether UN peacekeeping missions experience a shortfall in personnel due to incentives to free-ride by contributing states. It argues that as the number of states contributing to a mission increases, contributors have a greater incentive to free-ride and make suboptimal personnel contributions, leading to greater overall shortfall in the mission’s personnel. However, this free-riding behavior can be mitigated by the economic incentives of contributor states. The findings support two central tenets of collective action theory: that free-riding by member states contributing to the mission is more prevalent when the number of contributors is larger, and when selective incentives such as economic gains are lower. These findings have implications for the strategic composition and efficacy of peacekeeping forces. More broadly, the results underscore the struggle of international organizations to obtain compliance from member states in achieving their international objectives.

Navigating the Complexity of HIV/AIDS in African Peacekeeping Missions: Challenges and Prospects

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 361-384
Author(s):  
Ayodele Akenroye
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Hiv Transmission ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Hiv Aids

The end of the Cold War witnessed the resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Africa, which necessitated the deployment of peacekeeping missions in many crisis contexts. The risk of HIV transmission increases in post-conflict environments where peacekeepers are at risk of contracting and spreading HIV/AIDS. In response, UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000) stressed the need for the UN to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and advice in its training for peacekeepers. However, troops in peacekeeping missions remain under national command, thus limiting the UN prerogatives. This article discusses the risk of peacekeepers contracting or transmitting HIV/AIDS, as well as the role of peacekeeping missions in controlling the spread of the disease, and offers an account of the steps taken within UN peacekeeping missions and African regional peacekeeping initiatives to tackle the challenges of HIV/AIDS. While HIV/AIDS remains a scourge that could weaken peacekeeping in Africa, it seems that inertia has set in, making it even more difficult to tackle the complexity of this phenomenon.

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