scholarly journals UNREFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp

AbstractVirtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of success from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain the intuitive lack of knowledge in Fake Barn cases, whilst holding on to the core claim that knowledge is success from ability. Ernest Sosa's version of virtue epistemology promises to rise to this challenge. Sosa distinguishes two types of knowledge, animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. He argues that while animal knowledge is present in Fake Barn cases, reflective knowledge is absent and ventures to explain the intuition of ignorance by the absence of reflective knowledge. This paper argues that Sosa's treatment of Fake Barn cases fails as it commits Sosa to a number of highly counterintuitive results elsewhere in epistemology.

Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa

This chapter discusses how Descartes uses his principle of clarity and distinctness to raise his first-order judgments to the scientia level. Error is what one must avoid, not just falsity; so he seeks not just truth but also aptness. You are to assure yourself that you attain such aptness, which is required for confidence that you avoid error and attain certainty. But this assurance is forthcoming only with assurance that the operative source of your judgment is indeed a reliable-enough competence. This raises an issue of circularity, also known as the Cartesian Circle. The chapter shows how this circle also affects contemporary virtue epistemology when it postulates a level of reflective knowledge above that of animal knowledge.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams

AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.


Author(s):  
TUNCER ÖREN

The discipline of modeling and simulation (M&S) is advancing, maturing, and is being used in more and more challenging areas. Appreciation of its comprehensive and integrative view, i.e., its big picture would be very useful for its continued and systematic growth and successful applications. The article starts with a rationale for the needs to see the big picture of M&S and ways to see the big picture. Since M&S is closely related with reality and its representations i.e., models, reality/model dichotomy is clarified. As the core of the article, detailed perceptions of M&S from different perspectives such as: purpose of use, problem to be solved, connectivity of operations, and types of knowledge processing are clarified. Then, three aspects of ways to increase the trustworthiness of M&S are outlined (i.e., validation and verification (V&V), quality assurance (QA), and failure avoidance (FA). The article ends with a discussion of M&S from the perspective of professionalism. Some recommendations or challenges are still open for implementations for the success of M&S.


Author(s):  
Diah Kurniati ◽  
Nuraeningsih Nuraeningsih

One of the core components of teacher knowledge is reflective knowledge which is defined as the teacher’s capacity to reflect on and assess his or her own practice. In other words, as teachers, they should be able to do reflective teaching. Reflective teaching is the teacher’s thinking about what happens in the classroom lessons, and thinking about alternative means of achieving goals and aims (Cruickshank and Zeichner in Richard and Nunan 1990). This paper discusses reflective teaching as a means of professional development.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 315
Author(s):  
Matthew Soteriou

De acuerdo con Sosa, Descartes es un epistemólogo de virtudes, y podemos entender el proyecto epistemológico de Descartes sólo como un proyecto de segundo orden que concuerda con esta manera de entender su epistemología. Mi objetivo en este artículo es el de ahondar en esta comparación con la epistemología de Descartes, principalmente mediante la exploración de una manera en la que uno podría añadir ciertos detalles suplementarios a la postura general de Sosa, con la finalidad de que ésta concuerde de mejor manera con la postura de Descartes, o al menos con la que yo considero que es la postura de DescartesPalabras clave: Ernest Sosa, Descartes, conocimiento animal, conocimiento reflexivo, cognitio, scientia.AbstractAccording to Sosa, Descartes is a virtue epistemologist, and we can make sense of Descartes’ epistemological project only as a second-order project that fits with this view of his epistemology. My aim in this paper is to pursue this comparison with Descartes’ epistemology—principally through exploring a way in which one might add certain supplementary details to Sosa’s general approach, in order to bring it into closer alignment with Descartes’ view, or at least what I take to be Descartes’ view Keywords: Ernest Sosa, Descartes, animal knowledge, reflective knowledge, cognitio, scientia. 


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Van Loon ◽  
Roland Bal

This article explores how developers address uncertainty in the creation of an evidence-based guideline (EBG). As the aim of an EBG is to assist healthcare practitioners in situations of doubt, it is easy to assume that uncertainty has no place in guidelines. However, as we discovered, guideline development does not ignore uncertainty but seeks to accept it while establishing credible recommendations for healthcare. Dealing with omissions in knowledge, ignorance, or challenges in valuating different sorts of knowledge form the core of the work of guideline developers. Interviewing guideline developers, we found three types of valuation work: classifying studies, grading types of knowledge, and involving expertise and clinical practice. These methods have consequences for the credibility, and amount and kind of uncertainty EBGs can include.


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