scholarly journals EU Operational Powers and Legal Protection: A Legal Theory Perspective on the Operational Powers of the European Border and Coast Guard

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-649
Author(s):  
Bas Schotel
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Blind Spot ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Public Power ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

AbstractFor the first time in its history, the EU is in the process of acquiring significant and genuine permanent operational powers. A new Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard provides Frontex with a permanent corps of 10,000 border guards—3,000 of which will be EU agents—its own equipment, and its own competences to intervene along the EU borders and beyond. The operational powers will allow the EU to directly and physically intervene in tangible reality.This Article argues that the conferral of operational powers on the EU poses a risk to individual legal protection. This is because once authorities have acquired operational powers of a certain extent and quality, they can afford to act against or without the law by simply overpowering or eluding the legal mechanisms that normally constrain the exercise of public power. So far, Members of the European Parliament and academics critical of Frontex and the new Regulation have overlooked this issue and concentrated exclusively on how to legally constrain the exercise of operational powers. This Article addresses this blind spot by examining whether and how public law should place legal constraints not only on the exercise but also on the build-up of operational powers.

The Alternatives to a Bite or a Bark: After Launching Article 7 TEU Against the Hungarian Government

2020 ◽  
pp. 63-78
Author(s):  
Gábor Halmai
Keyword(s):  
Regional Development ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Structural Funds ◽  
A Value ◽  
Political Function ◽  
Alternative Means ◽  
Eu Structural Funds ◽  
Naming And Shaming ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

On 12 September the European Parliament—for the first time ever—launched Art 7 TEU proceedings against Hungary. The decision was based on a report denouncing various violations of EU values by Viktor Orbán’s government. But triggering Art 7 TEU came too late, and meant also too little, because besides the important political function of naming and shaming Hungary as a violator of EU values, the chances of reaching the corrective arm of the procedure are extremely low. Hence, the chapter argues, instead of Art 7 alternative means from the toolkits of the EU may be more effective. Infringement actions as alternatives have not really worked so far in the case of Hungary, but cutting off EU structural funds for regional development or other forms of assistance as a value conditionality approach has not really been tried as yet.

The Community Plant Variety Office

2021 ◽  
pp. 17-26
Author(s):  
Gert Würtenberger ◽  
Paul van der Kooij ◽  
Bart Kiewiet ◽  
Martin Ekvad
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Public Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Plant Variety ◽  
European Public ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
The Eu

This chapter is about the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), which was created by Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights or the Basic Regulation. It explains the purpose of the implementation and application of the Basic Regulation. It also describes CPVO as an agency of the European Union (EU), which is a body governed by European public law that is distinct from the EU institutions. This chapter describes the resources that led the European Parliament, the EU Council, and the European Commission to launch an inter-institutional dialogue on decentralized agencies in 2009. It points out, as stated in the Basic Regulation, that the decisions of the CPVO will be taken by a committee of three members of its staff.

21. Institutions of the European Union

Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 756-794
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Public Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Law Making ◽  
The Eu

This chapter introduces the project of European integration and discusses the legal basis of the EU, which consists of treaties that authorize law-making. It will identify the principal executive institutions of the European Union and their functions. They will be classified under the headings of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The chapter will also examine the process of enacting legislation and the role of the European Parliament. Drawing on an understanding of similar institutions and processes in the UK, the discussion is particularly concerned with an assessment of the institutions in terms of public law values, such as legitimacy, accountability, and transparency.

scholarly journals More Powers – More Problems: the European Parliament against the Frontex Agency

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-47
Author(s):  
Olga Potemkina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Search And Rescue ◽  
Asylum Policy ◽  
The Press ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
Migrants Rights ◽  
Maritime Search And Rescue ◽  
The Eu

The article analyses the accusations made by the press against the Frontex agency (The European Border and Coast Guard Agency – EBCG). Media investigations have revealed noncompliance with the norms of European and international law in the agency’s operations, including violations of migrants’ rights during maritime search and rescue operations: pushback of boats, abuse of authority during return of those who were refused asylum. The author presents the positions of the Council and the Commission, emphasizing that the activities and reputation of the EBCG are very important for the EU leadership, since the agency’s reform is one of the few points of the program document «Pact on Migration and Asylum» that does not cause objections from the Member States. The article also touches upon the issues of arming the agency’s personnel, which cannot be organized without a clear legal justification. While agreeing with the Commission’s assertion that the increased attention to Frontex’s activities is due to the prospects for expanding its powers, staff and funding, the author still concludes that the agency’s problems reflect the unsatisfactory state of the EU’s migration and asylum policy.

Countries will want EU solution to migration

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mediterranean Sea ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Central Mediterranean ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Mediterranean ◽  
Border Controls ◽  
The Eu

Subject Europe's immigration challenge. Significance On March 27 EU leaders agreed to extend Operation Sophia, the mission aimed at curtailing smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea, by six months. Under revised terms, the EU mission will no longer deploy naval assets, but will continue to deploy aerial assets and train Libya’s coast guard to strengthen that country’s border controls. The compromise to abandon naval assets is aimed at appeasing Italy, which opposes the mission as the vast majority of migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean are brought to Italian ports. Impacts Divergence over immigration could prevent Europe’s far-right parties from forming a stable alliance in the European Parliament. The number of migrants forcibly returned to Libya will likely increase. Humanitarian NGO ships will continue to operate in the Central Mediterranean, but could face criminalisation from Italy.

