Heterogeneity in the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), 1816–2001: What Fatal MIDs Cannot Fix

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas M. Gibler ◽  
Erin K. Little
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Bias ◽  
Additional Measurement ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Private Citizens ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Dispute ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

We examine a major source of heterogeneity across cases in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset, 1816–2001, and demonstrate that this variation across cases biases most analyses of conflict. Disputes are coded using two logics—the familiar state-to-state militarized action represents one case while the second relies on sponsor governments to protest state targeting of private citizens. We show that the latter introduces additional measurement bias and does not match well the original conceptualization of what constituted a dispute. The protest-dependent cases are caused by different processes, and omitting them from analyses provides truer estimates of the effects of most conflict predictors. We find that previous controls for heterogeneity in the dispute data—such as using fatal militarized interstate disputes only—substantially underestimates the dangerous effects of contiguity and the pacifying effects of regime similarity. We also show that governments are seldom willing to risk militarized conflict for private citizens during these unique cases. We provide a list of the protest-dependent cases for future conflict analyses.

Ideology, Institutions, Power, and Militarized Disputes

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-129
Author(s):  
Erik Voeten
Keyword(s):  
Territorial Dispute ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Militarized Disputes ◽  
Intergovernmental Organization ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
Democratic Communities ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter examines if and how intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships shape participation in militarized interstate disputes. Theorists have argued that IGOs solve informational problems, socialize states, or constitute democratic communities that prevent a resort to violence. The distributive ideological approach suggests that IGOs institutionalize ideologically cohesive coalitions that ameliorate conflicts with insiders but can exacerbate conflict with outsiders. The effect of IGOs on militarized disputes should be present only if the distributional stakes have global ideological implications as opposed to when disputes are purely over particularistic stakes, such as territory. Regression analyses support this insight. Both ideological differences and IGO membership patterns affect dispute participation in dyads that include a major power but not among neighboring states or states involved in a territorial dispute. One implication is that IGO memberships affect the distribution of militarized disputes, but it is unclear whether IGOs in the aggregate reduce militarized conflict.

Rivalry, Instability, and the Probability of International Conflict

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 543-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula E. Daxecker
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Instability ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Dispute Initiation ◽  
Dyad Analysis ◽  
Willingness To Use ◽  
Militarized Interstate Dispute ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This article addresses the effect of political instability and domestic conflict on the probability of militarized interstate disputes. Existing research on the subject has produced inconsistent findings. I hypothesize that the effect of political instability on international disputes is conditional on states’ involvement in civil conflict. More specifically, I argue that while political instability provides leaders with the willingness to use force, civil war creates the necessary opportunities for initiating conflict abroad. A directed-dyad analysis of international rivals for the 1816–2000 time period shows that instability coupled with civil war increases the probability of militarized interstate dispute initiation among rival states. Results are consistent for alternative indicators of political instability and civil war.

Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mousseau
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
The State ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Zero Correlation ◽  
Direct Data ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

AbstractMultiple studies have shown that when advanced-market “contract-intensive” economy is considered in a regression of fatal militarized interstate disputes, crises, or wars, the democratic peace correlation, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, becomes near zero and insignificant. Defenders of the existence of a correlation of democracy with peace claim these studies contain multiple errors. This article examines the state of evidence behind all claims in this debate. Four crucial facts are identified: (1) There is no report in print that shows democracy significant in a regression of fatal disputes controlling for contractualist economy that is unencumbered with controversial practices; (2) Every empirical defense of democracy has been rebutted, and the rebuttals remain uncontested; (3) There is no democratic peace in the nineteenth century, when there were no contractualist dyads but were democratic dyads; and (4) New analyses with revised direct data on contractualist economy covering 94% of observations over the largest-observed 1920–2010 period show that democracy without contractualist economy has a near-zero correlation with peace. Together, these facts inform us that there are no scientific grounds for deeming the democratic peace correlation as existing in the state of knowledge.

The Liberal Illusion Is Not a Complete Delusion: The WTO Helps Member States Keep the Peace Only When It Increases Trade

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Ariel Aaronson ◽  
M. Rodwan Abouharb ◽  
K. Daniel Wang
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Daily Interactions ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
Militarized Interstate Dispute ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Inter State

We use both qualitative and quantitative tools to examine whether membership in the WTO reduces the likelihood of conflict. In our qualitative analysis, we show how WTO facilitates cooperation and transparency. Then we study what policymakers say and do to use trade to promote peace. We also examine whether and how members of the WTO respond to acceding states as well as member states experiencing inter-state conflict. We find member states do little to expand trade with states in conflict. Moreover, they continue to use trade sanctions. Hence, they are sending contradictory messages about the trade/peace relationship. Next we test whether the trust engendered through daily interactions and participation in a rules based system (our membership hypothesis) reduces the likelihood of conflict or whether membership in the WTO which in turn leads to expanded trade reduces the likelihood of conflict (our membership and trade hypothesis). We find no evidence that membership alone reduces the likelihood of either major interstate war or militarized interstate dispute among members. However, when states are both members of the GATT/WTO and benefit from increased trade, they are less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes. Hence, the liberal illusion is not a complete delusion.

Same Evidences, Different Interpretations – A Comparison of the Conflict Index between the Interstate Dyadic Events Data and Militarized Interstate Disputes Data in Peace-Conflict Models

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-372
Author(s):  
Scott Y. Lin ◽  
Carlos Seiglie
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

AbstractStudying the determinants of international conflict, researchers have found a series of influential variables, but few have addressed the robustness of the results to changes in the definition of the dependent variable, conflict. The two main sources for operationalizing conflict in empirical work are data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and events data. In this paper, we find that a χ2-test indicates a correlation between events data and MIDs data. However, detailed regression analysis indicates that there are some contradictory findings depending on whether we use events data as opposed to MIDs data to measure conflict.

Self-Monitoring, US Presidents, and International Crises

2018 ◽  
pp. 67-102
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
The Self ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Self Monitoring ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter looks at original surveys of sixty-eight presidential historians on the president each had studied in depth. The historians’ survey suggests that American presidents exhibit variation in their self-monitoring dispositions. The chapter then leverages this variation to test statistically whether US presidents’ behavior during international crises is consistent with the expectations of the theory presented in this book. The self-monitoring disposition of a US president is a significant predictor of his likelihood of employing and initiating military instruments to demonstrate resolve during international conflict. Low self-monitor presidents not only engage in less militarized interstate disputes, but they are also significantly less likely to initiate such disputes, compared to high self-monitor presidents. The chapter also presents findings indicating that high self-monitor presidents are more likely to prevail in militarized interstate disputes compared to their low self-monitor counterparts.

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