Issues and the Dynamics of Party Identification: A Methodological Critique

1993 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 151-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Schickler ◽  
Donald Green

Using data from the 1956–60 and 1972–76 National Election Studies (NES), we replicate the issues/party identification (PID) models set forth in Franklin (1992) and Franklin and Jackson (1983). Mild constraints on the signs of the parameters in a full-information model reduce to insignificance the apparent causal influence of issue proximities on partisanship. Furthermore, alternative specifications of the issues/PID relationship yield no evidence that citizens update their partisanship based on their ideological distance from the parties.

2002 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Andrew J. LoTempio

The partisanship strength of individuals is investigated as dependent upon the cumulative effect of their electoral decisions. Using data from the 1956-1960 and 1972-1976 American National Election Studies (NES), voters who reinforce their party identification through loyal presidential vote choices over their life-cycle were found to experience gains in partisanship strength to a larger degree than those who vote for different parties or who do not vote. Additionally, short-term forces such as defecting from one’s party identification in a single election or casting a split-ticket vote hinder life-cycle gains in partisanship. The totality of the evidence shows that the dynamics of partisanship may be better understood if the absence or presence of electoral reinforcement is accounted for across several presidential elections and across the entire ballot in a single election.


The Gun Gap ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 50-79
Author(s):  
Mark R. Joslyn

Chapter 2 presents a framework to examine the vote choices of gun owners. Using data from the General Social Survey and American National Election Studies, two important empirical regularities emerge. First, compared to those who do not own a guns, people who do own guns reliably vote Republican. In addition, the divide between the vote choices of gun owners and nonowners is growing. Since 2004, the “gun gap” has nearly doubled. Second, the more guns an individual owns, the more likely he or she is to vote Republican. In this respect, purchasing a gun or guns is an act of some political consequence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evelyn M. Simien ◽  
Sarah Cote Hampson

AbstractUsing data from the 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES) time series, and the 2008 ANES panel wave, this study examines whether the intragroup emotions Hillary Clinton elicits—gender affinity and pride—are predictive of political engagement for the group she represents: women voters. We focus on voters who report having participated in the primaries and the range of potential voters who proselytize during the primary season and express an intention to vote in the general election. Contrary to the conclusion one might reasonably draw—that is, women rather than men would be more likely to support Clinton—the real question is:whichwomen?


The Forum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-545
Author(s):  
Anne M. Cizmar ◽  
John McTague

Abstract This paper examines the role of authoritarianism in the 2018 US congressional elections. In particular, we assess whether the issues that have historically been central to the authoritarian divide in the American electorate were salient in the campaigns of several important Senate races. We demonstrate that authoritarian attitudes played a consistent, significant role on presidential vote choice, party identification, and numerous policy areas in the 2016 presidential election using data from the American National Election Studies. Using case studies of six Senate races in the 2018 midterm elections, we find that authoritarianism was more muted than in 2016, and that the role of authoritarianism varied considerably depending upon the race. States with stronger Trump support in 2016 featured authoritarianism more heavily than states with less Trump support in 2016, but authoritarianism overall was not as prominent in 2018 as in 2016. Overall, Senate candidates relied on traditional campaign messages related to candidate qualifications, personal attacks, the economy, and other messages less central to authoritarianism.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul R. Abramson ◽  
Charles W. Ostrom

To evaluate the comparability of the Gallup and Michigan Survey Research Center measures for studying levels of partisanship among the U.S. electorate we compare the overtime distribution of partisanship and the correlates of partisanship using the results of Gallup surveys, the National Election Studies, and the General Social Surveys. Compared with the Gallup results, both the other two surveys reveal less short-term variation and also less total variation. Compared with the Gallup results, the National Election Studies partisanship results are less related to short-term electoral outcomes and do not appear to be strongly driven by short-term economic and political evaluations. Our analyses suggest that scholars should be cautious about using Gallup results to revise conclusions based upon analyses that employ the Michigan Survey Research Center party identification measure.