Banking Resolution: The EU Framework Governing the Resolution of Credit Institutions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christos V Gortsos
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
First Time ◽  
Crd Iv ◽  
Deposit Guarantee Schemes ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Credit Institutions

On 15 May 2014, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD). It was the first time that harmonized rules were adopted at European Union (EU) level in this field, as opposed to other fields in which a regulatory framework had been in place since the late-1980s and mid-1990s (respectively), such as the field of authorization, prudential regulation and supervision of credit institutions, currently governed by Regulation (EU) 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 648/2012 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (Capital Requirements Directive IV or CRD IV) and the field of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs), currently governed by Directive 2014/49/EU (DGSD).

Controlling the EU Executive?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gijs Jan Brandsma ◽  
Jens Blom-Hansen
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Lisbon Treaty ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Combination Of Methods ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
First Time ◽  
Control Regime ◽  
Eu Commission ◽  
New System ◽  
The Eu

Every year the EU Commission issues thousands of rules based on powers delegated by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. But delegation is carefully controlled. Traditionally, control has been exerted through a system of committees of member state representatives (‘comitology’). However, this system was contested by the European Parliament which was left without any influence. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new control regime for delegated powers, the so-called delegated acts system, which was meant to supplement the existing system. The new system involves direct control by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and thus for the first time gave the European Parliament real influence over delegated powers. However, the choice over which delegation regime to use in practice has turned into one of the most vehement institutional conflicts in the EU political system. Controlling the EU Executive represents the first comprehensive investigation of this conflict. It does so by a combination of methods and data, including process-tracing of the introduction of the new system in the Lisbon Treaty, case studies of selected post-Lisbon delegation situations, and statistical analysis of data sets comprising hundreds of post-Lisbon legislative files.

The culture of constitution-making? “Listening” at the Convention on the Future of Europe

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Scott
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Council ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Constitutional Convention ◽  
The Future ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Heads Of State ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

Established in the wake of the Nice Treaty debacle by the December 2001 European Council Laeken Summit, the Convention on the future of Europe is a radical political experiment. The Convention has been meeting in Brussels under the chairmanship of ex-heads of state Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene since February this year. It combines a novel political formula with an immense open-ended remit. Its 105 members represent the governments and parliaments of the EU15 and of the 13 candidate accession states, and the European Parliament. For the first time national parliaments and the European Parliament are sitting jointly with governments. This is also the first occasion on which the accession states have participated as equals in the EU (technically they are non-voting, but consensus is the aim). The Convention takes its mandate from the Laeken Declaration, which proclaims that “the Union stands at a cross-roads.” The complexity, juxtaposition and inter-relation of the questions which the Declaration raises, and the urgent historic decisions which accompany these – as well as explicit expectations from many quarters – earn the Convention the label ‘constitutional'. Media and academic comment alike favour comparisons with the 1787 Philadelphia constitutional convention – neither a recent nor a local precedent (but one with obvious additional appeal for the Euro-federalist tendency). A more empirical reference is the Convention that drafted the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For a recent survey of the Convention's progress see The Economist.

Der Gemeinsame Parlamentarische Kontrollausschuss für Europol: Innovative Verwaltungskontrolle in der EU

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-103
Author(s):  
Tarik Tabbara ◽  
Jelena von Achenbach
Keyword(s):  
Specific Capacity ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Administrative Control ◽  
Administrative Body ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

2017 hat der Gemeinsame Parlamentarische Kontrollausschuss für Europol seine Tätigkeit aufgenommen. Mit der Einrichtung dieses Ausschusses aus Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments und der mitgliedstaatlichen Parlamente übt erstmals ein interparlamentarisches Gremium formalisierte Verwaltungskontrolle aus. Dies bedeutet eine substantielle Fortentwicklung der interparlamentarischen Zusammenarbeit; und es wird ein neuartiger Mechanismus der Verwaltungskontrolle im europäischen Sicherheitsverwaltungsverbund etabliert. Vor dem Hintergrund bestehender Formen interparlamentarischer Zusammenarbeit beleuchtet der Beitrag, wie der Europol-Kontrollausschuss als innovatives Instrument der Verwaltungskontrolle funktioniert. Er untersucht die Leistungsfähigkeit aber auch die Barrieren der Verwaltungskontrolle in der Form interparlamentarischer Gremien. Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass solche Gremien grundsätzlich einen Beitrag zur demokratischen Kontrolle von Verwaltungsverbünden auf europäischer Ebene leisten können, gerade im Hinblick auf EU-Agenturen und sonstige verselbstständigte Behörden. Das Ergebnis der Analyse ist jedoch, dass der Europol-Kontrollausschuss in der Praxis erst noch beweisen muss, dass er effektive Kontrolle leistet und sich somit als Vorbild eignet. In 2017, the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group for the oversight over the EU agency Europol took up its work. This committee, which consists of parliamentarians from both the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States, is the first of its kind. For the first time an interparliamentary institution is formally tasked with a mandate to scrutinize an administrative body. This amounts to a substantive evolution of parliamentary cooperation. At the same time, an innovative mechanism of administrative control regarding the cooperation of European security administrations was introduced. The paper examines how the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group exercises its scrutiny powers. It analyses both the specific capacity of interparliamentary bodies to perform administrative control and the inherent limits thereof. It points out that interparliamentary bodies can contribute, in particular, to controlling independent EU agencies that take part in European administrative cooperation. Yet, it shows that the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group in practice still has to prove that it is actually willing and able to exercise effective control over Europol.

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