Wars and Rumours of Wars: The Contexts of Cultural Conflict in American Political Behaviour

2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY C. LAYMAN ◽  
JOHN C. GREEN

A heated scholarly debate rages over the ‘culture wars thesis’ in American politics. Drawing on the literature on mass opinion constraint and its sources, we propose a resolution to this debate: the culture wars influence mass political behaviour in special religious, policy and political contexts where logical, psychological, social and electoral sources of opinion constraint are in effect. Using data pooled from the 1992, 1996 and 2000 American National Election Studies, we find strong support for our argument. We conclude that the cultural wars are waged by limited religious troops on narrow policy fronts under special political leadership, and a broader cultural conflagration is largely a rumour.

The Gun Gap ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 50-79
Author(s):  
Mark R. Joslyn

Chapter 2 presents a framework to examine the vote choices of gun owners. Using data from the General Social Survey and American National Election Studies, two important empirical regularities emerge. First, compared to those who do not own a guns, people who do own guns reliably vote Republican. In addition, the divide between the vote choices of gun owners and nonowners is growing. Since 2004, the “gun gap” has nearly doubled. Second, the more guns an individual owns, the more likely he or she is to vote Republican. In this respect, purchasing a gun or guns is an act of some political consequence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evelyn M. Simien ◽  
Sarah Cote Hampson

AbstractUsing data from the 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES) time series, and the 2008 ANES panel wave, this study examines whether the intragroup emotions Hillary Clinton elicits—gender affinity and pride—are predictive of political engagement for the group she represents: women voters. We focus on voters who report having participated in the primaries and the range of potential voters who proselytize during the primary season and express an intention to vote in the general election. Contrary to the conclusion one might reasonably draw—that is, women rather than men would be more likely to support Clinton—the real question is:whichwomen?


2002 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Andrew J. LoTempio

The partisanship strength of individuals is investigated as dependent upon the cumulative effect of their electoral decisions. Using data from the 1956-1960 and 1972-1976 American National Election Studies (NES), voters who reinforce their party identification through loyal presidential vote choices over their life-cycle were found to experience gains in partisanship strength to a larger degree than those who vote for different parties or who do not vote. Additionally, short-term forces such as defecting from one’s party identification in a single election or casting a split-ticket vote hinder life-cycle gains in partisanship. The totality of the evidence shows that the dynamics of partisanship may be better understood if the absence or presence of electoral reinforcement is accounted for across several presidential elections and across the entire ballot in a single election.


1993 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 151-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Schickler ◽  
Donald Green

Using data from the 1956–60 and 1972–76 National Election Studies (NES), we replicate the issues/party identification (PID) models set forth in Franklin (1992) and Franklin and Jackson (1983). Mild constraints on the signs of the parameters in a full-information model reduce to insignificance the apparent causal influence of issue proximities on partisanship. Furthermore, alternative specifications of the issues/PID relationship yield no evidence that citizens update their partisanship based on their ideological distance from the parties.


Author(s):  
Alan Abramowitz ◽  
Jennifer McCoy

Growing racial, ideological, and cultural polarization within the American electorate contributed to the shocking victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Using data from American National Election Studies surveys, we show that Trump’s unusually explicit appeals to racial and ethnic resentment attracted strong support from white working-class voters while repelling many college-educated whites along with the overwhelming majority of nonwhite voters. However, Trump’s campaign exploited divisions that have been growing within the electorate for decades because of demographic and cultural changes in American society. The 2016 presidential campaign also reinforced another longstanding trend in American electoral politics: the rise of negative partisanship, that is voting based on hostility toward the opposing party and its leaders. We conclude with a discussion of the consequences of deepening partisan and affective polarization for American democracy and the perceptions by both experts and the public of an erosion in its quality.


1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 141-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson Wiseman

Asian Survey ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-439
Author(s):  
Reetika Syal

Abstract This article finds, through statistical analysis of the National Election Studies (2004) data, that an increase in intergenerational education levels can positively influence an individual's political interest and political participation. Participatory trends in India are influenced by demographic factors such as caste, class, gender, income, and locality. However, this study finds that education can have a liberating effect from these various socio-economic constraints. It can provide greater access to resources and information, thus helping to increase active political participation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 237802311772765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

Most public opinion attitudes in the United States are reasonably stable over time. Using data from the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies, I quantify typical change rates across all attitudes. I quantify the extent to which change in same-sex marriage approval (and liberalization in attitudes toward gay rights in general) are among a small set of rapid changing outliers in surveyed public opinions. No measured public opinion attitude in the United States has changed more and more quickly than same-sex marriage. I use survey data from Newsweek to illustrate the rapid increase in the 1980s and 1990s in Americans who had friends or family who they knew to be gay or lesbian and demonstrate how contact with out-of-the-closet gays and lesbians was influential. I discuss several potential historical and social movement theory explanations for the rapid liberalization of attitudes toward gay rights in the United States, including the surprising influence of Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-668
Author(s):  
Christina Eder ◽  
Alexander Jedinger

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