Crimes Against Humanity and the Responsibility to Protect

Author(s):  
Gareth Evans
2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Sarkin

AbstractThis essay investigates the connection between humanitarian intervention and R2P within an historical, legal, and conceptual context. It challenges the widely held view that Africa lacks the capacity to intervene in areas of conflict and human rights violations, arguing instead that the continent possesses the will and instruments to protect human rights. The author notes that, while the UN Security Council retains the primary responsibility for promoting global peace and security, the R2P norm remains contested even within the UN. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were initially undertaken without UN approval, but were later sanctioned by the world body. These interventions undermined the idea of state sovereignty as independence from external interventions, which had previously constrained humanitarian missions in Africa. However, the essay argues that the R2P principle was boosted by the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 to prosecute persons suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide. In addition, the intervention clause in the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000 supports the R2P principle while prohibiting unilateral interventions. Notwithstanding these developments, the author notes that the AU and Africa's regional bodies still have a long way to go in translating the R2P doctrine into practice.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahana Dharmapuri

Although the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has a number of supporters, there is still little agreement on institutional procedures to execute Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) systematically. This is due to a lack of consensus on how exactly to operationalize specific RtoP practices with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The acceptance of this line of thinking is peculiar in its ignorance of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UN 1325) on Women, Peace and Security, by militaries, both national and multinational, over the last five to ten years. Misunderstanding, underutilization, and neglect of the UN 1325 mandate within the RtoP community has caused many important developments in the field to be overlooked. This article attempts to begin filling that gap. It presents an overview of what UN 1325 is about and compares UN 1325 to the Responsibility to Protect agenda. It also examines how implementing UN 1325 in UN and NATO peace and security operations is pushing the RtoP agenda forward in practical, not theoretical, terms in three key areas of military peace and security operations – the transformation of doctrine, command structure, and capabilities.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Mayersen

Within the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, there is an assumption that is rarely questioned. Beneath the statement that states and the international community are charged with the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, lies the implication that vulnerable populations cannot protect themselves. In periods of crisis, when the international community might consider mobilising a response under pillar three, this is often the case. Yet outside of such crises, when pillar one – the enduring responsibility of the state to protect its own populations – and pillar two – assistance from the international community to meet this responsibility – might be invoked in a preventive capacity, vulnerable populations may not be wholly reliant upon protection from external actors. In these circumstances, persecuted groups may actively seek to protect themselves, and may be successfully able to do so. In this paper, I challenge the current understanding of prevention within R2P as an externally imposed process, by considering how persecuted groups have themselves acted in ways that mitigate their vulnerability to mass atrocities. The paper considers a number of historical case studies in which targeted groups were able to leverage their own agency, often with assistance from others, to reduce this vulnerability. These include cases that culminated in genocide, namely the experiences of German and Austrian Jews under Nazi rule, and negative cases studies in which a demonstrable risk of mass atrocities was not realised, such as the experiences of Yemenite Jews in the first half of the twentieth century and those of the Bahá’í community in Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. These cases suggest that assisting persecuted populations to empower themselves can be an effective way to promote resilience to mass atrocities. In the final section of the paper, I explore why this approach is often overlooked, despite its capacity for some success. I consider the potential benefits and costs of a greater focus on utilising the agency of vulnerable groups in endeavours to prevent mass atrocities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 190-214
Author(s):  
Svetlana Bokeriya ◽  
Dmitriy Sidorov

The three-stage transformation in the framework of «humanitarian intervention – personal security – responsibility to protect (R2 P)» reflects the international community's search for the most effective forms of protecting the population from crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The concept of humanitarian intervention turned out to be untenable, and in 2005 the «responsibility to protect» was formalized. Responsibility to protect concept was intended to become an effective tool in the field of ensuring peace and security. The article deals with the approaches of the BRICS countries, which took an active part in the development of the R2 P, to its interpretation at the present stage. The contradictory semantic content and legal non-formality of the concept make it difficult to implement it in practice and divide R2 P researchers into two main groups. The key goal of the article is to study the evolution of the positions of the BRICS countries on R2 P.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-74
Author(s):  
Nicholas Idris Erameh ◽  
Victor Ojakorotu

Existing studies on the Myanmar-Rohingyan crisis have explored the contending issues from a narrow perspective. This underscores the need for broader engagement by interrogating the veracity of the claims of mass atrocities against the Rohingyans, nonauthorization of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), and implications for consolidating and internalizing the RtoP norm. This study argues that, while the acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingyans satisfies four of the crimes upon which RtoP can be authorized, its nonauthorization suggests that in spite of its commitment to “Never Again,” the international community is yet to come to terms with issues bordering on mass atrocity and civilian protection. This inaction amidst widespread atrocities against the Rohingyans explains why the RtoP is not only contested, but also risks the chances of further nonutilization and institutionalization. Thus, the possibility that the RtoP would remain valuable depends on how the international criminal court and the global community prosecute those culpable of atrocities against the Rohingyans, adopt a clear rule of establishing when mass atrocity has been perpetuated and demand RtoP intervention, and ensure that these interventions are guided by the principle of Jus in Bellum and Jus ad Bello.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 19-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Shusterman ◽  
Michelle Godwin