1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Gidengil

AbstractThis review essay examines the contribution of the Canadian National Election Studies to understanding vote choice in Canada. Analyses using both the sociological approach and the social-psychological approach are discussed. The essay starts with a review of the debates about the role of class, region and religion in Canadian voting and then goes on to discuss the applicability of the concept of party identification to Canada. An evaluation of both recursive and non-recursive models of vote choice follows. The review calls for social psychological approaches to take the social context of political choice more seriously and points to the need for sociological approaches to conceptualize social categories as live social forces.


2005 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 287-303
Author(s):  
Brad Lockerbie

Using the American National Election Studies of 1990, 1994, and 1998, we can see that there is an incumbency advantage for governors, senators, and members of the House of Representatives. There is, however, some variability to the magnitude of the incumbency advantage. Moreover, it appears to follow a rather sensible pattern. It appears to be strongest for members of the House and weakest for Governors. When looking at House elections, we can see that incumbency is more powerful than is party identification. When we look at senatorial and gubernatorial elections, the items appear to be more evenly matched. When we look at evaluations of the national parties performance and expectations of performance, the picture becomes much more muddy. Gubernatorial candidates consistently avoid being held accountable for their national parties past economic performance. Candidates for the House and Senate are largely able to avoid responsibility for the past economic performance of their national parties. Economic expectations, however, are modestly more related to vote choice.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-59
Author(s):  
H. Whitt Kilburn ◽  
Brian J. Fogarty

AbstractThe conventional wisdom on evangelical American Protestant support for the use of torture on suspected terrorists is incorrect. With data from the 2008 American National Election Studies survey, we specify the interactive influence of religious traditions on attitudes toward torture by religious commitment and belief orthodoxy. Only at low orthodoxy, and low to average commitment, are Catholics, mainline, and black Protestants more likely to support torture than the unaffiliated; the effect for evangelical Protestants is null. Greater commitment moves most traditions and the unaffiliated toward increased opposition to torture. Stronger orthodoxy, however, leads to support for torture only for the unaffiliated. The findings persist given controls for demographic characteristics, party identification, left-right self-placement, and authoritarian values.


1975 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Jenson

In a recent article in this Journal, Paul M. Sniderman, H. D. Forbes, and Ian Melzer challenge the proponents of what they characterize as the “textbook theory” of Canadian parties. They claim that their examination of the 1965 and 1968 Canadian national election studies contradicts the conclusions of almost every analyst of parties and voting in Canada. While a little debunking of long-held interpretations is always valuable in any discipline, one should exercise caution. Conventional wisdom does not usually acquire that status without containing at least some small measure of validity. In this case I must conclude that more confusion has been created than has been cleared away and previous analysts should not be considered to have erred quite as much as the authors of this article would like us to believe. Sniderman et al. argue that, because of “an obsession with national unity” on the part of political parties and a fear of fragmentation which produces undifferentiated politics of accommodation, “Canadian voters tend to lack strong loyalties to the older parties, at least when compared to the Americans and the British. As a consequence, electoral support for the older parties in Canada tends to be unstable.”The first part of this proposition asserts that concern with national unity necessarily produces such similar policy positions that parties are interchangeable, being distinguished only by their leadership. Although this is an interesting proposition, it will not be dealt with here.


2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY C. LAYMAN ◽  
JOHN C. GREEN

A heated scholarly debate rages over the ‘culture wars thesis’ in American politics. Drawing on the literature on mass opinion constraint and its sources, we propose a resolution to this debate: the culture wars influence mass political behaviour in special religious, policy and political contexts where logical, psychological, social and electoral sources of opinion constraint are in effect. Using data pooled from the 1992, 1996 and 2000 American National Election Studies, we find strong support for our argument. We conclude that the cultural wars are waged by limited religious troops on narrow policy fronts under special political leadership, and a broader cultural conflagration is largely a rumour.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document