scholarly journals “The Platonic Republic.” The Beginnings of Kant’s Juridico-Political Philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter ZÖLLER
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Civic Life ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Normative Conception ◽  
Theory Of Ideas ◽  
Magnum Opus

The essay focuses Kant’s engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant’s magnum opus. In particular, the essay examines Kant’s positive pronouncements on the “Platonic republic” (Platonische Republik) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first Critique’s affirmative retake on Plato’s Forms (Ideen) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant’s prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant’s appropriation of the idea of the “Platonic republic” for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.

scholarly journals Państwo prawa na gruncie filozofii politycznej Immanuela Kanta – dwie interpretacje

2019 ◽  
pp. 108-124
Author(s):  
Michał Wieczorkowski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
State Power ◽  
Ethical Reflection ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Crucial Difference

The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept.

13. John Locke

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Waldron
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
Short Biography ◽  
Political Thinker

This chapter examines and defends the relevance of John Locke's writings as political philosophy. Locke's political philosophy continues to have an enormous impact on the framing and the pursuit of liberal ideas in modern political thought — ideas about social contract, government by consent, natural law, equality, individual rights, civil disobedience, and private property. The discussion and application of Locke's arguments is thus an indispensable feature of political philosophy as it is practised today. After providing a short biography of Locke, the chapter considers his views on equality and natural law, property, economy, and disagreement, as well as limited government, toleration, and the rule of law. It concludes with an assessment of Locke's legacy as a political thinker.

Hayek and Schmitt on the Rule of Law

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. R. Cristi
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
The Rule Of Law

abstractAccording to Hayek the rule of law constitutes the foundation of liberalism's political and legal theory. General and abstract laws, as opposed to concrete measures, protect individual freedom from prerogative and arbitrariness (normativism versus decisionism). Hayek maintains that Carl Schmitt's decisionism explains his attacks on liberalism and the prominent role he played in support of Hitler's regime. Two general observations should shorten the distance that Hayek seeks to establish between his posture and that of Schmitt. Firstly, Schmitt's critique is primarily aimed against the tendency that neutralizes the state and makes it vulnerable to democratic pressures. Secondly, Hayek's normativism is seen to contain a decisionist potential.

Kant, Intervention and the ‘Failed State’

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 91-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Cavallar ◽  
August Reinisch
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Failed State ◽  
Important Development ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Political Works

Nowadays Kant's practical philosophy (including his political philosophy) is as highly regarded as his theoretical philosophy. This is an important development since the more constructive side of Kant's philosophy is to be found in his moral and political works. The main task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to clarify its concepts and to get rid of basic errors, and thus only ‘negative’. The moral and political writings, on the other hand, try to expand the scope of reason ‘for practical purposes’ (‘in praktischer Absicht’). Establishing principles of moral and political conduct, their main objective is not negative, but constructive.

scholarly journals The Rule of Law as Political Philosophy

NUTA Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 95-105
Author(s):  
Gopal Prasad Dahal
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Power Rule ◽  
Modern Natural ◽  
The Law ◽  
Political Foundations

In social science, rule of law indicates one of the most subjective and value loaded concepts. From the pragmatic vantage point, rule of law represents procedural device. This paper thus tried to appraise rule of law from philosophical perspectives. Based on literature review, my appraisal highlights that rule of law lays down under fundamental requirements for law by which those with power rule under the law. And for the citizen, the rule of law is both prescriptive (i.e. dictating the conduct required by law) and protective (i.e. demanding that government acts according to law) of the citizens. The notion of the rule of law is dependent upon the political foundations of a state that tailored to the concept upon a nation’s economic resources. Here is why, rule of law must follow political philosophy or ancient/modern natural law thought that corresponded good and equitable. And the rule of law must not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of the citizens. However, critical philosopher claimed that rule of law neither says about how the law is to be made by tyrants for democratic majorities nor says about ensuring fundamental rights and social justice. They also blamed that the rule of law is an ideological device engaged by those with power to mask the reality of that power in society, and the correlative powerlessness of the mass citizens.

scholarly journals The Facets of the Enlightenment Movement from a Libertarian Perspective:

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Reimers
Keyword(s):  
French Revolution ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
French Enlightenment ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Main Period ◽  
Reign Of Terror ◽  
The French Revolution

This paper pretends to explain the origins of the French Revolution, in particular in regards to its connection with the main proponents of the French Enlightenment. It argues that the Enlightenment movement was rather heterogeneous, shaped by many different thinkers with often incompatible views. The merits of Jean Jacques Rousseau in regards to conservation and education are described, while equivalently criticizing his rather collectivist ideas and his disputable views on women. It is argued that even if during the main period of the Enlightenment movement, liberal thinkers such as Montesquieu, Turgot, Lafayette and Condorcet had defined political theories based on individual freedom and competition, they were possibly “too far ahead of times” to significantly shape the French Revolution. Independently from the positive aspects of the Enlightenment movement, the actual French Revolution was often collectivist and nationalist and led to a violent phase – the ‘Reign of Terror’. Thus, this analysis allows us to understand the complexity and diversity of the Enlightenment movement and its relation to the actual French Revolution. Consequently, the revolution’s collectivist, nationalist and violent phase must be seen critically, also showing us that the implementation of democratic processes can bear risks, as the ‘majority rule’ can differ quite significantly to the concept of the ‘Rule of Law’.

