scholarly journals The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Pugh

Abstract In response to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic the UK government has passed the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CA). Among other things, this act extends existing statutory powers to impose restrictions of liberty for public health purposes. The extension of such powers naturally raises concerns about whether their use will be compatible with human rights law. In particular, it is unclear whether their use will fall within the public heath exception to the Article 5 right to liberty and security of the person in the European Convention of Human Rights. In this paper, I outline key features of the CA, and briefly consider how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the public health exception to Article 5 rights. This analysis suggests two grounds on which restrictions of liberty enforced some under the CA might be vulnerable to claims of Article 5 rights violations. First, the absence of specified time limits on certain restrictions of liberty means that they may fail the requirement of legal certainty championed by the European Court in its interpretation of the public health exception. Second, the Coronavirus Act’s extension of powers to individuals lacking public health expertise may undermine the extent to which the act will ensure that deprivations of liberty are necessary and proportionate.

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Tom Hickman

WHEN, the European Court of Human Rights decided in Osman v. UK [1999] 1 F.L.R. 193 that striking out a claim in negligence (in Osman v. Ferguson [1993] 4 All E.R. 344) against the police, for failing to prevent a disturbed teacher injuring a pupil and killing the pupil’s father, amounted to a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention, many domestic lawyers felt that human rights law had gone too far. Article 6 protects the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of one’s civil rights. The ECtHR did not say that the hearing had not been fair, but that it had not really been a hearing at all. By so deciding, the ECtHR subjected the public policy considerations that had been relied on by the Court of Appeal to strike out the claim to the requirements of legitimacy and necessity which have to be satisfied to justify an interference with Article 6.


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter focuses on freedom of religion and freedom of expression, which are classified as qualified rights, and examines Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which explains the right to hold or not hold a belief as well as the right to manifest a belief. It also considers how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decides if there has been manifestation of belief, interpretation of Article 10 with respect to views that shock and disturb and some forms of hate speech, and state restriction of expression. The chapter concludes with a discussion of freedom of religion and expression in the UK.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin

On October 1, 2002, Magnus Gäfgen was taken into custody by the Frankfurt police in connection with the kidnapping of a young boy held for ransom. The police threatened Gäfgen with various forms of torture unless he divulged the location of the boy. Gäfgen quickly relented and led the police to the boy, who was already dead. Gäfgen was convicted of murder and the police were convicted of coercion. However, the district court concluded that the police, though culpable, were not appropriate subjects of punishment. Gäfgen, unhappy that his torturers were not punished, filed a case against Germany at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), arguing that Germany's failure to punish his torturers violated his human rights. The ECHR concluded that Gäfgen was right--the German government was obligated to punish perpetrators of torture, and by failing to do so adequately, Germany violated Gäfgen's human rights.The goal of this chapter is to show that the argument in Gäfgen is generalizable to other contexts. Although the case arose from a particular procedural posture, there is little reason to suspect that the arguments in Gäfgen will not hold for other crimes as well. At the very least, these arguments can be extended, without logical disruption, to other international crimes that states are under a legal obligation to criminalize, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Moreover, if the structure of these arguments is conceptually sound, in theory they should apply outside of the European context, unless the argument is based on a particular right that is only protected by the European Convention and not by international law.This subtle change in emphasis -- moving from punishment as a license to punishment as a legal requirement -- has profound consequences for the operation of international criminal justice. States and international tribunals are required to punish perpetrators as a matter of human rights law, and their failure to follow through on this obligation violates not just some vague or inchoate ergo omnes obligation, it also violates an obligation owed directly to the victims of that particular atrocity. This applies not just when the perpetrators are not punished at all but also when the perpetrators, like in Gäfgen's case, are not punished severely enough.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-360
Author(s):  
Jonathan Collinson

Abstract This article rationalises the case law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in deportation cases involving children. The Court engages in a balancing exercise between the right to family life of the deportee’s family on the one side, and the public interest in deportation on the other. This article expands on existing case law analysis by suggesting that in deportation cases, the Court considers Article 8 as a form of commonly held right, rather than an individual right held by one member of the family. Furthermore, the balance is argued to be constructed as a relationship between two factors on both sides, rather than of a sole factor on either side as being determinative. This article concludes that the best interests of the child (one of the ‘Üner criteria’) is not adequately reflected in the Court’s deportation decision-making practice.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erica Howard

AbstractThis article examines school bans on the wearing of religious symbols and starts with a discussion of the arguments for the imposition of a ban and the counter arguments against these. The question whether a ban on the wearing of religious clothing in schools is a violation of the right to manifest one's religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is analyzed using the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the English courts in relation to such bans in education. The cases appear to suggest that such bans can be considered an interference with the right to manifest one's religion under Article 9(1), but that these bans can be justified under Article 9(2) in certain circumstances. Two important considerations in the decision of the courts are the way decisions to ban certain forms of religious dress are made and whether alternative ways of manifesting the religion are available.


2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-136
Author(s):  
Marcin Szwed

All judicial proceedings are inevitably based on the formalized procedures. Procedural provisions pursue many important objectives, such ensuring the effectiveness of proceedings or protecting legal certainty by regulating the competences of procedural bodies and the rights and duties of parties. At the same time, excessive procedural formalism may disproportionately limit the right to court, making access to court illusory. Within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, the permissible limits of procedural formalism are set by Article 6(1). The European Court of Human Rights, assessing whether excessive formalism has occurred in a given case, examines whether relevant formal requirements served a legitimate purpose, in particular legal certainty and proper administration of justice, and did not lead to a disproportionate restriction of the right of access to court. This assessment is made on the basis of all relevant circumstances of the case, such as the stage at which the proceedings were terminated, the type of proceedings, the party’s due diligence, the existence of circumstances justifying failure to comply with a formal requirement or the fact that the party was represented by a professional representative. Therefore, not only the content of national provisions is important, but also the manner of their application by courts.


Author(s):  
Duncan Fairgrieve ◽  
Dan Squires QC

The following chapter examines claims that can be brought under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). The HRA makes it unlawful for a ‘public authority’ to breach the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). The HRA accords to the victims of a breach of the Convention the right to pursue a claim against the offending public authority in the UK courts, when previously they were required to apply to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg to vindicate their Convention rights.


coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.

2012 ◽  
pp. 415-419

Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter focuses on the right to family and private life, which is considered a qualified right. It discusses Article 8, which has been developed to expand protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) through wide definitions and use of positive obligations. It also considers the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) definition of private life and application of the living instrument principle to include areas such as sexuality and the environment. In addition, the chapter explains the use of the proportionality and margin of appreciation doctrines when examining the justification of an interference with the right to family and private life, and finally, looks at the development of the right to privacy in the UK via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).


Author(s):  
Wickremasinghe Chanaka

Entico v UNESCO provides the most detailed examination to date by a court in the UK of the relationship between the immunity of an international organization, UNESCO, and the right of access to a court, as it is implied in the interpretation of art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It raises an interesting question about the applicability of the much-cited judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Waite and Kennedy in the context of a UN Specialised Agency. The case teaches us that the huge variety of international organizations means that the extent of their immunities must be fashioned in the case of each organization to meet their particular functional needs. This suggests that the national court needs to approach generalizations with care, and a full appreciation of the international legal context that governs the organization in question.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document