Which Lessons Matter?: American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987. By Christopher R. Hemmer. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000. 217p. $17.95 cloth, $55.50 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 686-687
Author(s):  
William B. Quandt

At least since Ernest May's influential (1973) ‘Lessons’ of the Past, students of American foreign policy have been conscious of the powerful hold that some analogies seem to have on the minds of decision makers. All of us can think of “Munich” and “Vietnam” as shorthand for a whole series of judgments that we rely on to work through the maze of foreign policy calculus. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001, we heard reference to “Pearl Harbor.” And we can now anticipate that “9-11” will take its place as a marker for a set of lessons concerning the struggle against terrorism.

Author(s):  
James M. Goldgeier

Decision makers, acting singly or in groups, influence the field of international relations by shaping the interactions among nations. It is therefore important to understand how those decision makers are likely to behave. Some scholars have developed elegant formal theories of decision making to demonstrate the utility of rational choice approaches in the study of international relations, while others have chosen to explain the patterns of bias that exist when leaders face the difficult task of making decisions and formulating policy. Among them are Herbert Simon, who introduced “bounded rationality” to allow leaders to short-circuit the decision process, and Elizabeth Kier, who has shown how organizational cultures shaped the development of military doctrine during the interwar period. The literature on foreign policy decision making during the Cold War looked inside the black box to generate analyses of bureaucratic politics and individual mindsets. Because decision making involves consensus seeking among groups, leaders will often avoid making choices so that they will not antagonize key members of the bureaucracy. Scholars have also investigated the role of “policy entrepreneurs” in the decision-making process, bringing individual agents into organizational, diplomatic and political processes. Over time, the field of policy decision making has evolved to help us understand not only why leaders often calculate so poorly but even more importantly, why systematic patterns of behavior are more or less likely under certain conditions.


AORN Journal ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Forgione ◽  
Patricia J. Owens ◽  
James P. Lopes ◽  
Susan M. Briggs

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 587-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Cody Wilson ◽  
Beth Spenciner Rosenthal

Four different studies using a total sample of 711 from the same New York City student population tested a model that has emerged from previous research on disasters. The model suggests that postdisaster psychological distress is a function of exposure to the disaster, predisaster psychological distress, acute distress following the disaster, time elapsed between disaster and observation of distress, and additional traumatic experiences since the disaster. Although findings replicate those of previous cross-sectional studies regarding association of exposure and distress after the disaster, before and after studies did not detect an effect on postdisaster psychological distress of the World Trade Center attack. Great caution must be used in attributing elevated psychological distress observed postdisaster to the effects of the disaster.


2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (9) ◽  
pp. 672-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.K. Niles ◽  
M.P. Webber ◽  
J. Gustave ◽  
R. Zeig-Owens ◽  
R. Lee ◽  
...  

1983 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Steiner

All prescriptive decision-making epistemologies are rooted in worldviews. If the worldview assumptions of an epistemology are not congruent with the world in which decisions are to be made, that epistemology ought not to be granted prescriptive authority. The rationalistic wortdview is described in two versions, classic and modified, together with the prescriptive decision-making epistemologies that depend on them. The classic version is firmly grounded in the assumptions of the 18th century Enlightenment; the modified version is more pragmatic in orientation. Both emphasize order, clarity, empiricism, and logical analysis. An alternative, nonrationalistic worldview concerns itself with novelty, incongruity, intuition, and subjective awareness. Foreign-policy decision theorists routinely assume that the foreign-policy world contains a mixture of rationalistic and nonrationalistic elements but are reluctant to grant decision makers the intuitive and subjective capabilities that, together with logical thinking and empirical observation, are necessary to operate in such a world. This reluctance inhibits the development of a prescriptive decision-making epistemology suitable for a mixed world. Analytical psychology provides one avenue for exploring the prescriptive implications of a more comprehensive psychology. It is clear that in a world with important nonrationalistic elements, true rationality requires that nonrationalistic capabilities and skills be both appreciated and developed.


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