NEGLIGENCE AND ARTICLE 6: THE GREAT ESCAPE?

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Tom Hickman
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Public Hearing ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

WHEN, the European Court of Human Rights decided in Osman v. UK [1999] 1 F.L.R. 193 that striking out a claim in negligence (in Osman v. Ferguson [1993] 4 All E.R. 344) against the police, for failing to prevent a disturbed teacher injuring a pupil and killing the pupil’s father, amounted to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention, many domestic lawyers felt that human rights law had gone too far. Article 6 protects the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of one’s civil rights. The ECtHR did not say that the hearing had not been fair, but that it had not really been a hearing at all. By so deciding, the ECtHR subjected the public policy considerations that had been relied on by the Court of Appeal to strike out the claim to the requirements of legitimacy and necessity which have to be satisfied to justify an interference with Article 6.

scholarly journals The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Pugh
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right ◽  
Article 5

Abstract In response to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic the UK government has passed the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CA). Among other things, this act extends existing statutory powers to impose restrictions of liberty for public health purposes. The extension of such powers naturally raises concerns about whether their use will be compatible with human rights law. In particular, it is unclear whether their use will fall within the public heath exception to the Article 5 right to liberty and security of the person in the European Convention of Human Rights. In this paper, I outline key features of the CA, and briefly consider how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the public health exception to Article 5 rights. This analysis suggests two grounds on which restrictions of liberty enforced some under the CA might be vulnerable to claims of Article 5 rights violations. First, the absence of specified time limits on certain restrictions of liberty means that they may fail the requirement of legal certainty championed by the European Court in its interpretation of the public health exception. Second, the Coronavirus Act’s extension of powers to individuals lacking public health expertise may undermine the extent to which the act will ensure that deprivations of liberty are necessary and proportionate.

scholarly journals The Right to Punishment for International Crimes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
District Court ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
German Government ◽  
Subtle Change ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

On October 1, 2002, Magnus Gäfgen was taken into custody by the Frankfurt police in connection with the kidnapping of a young boy held for ransom. The police threatened Gäfgen with various forms of torture unless he divulged the location of the boy. Gäfgen quickly relented and led the police to the boy, who was already dead. Gäfgen was convicted of murder and the police were convicted of coercion. However, the district court concluded that the police, though culpable, were not appropriate subjects of punishment. Gäfgen, unhappy that his torturers were not punished, filed a case against Germany at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), arguing that Germany's failure to punish his torturers violated his human rights. The ECHR concluded that Gäfgen was right--the German government was obligated to punish perpetrators of torture, and by failing to do so adequately, Germany violated Gäfgen's human rights.The goal of this chapter is to show that the argument in Gäfgen is generalizable to other contexts. Although the case arose from a particular procedural posture, there is little reason to suspect that the arguments in Gäfgen will not hold for other crimes as well. At the very least, these arguments can be extended, without logical disruption, to other international crimes that states are under a legal obligation to criminalize, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Moreover, if the structure of these arguments is conceptually sound, in theory they should apply outside of the European context, unless the argument is based on a particular right that is only protected by the European Convention and not by international law.This subtle change in emphasis -- moving from punishment as a license to punishment as a legal requirement -- has profound consequences for the operation of international criminal justice. States and international tribunals are required to punish perpetrators as a matter of human rights law, and their failure to follow through on this obligation violates not just some vague or inchoate ergo omnes obligation, it also violates an obligation owed directly to the victims of that particular atrocity. This applies not just when the perpetrators are not punished at all but also when the perpetrators, like in Gäfgen's case, are not punished severely enough.

Reconstructing the European Court of Human Rights’ Article 8 Jurisprudence in Deportation Cases: The Family’s Right and the Public Interest

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-360
Author(s):  
Jonathan Collinson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Court ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

Abstract This article rationalises the case law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in deportation cases involving children. The Court engages in a balancing exercise between the right to family life of the deportee’s family on the one side, and the public interest in deportation on the other. This article expands on existing case law analysis by suggesting that in deportation cases, the Court considers Article 8 as a form of commonly held right, rather than an individual right held by one member of the family. Furthermore, the balance is argued to be constructed as a relationship between two factors on both sides, rather than of a sole factor on either side as being determinative. This article concludes that the best interests of the child (one of the ‘Üner criteria’) is not adequately reflected in the Court’s deportation decision-making practice.

coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.

