SHORN-OFF COMPLICITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Dyson

CRIMINAL complicity has been dramatically changed by the combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and the Privy Council in Jogee; Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681. At least since the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it has been settled that a person (S) who has intentionally assisted or encouraged another (P) to commit a crime has been liable to be tried, convicted, and punished as if S was a principal. For decades, there has also been a much-debated, additional form of complicity where the accomplice was “parasitically” liable for further crimes committed by P beyond the scope of a common criminal purpose shared by S and P. For that kind of liability, the accomplice need not have assisted or encouraged the further crime but need only have foreseen that it was a possible incident of the common purpose. The effect of Jogee and Ruddock is that this further form of complicity, first recognised explicitly in the Privy Council decision of Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168 and later endorsed by the House of Lords in Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1, has been shorn off the criminal law. As a result, Chan Wing-Siu directions will no longer be given to juries.

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.


2019 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 98-121
Author(s):  
Piotr Brzostek

The combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen caused upheaval in the English law on criminal complicity. The Supreme Court/Privy Council decided that the law on criminal complicity „took a wrong turn” 33 years ago in the Privy Council ruling in Chan Wing-Siu which concerned a controversial doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. According to the said doctrine, if A and B set out to commit a crime X (e.g. robbery) and B foresees that A might commit crime Y (e.g. murder) in the course of committing crime X, B will be liable for crime Y, even if he does not intend that crime Y be committed. The mere fact of foresight on B’s part is enough for him to be criminally liable. Decision in Jogee; Ruddock is of seminal importance as it overturned the doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. It is doubtful, however, to what extent the Supreme Court has resolved the problems that have bedeviled this area of law. This article presents in outline the English law on criminal complicity and attempts to assess the changes that were introduced in Jogee; Ruddock. A number of issues still call for further refinement and resolution. It appears, however, that the emphasis the Supreme Court put on intention as a required standard of fault, draws, at least superficially, the continental (Polish and German) and English criminal law closer together in terms of mens rea requirements for secondary liability.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  

This article provides an exposition and assessment of the UK Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd. It identifies the Supreme Court’s reconsideration, obiter dictum, of the test of dishonesty in civil and criminal law. This term is used in particular in offences such as those set out in the Theft Act 1968. Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention, the leading case was R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2. However, the Ghosh test in that case has been the subject of significant criticism in the academy and elsewhere, and some such critiques are discussed in the Supreme Court judgment. This article, which considers these developments, was first delivered as the Bristol Alumni Association Lecture on 23 February 2018.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Alarie ◽  
Andrew J. Green

This chapter sets out and justifies the building blocks of commitment and cooperation. These two dimensions allow the authors to situate high courts relative to each other. They use them to focus on the five main high courts in their study, namely, the US Supreme Court, the UK Supreme Court (and its predecessor House of Lords), the Supreme Court of Canada, the High Court of Australia, and the Indian Supreme Court. This chapter provides both a preliminary assessment of how these courts sit relative to each other along these two dimensions and a brief overview of the key design choices made by each of these courts.


Author(s):  
Petra Butler

This chapter discusses the New Zealand courts' jurisprudence in regard to the interpretative provisions — sections 4, 5, and 6 — of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It not only gives an overview of the relevant New Zealand case law but also compares the courts' approaches to those of their UK counterparts, in particular the UK Supreme Court (formerly, the House of Lords) in regard to section 3 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998. It is argued that the perceived difference in the approaches can be explained by different contexts rather than different methodology. The chapter thereby questions the view held in New Zealand that the UK courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are more activist than the New Zealand courts.


Legal Studies ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel J Cahill-O'Callaghan

It has long been argued that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, now the UK Supreme Court, is characterised by Justices who are white and male, with a public school and Oxbridge education. Despite continuous debate and reflection on the lack of diversity, by academics, government and the popular press, little has changed. These debates have centred on explicit diversity, overt characteristics that are easily codified and reflect how the judiciary is seen. Drawing on the psychological theory of decision making, this paper argues that judicial decisions are subject to tacit influences that are not limited to overt characteristics. Personal values serve as one such tacit influence on decision making. Personal values are formed by life experiences and reflect many of the characteristics identified within the explicit diversity debates. However, personal values are influenced by more than simple demographic variables. This paper uses the example of personal values to highlight the fact that despite the lack of explicit diversity, there is an element of tacit diversity in the Supreme Court, which is reflected in judicial decisions. The impact of these findings serves to extend the debates surrounding diversity, highlighting the limitation of debates centred on explicit diversity alone.


Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 58-77
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter begins by tracing the development of the duty of care starting with the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]. It goes on to consider the various general tests developed and used by the courts in order to establish when a duty of care is owed. Finally, the chapter discusses the ‘incremental and by analogy’ and so-called Caparo three-stage ‘test’ established by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] and recently reconsidered by the UK Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018].


2021 ◽  
pp. 58-77
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter begins by tracing the development of the duty of care starting with the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]. It goes on to consider the various general tests developed and used by the courts in order to establish when a duty of care is owed. Finally, the chapter discusses the ‘incremental and by analogy’ and so-called Caparo three-stage ‘test’ established by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] and recently reconsidered by the UK Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018].


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in A v BBC (Scotland) [2014] UKSC 25, before the UK Supreme Court. This case concerned whether a court order granting anonymity to a convicted and deported foreign national sex offender could remain in place, notwithstanding objections from BBC (Scotland). In answering the question, the Court articulated what it referred to as the common law principle of open justice, which is the focus of this case note. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Legal Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-268
Author(s):  
Cerian Griffiths

AbstractThe UK Supreme Court took the opportunity in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 to reverse the long-standing, but unpopular, test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh. It reduced the relevance of subjectivity in the test of dishonesty, and brought the civil and the criminal law approaches to dishonesty into line by adopting the test as laid down in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. This paper employs extensive legal historical research to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was too quick to dismiss the significance of the historical roots of dishonesty. Through an innovative and comprehensive historical framework of fraud, this paper demonstrates that dishonesty has long been a central pillar of the actus reus of deceptive offences. The recognition of such significance permits us to situate the role of dishonesty in contemporary criminal property offences. This historical analysis further demonstrates that the Justices erroneously overlooked centuries of jurisprudence in their haste to unite civil and criminal law tests for dishonesty.


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