Practical reason and the status of moral obligation

2015 ◽  
pp. 97-126
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Status

Practical Reason and the Status of Moral Obligation

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 197-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Status ◽  
Moral Claims

The power of skepticism depends on the apparent possibility of rationally asking, for virtually any kind of proposition commonly thought to be known, how it is known or what justifies believing it. Moral claims are among those commonly subjected to skeptical challenges and doubts, even on the part of some people who are not skeptical about ordinary claims regarding the external world. There may be even more skepticism about the possibility of justifying moral actions, particularly if they are against the agent's self-interest. Both problems-how to justify moral claims and how to justify moral action - come within the scope of the troubling question “Why be moral?” Even a brief response to moral skepticism should consider both kinds of targets of justification, cognitive and behavioural, and should indicate some important relations between the two types of skeptical challenge. I will begin with the cognitive case- with skepticism about the scope of theoretical reason in ethics - proceed to practical skepticism, which concerns the scope of practical reason, and then show how an adequate account of rationality may enable us to respond to moral skepticism.

MORAL OBLIGATION AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONCERNS FROM IMMANUEL KANT, G. W. F. HEGEL, AND ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tristram Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Important Change ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Presence Of God ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Status

AbstractOnce God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

scholarly journals 'Critique' as Technology of the Self

2005 ◽  
pp. 97-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Self ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Care Of The Self ◽  
The Status ◽  
Heated Debate ◽  
The Subject

This inquiry is situated at the intersection of two enigmas. The first is the enigma of the status of Kant's practice of critique, which has been the subject of heated debate since shortly after the publication of the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. The second enigma is that of Foucault's apparent later 'turn' to Kant, and the label of 'critique', to describe his own theoretical practice. I argue that Kant's practice of 'critique' should be read, after Foucault, as a distinctly modern practice in the care of the self, governed by Kant's famous rubric of the 'primacy of practical reason'. In this way, too, Foucault's later interest in Kant - one which in fact takes up a line present in his work from his complementary thesis on Kant's Anthropology - is cast into distinct relief. Against Habermas and others, I propose that this interest does not represent any 'break' or 'turn' in Foucault's work. In line with Foucault's repeated denials that he was interested after 1976 in a 'return to the ancients', I argue that Foucault's writings on critique represent instead both a deepening theoretical self-consciousness, and part of his project to forge an ethics adequate to the historical present.

scholarly journals Idea Boga w późnych pismach Immanuela Kanta

2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kupś
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Critical Period ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Moral Theology ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Theoretical Status ◽  
The Status ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Opus Postumum ◽  
Idea Of God

Kant’s position on the problem of God is radicalized under the influence of transcendental philosophy’s evolving project. The weakening position of physico-theology and the growing importance of moral theology are possible ways of describing the shift in perspective between the pre-critical period writings and the critical period writings. The separation of the area of cognition and action excludes the possibility of formulating theodicy in a classical form. God, as only a conceived idea, and its meaning is firmly grounded in practical philosophy, in which the presentation of the law is a sufficient condition for moral behaviour. In such a model, God is only an idea, but a fully functional one. This could be noticed mostly in the Opus postumum, where in analogy to God’s practical idea, Kant deduces the transcendental ether’s existence. Ether is not just a hypothesis for Kant; it is not just a ‘temporary’ or ‘contingent’ assumption made ad hoc to explain a particular experience. Still, it is a fundamental and indelible condition, a conditio sine qua non of experience in general. The non-hypothetical matter of heat (ether) is the transcendental condition of all experience, though it does not cease to be an ‘intelligible thing’, an ‘idea’. The status of this idea is entirely ‘non-theoretical’. Kant writes about the ether similarly as he writes about the idea of God, which is only conceivable but at the same time it maintains a strong ‘non-theoretical’ status. The Kantian idea of God is strongly objectified. It is not a ‘product’ of reason, but rather something ‘perceived’ by reason, a strictly theistic idea (as Erich Adickes claims). Kant’s statements, characteristic for the Opus postumum, in which God is identified with moral law, of course give grounds to suppose that the deification of practical reason can be understood as a final stage in the long process of anthropologizing God. However, these statements also allow us to consider practical reason as a new source of what is given.

