scholarly journals Regulating Off-Road: The California Desert and Collaborative Environmentalism

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-343
Author(s):  
Keith Makoto Woodhouse
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
National Environmental Policy Act ◽  
The West ◽  
Road Racing ◽  
Federal Administration ◽  
National Environmental

Historians often understand the 1970s and 1980s in terms of a declining New Deal order, in which an antistatist right as well as a conflicted relationship between public interest movements and administrative authorities undermined the notion of an effective federal government. Nowhere was the erosion of federal administration seemingly more apparent than in the West. An examination of the regulation of off-road racing in the California desert, focusing on everyday administration rather than on elections and lawsuits, reveals how federal agencies actually worked more collaboratively and productively with different interest groups than familiar narratives about these polarized decades would suggest. Contrary to depictions of federal agencies as administrating from afar, and of environmental organizations as overly litigious and out of touch, regulatory work in the California desert happened locally and through relationships shaped by new laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act.

The National Environmental Policy Act and the USDA Forest Service: Where We Agree, Where We Disagree, and Why

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Forrest Fleischman ◽  
Cory Struthers ◽  
Gwen Arnold ◽  
Michael J Dockry ◽  
Tyler Scott
Keyword(s):  
Land Management ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Planning Process ◽  
National Environmental Policy Act ◽  
Usda Forest Service ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Scientific Analysis ◽  
Planning Processes ◽  
National Environmental

Abstract In this article, we respond to a critique of our earlier work examining the USDA Forest Service’s (USFS’s) planning processes. We appreciate that our critics introduce new data to the discussion of USFS planning. Further data integration is a promising path to developing a deeper understanding of agency activities. Our critics’ analysis largely supports our original claims. Our most important difference is in our conceptualization of the planning process’s relationship to agency goals. Although our critics conceive of the USFS’s legally prescribed planning processes as a barrier to land management activities, we believe that public comment periods, scientific analysis, and land management activities are tools the agency uses to achieve its goals of managing land in the public interest. Study Implications: The USDA Forest Service’s current planning process has been critiqued as a barrier to accomplishing land management activities, but it is also an important tool for insuring science-based management and understanding public values and interests that the agency is legally bound to uphold.

The credibility of information sources in West Germany after the Chernobyl disaster

1992 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Peter Peters
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Information Sources ◽  
Information Policy ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
West Germany ◽  
German Population ◽  
Representative Survey ◽  
The West

In West Germany the `information disaster' after Chernobyl offered an opportunity to study the credibility of different information sources. A representative survey conducted in May 1987 of the West German population showed that on average the Federal Government—although heavily criticized because of its information policy and risk management—was rated most credible while the nuclear industry was judged least credible. On the whole, mean credibility ratings differed surprisingly little between sources; ratings of competence and public interest orientation varied more. These variables, interpreted as the classical credibility factors `expertise' and `trustworthiness', were important predictors of credibility. But beliefs and expectations recipients posess about individual sources also appear to influence credibility.

NEPA, the ESA, and the Tradeoffs of Interagency Coordination

2019 ◽  
pp. 101-124
Author(s):  
Alejandro E. Camacho ◽  
Robert L. Glicksman
Keyword(s):  
Endangered Species ◽  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Endangered Species Act ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Compliance Monitoring ◽  
National Environmental Policy Act ◽  
Information Distribution ◽  
Interagency Coordination ◽  
Careful Exploration ◽  
National Environmental

An analysis of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) comparing it to analogous provisions in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) illustrates the value of a careful exploration of interagency coordination-not only the choices that exist for policymakers in deciding the extent to which regulatory authority should be coordinated, but also how policymakers should assess such allocations on a function-by-function basis. Both statutes rely on mechanisms for coordinating certain functions of federal agencies. The chapter argues that NEPA would likely have been more effective if it had extended coordination obligations to information distribution, compliance monitoring, and possibly even project implementation. It suggests that the ESA illustrates one form that formal interagency coordination of implementation and post-decision monitoring might take. The chapter ultimately argues that policymakers should consider the tradeoffs of interagency coordination and independence on a function-by-function basis.

Madison’s Ratchet: Ambition Counteracting Ambition and the Aggregation of Political, Managerial, and Legal Controls Over Federal Administration

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 495-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Rosenbloom ◽  
Stephanie P. Newbold ◽  
Meghan Doughty
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Administrative State ◽  
James Madison ◽  
Legal Controls ◽  
Federal Administration

In Federalist 47 and 51, James Madison contended that the accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the hands of one body or person would produce tyranny. He explained that one defense against such tyranny was to make “ambition . . . counteract ambition” by giving each of the three constitutional branches of the federal government the “means,” “motives,” and wherewithal to “resist encroachments” on their powers by another. However, after the development of the contemporary administrative state in the 1930s, rather than serving as a check against encroachments alone, the process of ambition counteracting ambition prompts each branch to develop its own set of controls over federal agencies without necessarily trenching on the powers of the other branches. “Madison’s Ratchet” is the tendency for these controls overwhelmingly to aggregate and thereby vastly complicate federal administration.

Federal Management: Pathological Problems and Simple Cures

1982 ◽  
Vol 15 (02) ◽  
pp. 187-193
Author(s):  
Allan Rosenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Federal Bureaucracy ◽  
Short Run ◽  
East And West ◽  
Main Activity ◽  
Federal Management

Like all of their recent predecessors, senior officials of the Reagan administration have spoken both frequently and with enthusiasm of their intention to save large amounts of taxpayers' money while making the federal government more responsive and dramatically increasing agency productivity. All of this is to be done by shaping up the federal bureaucracy.The main activity which has emerged so far has been to implement a hiring freeze, to reduce the size of the federal bureaucracy through firings and furloughs, and to advocate a barely specified form of cabinet governance. While these actions may save money in the short run, they will not improve the actual functioning of the federal bureaucracy.Indeed, ideas emerging from presidential appointees frequently tend to be irrelevant for one simple reason: most secretaries, assistant secretaries and even deputy assistant secretaries know very little about federal bureaucracy when they come to Washington and subsequently spend a remarkably small portion of their time learning about it—a fact that in itself is one of the major obstacles to improving the management of the federal government.Few secretaries, assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries in any administration can resist the call of endless meetings with their counterparts from the states, other federal agencies or the big interest groups. Even more compelling for them is the siren call of travel to Paris, Peoria, and sundry places east and west to spread both enlightenment and the gospel of their administration and to revel in the attention automatically granted many visiting federal officials.

Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMON F. HAEDER ◽  
SUSAN WEBB YACKEE
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Administrative Process ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
The U.S

All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test our argument with more than 1,500 regulations written by federal agencies that were subjected to OMB review. We find that lobbying is associated with change during OMB review. We also demonstrate that, when only business groups lobby, we are more likely to see rule change; however, the same is not true for public interest groups. We supplement these results with illustrative examples suggesting that interest groups can, at times, use OMB review to influence the content of legally binding government regulations.

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