When the United Nations (un) agreed on a definition of the Responsibility to Protect (r2p) at the 2005 World Summit, the two paragraphs it endorsed articulated what r2p stands for, giving the concept a focused but narrow remit around protecting populations specifically from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in armed conflict. In its next paragraph, the un Membership reiterated concerns on the impact of armed conflict on children echoing the landmark 1612 Resolution by the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict (caac) adopted a few weeks before. Though side-by-side in the text, caac and r2p were not linked. To this day, for international practitioners in emergency responses, the interaction between both remains unclear. While this simultaneous peak moment for r2p and caac may have occurred by chance, this article describes how both concepts (as advocacy tools and instruments for practitioners to ‘respond’) emerged out of similar concern for protecting civilians – including children – in conflict. However, the link between both concepts should not be overstated. While r2p and caac fit together for the intentions they share, this happened more coincidentally than purposefully. This article argues, taking an international practitioner’s perspective, that both concepts should not be understood as always operating at the same level. caac has grown from an advocacy platform to an umbrella of different programmes, responses, tools and frameworks, including the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (mrm) on Children and Armed Conflict. Even if applied with variable success, these tools and approaches under the caac agenda chart some ways practitioners can hope to do more towards protecting children in conflict. But for those same practitioners, delivering on a Responsibility to Protect is a different question – one where their ‘responsibility’ is at best secondary and implicit, because r2p sits squarely as a primary and explicit responsibility of states – who are also the ultimate duty bearers for children’s rights. While the echoes of a child rights agenda can be heard in the conversation around r2p, and while r2p can help frame and drive efforts by child protection practitioners to respond to some of the worst situations children face, r2p is, for the protection agency field officer, an aspirational goal, necessarily out of reach.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Hubert ◽  
Ariela Blätter

In 2005 the UN’s World Summit endorsed the idea that its members have a responsibility to prevent and halt genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Insufficient attention has been paid to clarifying how the definitions and evolving jurisprudence relating to these international crimes can provide clarity in identifying the unlawful acts that the Responsibility to Protect seeks to prevent and to halt. Specifically, an analysis of the elements of the crimes establishes the following parameters: attacks directed against any civilian population, committed in a widespread or systematic manner, in furtherance of a state or organizational policy, irrespective of the existence of discriminatory intent or an armed conflict. This conclusion makes reference to four ‘crimes’ redundant: crime against humanity alone provides an appropriate framework for conceptualizing and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Although analysts focused on international crimes tend to prioritize accountability, such an approach need not be reactive. The essence of the Responsibility to Protect is best characterized as international crimes prevention.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Reike

On September 9, 2013, diplomats and civil society activists gathered in a ballroom in New York to welcome Jennifer Welsh as the UN Secretary-General's new Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). In her first public appearance in that role, Special Adviser Welsh explained that one of her top priorities would be “to take prevention seriously and to make it meaningful in practice.” “In the context of RtoP,” Welsh added during the discussion, “we are talking about crimes, and crimes have implications in terms of how we deal with them. You'll hear me say that a lot.” Welsh's approach of treating RtoP as a principle that is primarily concerned with prevention and is firmly linked to international crimes neatly captures the evolution of RtoP since its formal acceptance by states at the 2005 UN World Summit. Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the World Summit's Outcome Document not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of RtoP but also restricted the scope of RtoP to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The crime and prevention–focused version of RtoP has subsequently been defended and promoted by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and by UN member states. This article seeks to systematically explore some of the implications of linking RtoP to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of RtoP, the so-called responsibility to prevent. What, then, are the consequences of approaching the responsibility to prevent as the prevention of international crimes?In order to systematically examine this question, this article turns to literature from criminology. While the criminological perspective has so far been neglected in debates on RtoP, the prominent criminologists John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond argue vehemently that “criminology is crucially positioned to contribute understanding and direction to what the United Nations has mandated as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ groups that are threatened with mass atrocities.” For the purpose of this article, the label “criminology” comprises domestic criminology, supranational criminology, and international criminal law. While insights from supranational criminology and international criminal law are directly applicable to international crimes, translating knowledge generated in relation to crimes at the domestic level to atrocity crimes at the international level is, of course, not without challenges. Reasoning by analogy is an important method in this regard, though given the anarchical nature of international society some analogies will inevitably be imperfect. The benefits of such an approach, if carefully employed, however, outweigh the risks.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document