Rudolf Hilferding and the Theoretical Foundations of German Social Democracy, 1902–33

1988 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Smaldone
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Finance Minister ◽  
Party Central Committee ◽  
Ardent Supporter

Rudolf Hilferding's appointment as finance minister in the newly formed coalition government headed by Social Democrat Hermann Müller in June 1928 marked the peak of an outstanding political career in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). A prominent member of the Party Central Committee and its “chief ideologue,” Hilferding was an ardent supporter of the coalition tactic. He opposed those in the party's left wing, who demanded that the SPD remain in permanent opposition to the bourgeois state. Instead, he advocated a more flexible political strategy that did not rule out the formation of an SPD alliance with the moderate bourgeois parties. When the SPD leadership announced its willingness to form a coalition government in the wake of the successful Social Democratic electoral performance in May 1928, it reflected the strength of Hilferding and his supporters within the party.

The Myth of Chancellor von Schleicher's Querfront Strategy

2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 673-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Ashby Turner
Keyword(s):  
Trade Union ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Nazi Party ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Social Democratic

In the multitudinous accounts of Adolf Hitler's rise to power, one interpretation dominates with regard to the political strategy of his predecessor as Reich chancellor, General Kurt von Schleicher. Beginning with the pioneering books of the journalist Konrad Heiden in the 1930s and continuing through countless versions down to the most recent scholarly works, Schleicher has, with rare exceptions, been depicted as having sought to thwart Hitler by bringing behind his own cabinet a political bloc extending from a left wing split away from the Nazi Party to trade union elements of the republican Social Democratic Party. Sometimes described as a Gewerkschaftsachse, this putative goal on the part of Schleicher has now usually come to be referred to as his Querfront strategy. Long regarded by most historians as axiomatic, that version of the chancellor's intentions has seldom been subjected to critical analysis. It is, however, fundamentally erroneous and serves to obscure his actually very different aims.

scholarly journals The Demobilization of Class Politics in Denmark: The Social Democratic Party’s Group-Based Appeals 1961–2004

2018 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Thau
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
General Level ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Class Politics ◽  
Specific Level ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Parties ◽  
Social Democratic Parties

Abstract In Denmark, as in other Western European countries, the working class does not vote for social democratic parties to the same extent as before. Yet, what role did the social democratic parties themselves play in the demobilization of class politics? Building on core ideas from public opinion literature, this article differs from the focus on party policy positions in previous work and, instead, focuses on the group-based appeals of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark. Based on a quantitative content analysis of party programs between 1961 and 2004, I find that, at the general level, class-related appeals have been replaced by appeals targeting non-economic groups. At the specific level, the class-related appeals that remain have increasingly been targeting businesses at the expense of traditional left-wing groups such as wage earners, tenants and pensioners. These findings support a widespread hypothesis that party strategy was crucial in the decline of class politics, but also suggests that future work on class mobilization should adopt a group-centered perspective.

The Crisis in the Polish Communist Party

1950 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam B. Ulam
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Deputy Prime Minister

Just as the Russo-Yugoslav dispute was reaching its climax, and before the meeting of the Cominform, which issued a detailed condemnation of the Yugoslav Party, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party took place. What happened at this plenum of June 3, 1948 is known to us, not directly but from many accounts given at the August 31—September 3 plenum. At the June meeting Secretary General of the Party and Deputy Prime Minister of Poland Gomulka-Wieslaw, (Wieslaw was the party name of Gomulka during the war and it is used throughout the debate), delivered the main report, ostensibly an “historical analysis” of the character of the Polish working class movement. In his speech Gomulka took as the basis of Polish Socialism the tradition of the fervently nationalistic Polish Socialist Party, and condemned the internationalist and Pro-Russian Social Democratic Party of Poland, and by implication as well the pre-1938 Polish Communist Party of which the Workers' Party was supposed to be a continuation in everything but name.

‘Freedom of Discussion Inside the Party Is Absolutely Necessary’

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 104-128
Author(s):  
Florian Wilde
Keyword(s):  
Online Publication ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
World War ◽  
Labour Movement ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
International Group ◽  
To Come ◽  
Rosa Luxemburg

Despite being ‘one of the most notable leaders of the German Communist movement’, Ernst Meyer (1887–1930) remains relatively unknown. Prior to the online publication of the author’s PhD dissertation – an extensive 666-page biography of Meyer – there existed beyond two short biographies – an informative political autobiography from Meyer’s wife Rosa Meyer-Leviné and an essay by Hermann Weber published in 1968 – and some recent texts from the author, no other publications dealing closely with his life and work. Of these, only Meyer-Leviné’s biography has been published in English. Meyer played a major role in the left wing of the German labour movement, beginning in 1908 when he joined the German Social-Democratic Party (spd) until his death over twenty years later. A friend and collaborator of Rosa Luxemburg, he was also one of the founding and leading members of the International Group and its successor, the Spartacus League, in which the radical, anti-war wing of Social Democracy organised itself after the outbreak of World War i. He represented both of these groups as a delegate to the international conferences of anti-war socialists at Zimmerwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916). Elected to the kpd’s Zentrale at the party’s founding conference, Meyer remained a member of the leadership almost continuously in the years to come, occupying various leading positions. He also represented the party at the Second and Fourth World-Congresses of the Communist International (1920 and 1922).

Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tudor
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Social Democrat ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Friedrich Engels

Eduard Bernstein, an eminent German social democrat, is now noted as ‘the father of revisionism’. He made a reputation as the radical editor of the German Social Democratic Party organ, Der Sozialdemokrat, and became a close associate of Friedrich Engels. However, after the death of Engels he abandoned revolutionary Marxism and argued that socialism could be achieved by legal means and piecemeal reform. In doing this, he raised fundamental questions concerning the validity of Marxism and the direction of socialist political strategy, thus provoking what is now known as the ‘revisionist debate’.

General Lucius Clay, German Politicians, and the Great Crisis during the Making of West Germany's Constitution

2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 24-50
Author(s):  
Marjorie Lamberti
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Complex Interplay ◽  
Social Democrats ◽  
American Military ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Social

This article examines the complex interplay between the American military governor and German political leaders through an analysis of two crises that occurred over the making of the Basic Law. Why did a trial of strength between General Lucius Clay and the Social Democratic Party leadership in March and April 1949 come about? Understanding Clay's intervention in the politics of constitution-making in occupied Germany requires a more probing investigation than references to the temperament of a “proconsul” or a bias against a left-wing party. The analysis of Clay's intervention in this account shows how the Social Democrats evaded and challenged directives from the occupation authorities, and illuminates the limits of his influence over German framers of the Basic Law.

Populism Personified or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party in 2009 and Beyond

2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Hough ◽  
Michael Koß
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
The Social ◽  
Left Party

Despite its recent electoral successes, the Left Party's position in the German party system is more fragile that it may at first appear. The Left Party gained support in 2005 largely on account of dissatisfaction with other parties and not because masses of voters were flocking to its (nominally socialist) cause. Not even a majority from within its own supporter base thought it possessed "significant problem solving competences." Rather, much of the Left Party's political discourse is based on negative dismissals of much that it sees—in policy terms—before it. We discuss the Left Party's political development through the prism of populist politics. After outlining what we understand populism to mean, we analyze the Left Party's programmatic stances and political strategy within the context of this framework. Although populism is certainly not the sole preserve of the Left Party, it clearly excels in using populist tools to make political headway. We conclude by discussing the ramifications that this has for German party politics in general and for the Social Democratic Party in particular.

Continuity or Politikwechsel? The First Federal Red-Green Coalition

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michaela Richter
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Social Movement ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Federal Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
First Time ◽  
Party State

In October 1998 the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens1formed a coalition government, the first ever between these parties atthe federal level. In more ways than one, this new coalition marked awatershed in Germany’s post-1945 development. Since 1945, Germanyhad been a democracy in which political parties hold an especiallyprivileged position. This “party-state” has operated almostexclusively through the three major “Bonn” parties, which for nearlya half-century had governed through shifting coalitions. The Greensarose as a social movement challenging this hegemony; yet, only fifteenyears after they first entered the Bundestag, they forged a federalcoalition with one of the established parties they had once attacked.For the first time since 1957, a coalition had been formed thatinvolved not only a party other than the three “Bonn” parties but alsoone not linked to the Federal Republic’s creation. It was, furthermore,the first coalition ever to have resulted unambiguously fromthe wishes of voters.

Schröder Asserts the German National Interest, 1999–2003

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Political Union ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
Deutsche Mark ◽  
Full Swing

This chapter discusses how Gerhard Schröder, leader of Germany's Social Democratic Party, proposed to delay the euro's birth rather than start with members who had not achieved the required fiscal discipline. Campaigning to replace Helmut Kohl as chancellor in March 1998, Schröder observed that some countries would struggle to survive the rigors of the monetary union. However, once Schröder was elected chancellor in October, his hands were tied. In April 1998, the Bundestag had already authorized Germany's shift from the deutsche mark to the euro, Germany had made commitments to its European partners, and preparation for launch of the euro was in full swing. Ultimately, the euro was born uneventfully on January 1, 1999. Schröder continued the narrative of Europe's eventual political awakening; he even called for greater European “political union.” To the contrary, Schröder quickly developed a confrontational relationship with European institutions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document