The Radical Demand in Løgstrup's Ethics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Stern
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Stephen Darwall ◽  
Ethical Demand

This book focuses on the ethics of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905–81), and in particular on his key text The Ethical Demand (1956). The first part of the book provides a commentary on The Ethical Demand. The second part contains chapters on Løgstrup as a natural law theorist; his critique of Kant and Kierkegaard; his relation to Levinas; the difference between his position and the second-person ethics of Stephen Darwall; and the role of Luther in Løgstrup’s thinking. Overall, it is argued that Løgstrup rejects accounts of ethical obligation based on the commands of God, or on abstract principles governing practical reason, or on social norms; instead he develops a different picture, at the basis of which is our interdependence, which he argues gives his ethics a grounding in the nature of life itself. The book claims that Løgstrup offers a distinctive and attractive account of our moral obligation to others, which fits into the natural law tradition.

Kant’s Deduction of Freedom

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Transcendental Arguments ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
One Step

The aim in this chapter and in chapter 4 is to explain how the post-Kantian German Idealists radicalized Kant’s prioritizing of the practical. This chapter brings into focus the performative and first-personal aspect of transcendental arguments. I present a Fichtean interpretation of Kant’s Deduction of Freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. This interpretation shows that a transcendental argument always involves at least one step that cannot be established by logical means alone, but requires that the reader freely adopt a philosophical system or standpoint. By offering this Fichtean interpretation of Kant’s Deduction of Freedom, I also clarify the view that a form of self-relation that Fichte calls self-positing is the ground of moral obligation.

Dewey and White on Value, Obligation, and Practical Judgment

SATS ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
Practical Judgment ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Human Inquiry

AbstractThis essay examines the largely forgotten debate from 1949 between Dewey and White over the status of value judgments. It argues that White does not criticize Dewey’s moral philosophy as a misguided attempt to derive an “ought” from “is”, rather he maintains that Dewey’s ethical naturalism cannot provide an empirical definition of moral judgments that preserves their status as moral obligations. Although White is mistaken in presenting Dewey’s view as a failed theory of moral obligation, Dewey’s reply suggests that White is correct in understanding the connections between scientific and moral inquiry in normative terms. This further reveals that value judgments concerning what we should do, what Dewey calls “practical judgments”, are not moral obligations as White suggests, but are fallible directives for addressing problems disruptive of human activity. By presenting Dewey’s view as a failed attempt to reduce moral terms to an acceptable empirical vocabulary, White assumes a logical separation between the descriptive and that normative that is untenable from the perspective of Dewey’s account of human inquiry.

THE ARISTOTELIAN LEGISLATOR AND POLITICAL NATURALISM

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
George Duke
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Natural Entities ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The Status ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
Law Making ◽  
Natural Impulse

Aristotle's assertion in Politics 1.2 that there is a natural impulse to form political communities is immediately contraposed with the claim that the person responsible for their foundation is the cause (αἴτιος) of the greatest of goods (Pol. 1253a33). The attribution of an essential role to the legislator as an efficient cause appears to clash, however, with Aristotle's political naturalism. If the polis exists by nature and humans are by nature political animals (1253a1–2), then the question arises as to why active intervention by the legislator is necessary for a polis. Conversely, if the polis is an artefact of practical reason, then Aristotle's distinction between products of the intellect and natural entities seems to preclude the status of the polis as natural. In light of this apparent tension between different aspects of Aristotle's account of the origins of political communities, the current paper seeks to demonstrate their reconcilability. Section 1 considers the role of the Aristotelian legislator in light of broader Greek assumptions regarding law-making. Section 2 then considers the status of law-making expertise (νομοθετική) as part of political science (πολιτική) and examines the mode of practical reason that is exercised by the legislative founder. Finally, in section 3, and building on recent interpretations which have emphasized that Aristotle operates with an extended teleological conception of nature, I argue that acts of legislative founding and nature can consistently serve as joint causes of the polis, because the ‘products’ of the practical rationality of the architectonic legislator are themselves an expression of distinctly human nature.