2012 ◽  
pp. 415-419
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Drug Trafficking ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights as Guardians of Fair Criminal Proceedings in Europe

2019 ◽  
pp. 88-114
Author(s):  
Bettina Weisser
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Public Hearing ◽  
Presumption Of Innocence ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Procedural Rights

This chapter discusses the role of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in safeguarding fair criminal proceedings in Europe. In particular, it analyzes the procedure-related guarantee of a fair trial and its various implications as they are laid down in Article 6 ECHR and shaped by the case law of the Court. The chapter first provides an overview of the general procedural guarantees under Article 6, section 1, focusing on the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, right to a fair hearing (equality of arms, the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination, entrapment), public hearing, and hearing within a reasonable time. It then considers procedural rights in criminal proceedings under sections 2 and 3 of Article 6, along with the presumption of innocence under section 2 and specifically listed minimum rights in criminal proceedings under section 3.

scholarly journals The Right to a Fair Trial before The European Court of Human Rights

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. p133
Author(s):  
Alaa Mohamed Ismail Abdrabo
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
European Convention ◽  
New Work ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
European Court ◽  
Criminal Charges ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial, applies to disputes relating to civil rights and obligations as well as to criminal charges. The right to a fair trial includes, inter alia, the right of access to a court, the right to be heard and the equality of arms between the parties. This challenging new work elucidates the meaning of the fair trial and looks at the fair trials jurisprudence of the ECHR.Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights has become the defining standard within Europe for determining the fairness of criminal proceedings. Its success has been attributed to the fact that it is not based on a particular model of criminal procedure.

‘Marry in Haste …’: The (Partial) Abolition of Same-sex Marriage in Bermuda

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-188
Author(s):  
Nicola Barker
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
European Court ◽  
Legal Context ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract In 2018, the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda revoked the right to marry for same-sex couples. In a judgment that reconceives the relationship between sexual orientation and religious freedoms, the Bermuda Supreme Court and Court of Appeal found this revocation to be unconstitutional. I explore the political and legal context in which same-sex marriage was granted and then revoked in Bermuda. I also consider the Bermuda Courts’ judgments in light of the subsequent judgment of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in Steinfeld, among others. While there was an assumption from both the Bermuda and United Kingdom Governments that the revocation provision was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, I argue that this underestimates the significance of the distinction between declining to recognise a right to same-sex marriage and revoking a right that has already been exercised. While the European Court of Human Rights has not yet found the absence of same-sex marriage to be a violation of Article 12 of the Convention, I argue that the revocation of a right to marry between same-sex couples that had been recognised in accordance with national law changes the terrain on which the Convention arguments would be made.

The Right to a Public Trial under Maltese Criminal Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-147
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Public Hearing ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Freedoms ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Right

This paper attempts to answer whether section 24(2) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act conforms, or is in conflict, with the right to a public hearing under section 39(3) of the Constitution of Malta and Article 10(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It reviews case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to a public hearing and concludes that Strasbourg case law has developed to allow restrictions upon this right even if they are not written down in this Convention. On the other hand, from a comparative exercise carried out with seven similar laws to the Maltese Official Secrets Act, it transpires that the Maltese provision is unique, does not find any counterpart in these seven laws surveyed and, worse still, appears to conflict with Article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention.