scholarly journals Problem demokracji totalitarnej w filozofii politycznej libertarianizmu

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-25
Author(s):  
Norbert Slenzok
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The Rule Of Law

The aim of the paper involves presentation and evaluation of the concept of totalitarian democracy, which is to be found in the works of the libertarian political philosophy proponents: Murray N. Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. In the course of our analysis, the author formulates following tenets. Firstly, although libertarian thinkers do not employ the expression „totalitarian democracy” themselves, that notion can be successfully identified in their writings. To Rothbard and Hoppe democracy — including the liberal one — is a totalitarian system by nature. It is supposed to stem from democratic regime’s lust for taking control over all aspects of individual’s life in libertarian terms: all aspects of the use of private property, as well as from the inherent fallacies of liberal safeguards, designed in order to protect democracy from degradation to mere tyranny of majority, such as the rule of law, constitutionalism, and checks and balances principles. Secondly, in author’s judgement, however Rothbard’s and — in particular — Hoppe’s critique of democracy should be considered consistent with libertarian ideals, it appears to a certain extent exaggerated also in their light.

scholarly journals The slow and hidden road to serfdom

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-237
Author(s):  
Peter Bernholz
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Alexis De Tocqueville ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
General Rules ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Discretionary Powers

Without the rule of law limiting the discretionary powers of government agencies, but also of other organizations and in-dividuals no individual freedom is possible. If government re-presentatives or private persons can order at their discretion individuals to behave in certain ways, no individual liberty is guaranteed. As Immanuel Kant expressed it «man is free if he needs to obey no person but solely the law.» And even if indi-viduals are only obliged to follow the law, their freedom is al-ways threatened if these laws can be changed arbitrarily by any individuals or government authorities. This is even true for de-mocracies in which duly elected parliamentary majorities (that is minorities) are allowed to introduce new laws or change old ones relating to any sphere of human activities. The problem has been clearly stated by Alexis de Tocqueville (1945, vol. I, p.270): When I see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people or a king, an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, I say there is the germ of tyranny, and I seek to live elsewhere, under other laws. Similar ideas are expressed by Friedrich v. Hayek (1944, p. 62): The Rule of Law thus implies limits to the scope of legislation: it restricts it to the kind of general rules known as formal law, and excludes legislation either directly aimed at particular people, or at enabling anybody to use the coercive power of the state for the purpose of such discrimination.

The Principle of Reason's Self-Preservation in Kant's Essay on the Pantheism Controversy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
FARSHID BAGHAI
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Secondary Literature

Abstract In his 1786 essay on the pantheism controversy, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’, Kant implies that ‘the maxim of reason's self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]’ is reason's first principle for orienting itself in thinking supersensible objects. But Kant does not clearly explain what the maxim or principle of reason's self-preservation is and how it fits into his larger project of critical philosophy. Nor does the secondary literature. This article reconstructs Kant's discussion of the principle of reason's self-preservation in ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ It suggests that this principle is best understood as the discipline of pure reason. The principle of reason's self-preservation performs the same methodological function that Kant assigns to the discipline of pure reason. This principle establishes the rule of law in reason and subjects reason to its own laws. In so doing, it prevents reason's dialectical errors and also grounds reason's faith (Vernunftglaube), which in turn systematically conditions the practical use of reason.

Law and Political Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Damgaard Thaysen
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
The State ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Public ◽  
Legal Coercion ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law ◽  
Public Wrong

Modern states pursue most of their (domestic) ends by creating law and acting in accordance with the law they create. Moreover, many believe states ought to pursue most of their ends this way. If a state ought to do something, then chances are it ought to do it by creating, abolishing, changing, upholding, or enforcing some law. Therefore, almost any kind of political philosophy with bearing on what states should do has bearing on what law should be like. Justifying the legal proscription of some conduct involves more than just showing that citizens ought to refrain from that conduct. Legally restricting conduct is an exercise of coercion and must be justified as such. Criminal prohibitions in particular require special justification, as they are not only coercive but also commit the state to deliberately inflict the harm and stigma of punishment on some of its own citizens. Nevertheless, if the state must coerce its citizens, it ought generally to do so through a law that conforms to the rule of law. Law conforms to the rule of law if it is capable of guiding the citizens as they act and plan for the future. This the law can do only if it is open, clear, prospective, and stable, such that citizens can know what it demands now and predict with reasonable certainty what it will demand in the future. Conformity to the rule of law promotes freedom and is required to respect human dignity. Much of the debate about the justification and scope of legal coercion revolves around several principles that advance claims about what considerations are relevant to the justifiability of law. These principles all have the following structure: The fact that a legal restriction of a certain kind is related in a certain way to a certain type of conduct has a certain impact on whether that restriction is justifiable. Common principles include (a) legal moralism, according to which it is always a good reason to criminalize conduct that the conduct is wrongful; (b) the wrongness constraint, according to which criminalizing morally permissible conduct is never justified; (c) liberalism, according to which it is always a good reason to criminalize conduct that the conduct is either harmful or seriously offensive to others, and criminalizing conduct that is neither harmful nor offensive is never justified; (d) the public wrong principle, according to which it is always a good reason to criminalize conduct that the conduct is a public wrong, and criminalizing conduct is never justified unless the conduct is a public wrong; (e) the sovereignty principle, according to which the only legitimate restrictions on conduct are those that secure independence. Which, if any, of these principles one should accept is the subject of an extensive and sophisticated academic debate.

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