Sijaisvanhemmuus nyky-Venäjällä - työtä vai rakkautta?

Idäntutkimus ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 16-31
Author(s):  
Žanna Tšernova ◽  
Meri Kulmala
Keyword(s):  
Child Welfare ◽  
Focus Group ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Foster Parents ◽  
Russian Society ◽  
Foster Parenting ◽  
Alternative Care ◽  
The Status

Artikkelissa tarkastellaan hoivan käsitteen kautta sijaisvanhemmuuden ammatillistumista Venäjällä meneillään olevan lastensuojelun sijaishuollon uudistamisen kontekstissa. Analysoimme, kuinka lapsikylässä asuvat sijaisvanhemmat näkevät ja määrittelevät oman roolinsa ja toimintansa tarkoituksen pohjaten viidessä eri venäläisessä lapsikylässä sijaisvanhempien parissa toteutettuihin fokusryhmäkeskusteluihin ja teemahaastatteluihin. Sijaisvanhemmuus ymmärretään dikotomisesti joko rakkautena tai työnä. Käsitys hoivasta rakkautena ymmärretään moraalisena velvollisuutena ja eettisenä arvona. Tällöin kiistetään mahdollisuus hoivan virallistamiseen ja sen alistamiseen säännöille ja byrokratian ja markkinavoimien sanelulle. Hoivan määritteleminen työnä puolestaan tekee sijaisvanhemmille mahdolliseksi rationalisoida omaa toimintaansa ja problematisoida sijaisvanhemmuuden statusta yhteiskunnassa. Tällöin sijaisvanhemmuuden ammatillistuminen nähdään ratkaisuna lukuisille ongelmille, joihin sijaisvanhemmat törmäävät, ja sijaisperheissä tapahtuvan hoivan aseman parantamisena.   Foster parenting in contemporary Russia - work or love? The article explores the professionalisation of foster parenting in the context of the ongoing child welfare and so-called alternative care reforms in Russia through the concept of ‘care’. We analyse how foster parents who live in children’s villages see and define their role and the meaning of their activity based on focus group and thematic interviews with foster parents in five children’s villages in Russia. Foster parenting is understood through a dichotomy of ‘love’ and ‘work’. Seeing foster parenting as love is based on an understanding of it as a moral obligation and ethical value. In such a case, it becomes impossible to consider care as something official that exists under regulation and is led by bureaucratic and market principles. Understanding care as work, in turn, makes it possible for foster parents to rationalise their own activity and problematise their status in Russian society. In this case, the professionalisation of foster parenting is seen as a solution to multiple problems that foster parents face, and to the improvement of the status of this type of care more generally.

Pleasure and Fit in Kant's Aesthetics

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth F. Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Concept ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One

In the third Critique Kant shifts the focus in his enquiry from the status of factual statements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the grounding of moral imperatives in the Critique of Practical Reason to investigating two methods of considering the world which go beyond the strictly verifiable. This is a move from evaluating the interplay of a ‘determinate’ set of facts and intellectual preconditions to forming what Kant calls ‘reflective’ judgements on these facts. There are two major questions which the Critique of Judgement tackles. On the one hand Kant ambitiously considers how we might properly interpret a set of facts as comprising a larger teleological system and, on the other hand, he is interested in the seemingly quite separate issue of the appreciation of objects as beautiful. It is this latter issue which shall concern us here. Consistent with the reflective stand in the third Critique, Kant argues from the very outset that beauty is not an empirical concept with which we might describe the world. Beauty is not objective in the sense that size, colour or weight might be. Objective properties of this kind belong to the world of scientific understanding. Instead, he holds that judgements of aesthetic merit should be based upon the subjective pleasure we take in experiencing works of art and natural objects.

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