Algunas reflexiones en torno a la sentencia Negrepontis-Giannisis contra Grecia y la jurisprudencia reciente del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en materia de reconocimiento de decisiones judiciales extranjeras

2014 ◽  
pp. 3027-3042
Author(s):  
Juan M. VELÁZQUEZ GARDETA
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The Public ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
European Court ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren Negrepontis-Giannisis vs. Grezia epaiak atzerriko erabakiak libre zirkulatzeko bidea zabaldu du, prozesu zuzen bat izateko eskubidetik etorria, Giza Eskubideen Europako Hitzarmeneko 6.1 artikuluan aitortua. GEEAren jurisprudentzia-lerro horren eboluzioa abiatzen da Wagner eta J.M.W.L. vs. Luxenburgo eta McDonald vs. Frantzia erabakiekin, baina guk aipatzen duguna aurrerapausoa handia da, eskubidea ez zaiolako lotzen beste zuzenbide substantibo bati, eta berezko eskubidea dela planteatzen da. Gainera, ohar aipagarriak egiten dira atzerriko epai judizialak geldiarazteko ordena publikoko salbuespenari buruz, eta haien eragina leuntzen da. Oso interesgarria da EBko arautegien aplikazio-esparrutik ihes egiten duten erabakietan aplikatzeko, non exequaturra desagertzen den ad hoc prozedura gisa, baina eragindako alderdiak hura ez aitortzeko aukera mantentzen da. Ildo horretan, GEEAk Negrepontis-en erabilitako argudioak garrantzi berezikoak dira, kontuan hartuz GEEHk inspiratzen duela Batasuneko Zuzenbidea eta auzitegiak egiten duen artikuluen interpretazioa. RESUMEN: El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos abre en su sentencia Negrepontis-Giannisis c. Grecia una vía de ampliación de las posibilidades a la libre circulación de decisiones extranjeras como un derecho derivado del derecho a un proceso equitativo reconocido en el art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. La evolución de esta línea jurisprudencial del TEDH arranca con las decisiones Wagner y J.M.W.L. c. Luxemburgo y McDonald c. Francia pero en la que nos ocupa se produce un avance considerable porque no se ata el derecho al reconocimiento a otro derecho sustantivo sino que se plantea como un derecho en sí mismo. Además se establecen notables consideraciones en cuanto a la excepción de orden público como freno a la ejecución de decisiones judiciales extranjeras y se suaviza su efecto. Es especialmente interesante para su aplicación en aquellas decisiones que escapan del ámbito de aplicación de los correspondientes reglamentos de la UE donde desaparece el exequátur como procedimiento ad hoc pero se mantiene la posibilidad de oposición al reconocimiento por la parte afectada. En este sentido, los argumentos utilizados por el TEDH en Negrepontis son de especial relevancia, teniendo en cuenta el carácter inspirador del Derecho de la Unión que tiene el CEDH y por ende de la interpretación que dicho tribunal haga de su articulado. ABSTRACT: The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece opens the extension of the possibilities for a free movement of foreign decisions as a right derived from the right to a fair hearing of article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The evolution of this case law trend of the ECHR begins with decisions Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg and McDonald v. France but in the judgment we are now analyzing a considerable development is made because the right to the recognizition is not linked to other substantive right but it is considered as a right itself. Besides remarkable considerations are established as far as the exception to the public order is concerned as a brake to the execution of foreign judicial decisions and it softens its effect. It is especially interesting for its application in those decisions that go beyond the scope of application of the corresponding regulations of the EU where the exequatur as an ad hoc procedure is missing but it maintains the possibility of opposition to the recognizition by the affected party. In this sense, the reasoning of the ECHR in Negrepontis is of special relevance, taking into account the inspiring character of the European Law forthe ECHR and hence the interpretation of that Tribunal of its articles.

Article 6 Echr and Immunities Arising in Public International Law

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 463-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
David LLoyd Jones
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
National Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Right Of Access

The Procedural guarantees laid down in Article 6, European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the fairness and expedition of legal proceedings would be meaningless if the Convention did not protect the right of access to the courts which is a precondition to the enjoyment of those guarantees. As a result, the European Court of Human Rights has laid down the principle that Article 6(1) secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court. The right of access to the courts is not absolute. The Strasbourg case law acknowledges that it may be subject to limitations. Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in this regard. However, national courts must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Moreover a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.

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