The Principle of Reason's Self-Preservation in Kant's Essay on the Pantheism Controversy

Author(s):  
FARSHID BAGHAI

Abstract In his 1786 essay on the pantheism controversy, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’, Kant implies that ‘the maxim of reason's self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]’ is reason's first principle for orienting itself in thinking supersensible objects. But Kant does not clearly explain what the maxim or principle of reason's self-preservation is and how it fits into his larger project of critical philosophy. Nor does the secondary literature. This article reconstructs Kant's discussion of the principle of reason's self-preservation in ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ It suggests that this principle is best understood as the discipline of pure reason. The principle of reason's self-preservation performs the same methodological function that Kant assigns to the discipline of pure reason. This principle establishes the rule of law in reason and subjects reason to its own laws. In so doing, it prevents reason's dialectical errors and also grounds reason's faith (Vernunftglaube), which in turn systematically conditions the practical use of reason.

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter ZÖLLER

The essay focuses Kant’s engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant’s magnum opus. In particular, the essay examines Kant’s positive pronouncements on the “Platonic republic” (Platonische Republik) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first Critique’s affirmative retake on Plato’s Forms (Ideen) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant’s prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant’s appropriation of the idea of the “Platonic republic” for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-741
Author(s):  
Krisztina Juhász

Abstract The study, leaning on the concept of ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ introduced by R. Daniel Kelemen on the one hand, and new intergovernmentalism as a fresh theoretical approach of the European integration on the other hand, investigates if we can talk about the disruption of the ‘authoritarian equilibrium’ as a consequence of the split up between Fidesz and the EPP, and the adoption of the rule of law conditionality mechanism. In other words, whether we can talk about an initial authoritarian dis-equilibrium? Or can we rather talk about a converse process due to the mechanisms of new intergovernmentalism resulting in the further stabilisation of authoritarian governments and the ineffectiveness of the EU measures devoted to the protection of rule of law? Using qualitative resource analysis of the relevant secondary literature and the documents and legal acts of the EU and its institutions the paper comes to the conclusion that while we have witnessed efforts to disrupt the partisan and the financial support of the Hungarian governing party, these efforts were neutralised by the mechanisms of new intergovernmentalism and as a consequence we still cannot talk about an initial authoritarian disequilibrium in the EU.


Author(s):  
Newman Warren J

This chapter considers the meaning, scope, and application of three constitutional principles of surpassing importance in Canada. The rule of law is foundational to Canada’s constitutional framework and may properly be characterized as the first principle of Canadian constitutional law. It is linked to, and in some respects, forms the underpinning for other fundamental principles, including constitutionalism, federalism, democracy, and parliamentary sovereignty. As the latter principles are the focus of chapters by other commentators in this Handbook, this chapter will examine the rule of law primarily in relation to the separation of powers and judicial independence. The principle of judicial independence is also essential to the functioning and structure of the Constitution, given the role the courts are called upon to play in policing the constitutional limits of legislative power and administrative action. The separation of powers is still an emerging principle in Canada, but also increasingly viewed as fundamental.


REVISTA PLURI ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Gustavo Angelelli

A noção de rule of law (Estado de direito) é central no conceito moderno de direito e nos debates atuais em torno do direito e da legitimidade dos governos. Este artigo reflete sobre a figura do “tribunal da história” na constituição do direito e aponta para a necessidade de que a defesa do projeto substantivo do rule of law, exemplarmente encampada por David Dyzenhaus, seja acompanhada de uma filosofia crítica da história.Palavras-chave: Rule of law, Estado de direito, Tribunal da história, Filosofia crítica da história, Filosofias da história.AbstractThe notion of rule of law is central to the modern concept of law and the current debates about law and the legitimacy of governments. This article reflects on the figure of the “court of history” in the constitution of law and argues that the defense of the substantive project of the rule of law, exemplarily encamped by David Dyzenhaus, must be accompanied by a critical philosophy of history.Keywords: Rule of law, Estado de direito, Court of History, Critical philosophy of history, Philosophies of history


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
SOHINI GUHA

Abstract The political assertion by subalterns (specifically lower and backward castes) that India witnessed from the 1990s onwards, and the formation of governments by parties representing these groups in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, two electorally critical North Indian states, contributed significantly to the deepening of India's democracy. But these lower caste governments met with vehement resistance from privileged strata, and from a section of state actors themselves, in particular, the bureaucracy. These governments adopted a range of strategies to counter this resistance in turn, which had the effect of bringing the procedural and substantive elements of democracy into sharp conflict. The project of lower and backward caste empowerment was defined by a politics of levelling, which placed great value on instantly visible egalitarian outcomes, even when these could only be achieved by denting the rule of law and weakening public institutions. But it was precisely on account of its ability to deliver instant egalitarian fixes (albeit on an ad-hoc and sporadic basis) that this politics commanded so much legitimacy among subordinate groups. Drawing on ethnographic research conducted in Uttar Pradesh, and secondary literature on backward caste politics in Bihar, this article explores the consequences that this prioritizing of right outcomes over proper procedures had on public culture in North India. It argues that this prioritizing of consequences over means bred a widespread impatience with a procedural conception of democracy, which was seen as obstructing the modalities that went to secure justice in real life.


Dialogue ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
FARSHID BAGHAI

Kant often compares reason to an organized body, which suggests that reason should be understood as a whole from which all possible uses of the faculties of reason are derived. However, Kant does not elaborate his conception of the whole of reason. Nor does the secondary literature. This paper suggests that the wholeness of reason is the apodictic modality of reason, i.e., the necessary standard that determines what can systematically belong to reason, and thus works as the systematic condition for all possible uses of the faculties of reason. This necessary standard is the discipline of pure reason.


IEE Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 218
Author(s):  
Clifford Gray
Keyword(s):  

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