scholarly journals ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: A LEGAL AND APPROPRIATE LINKAGE?

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Switzer

AbstractThis article will question the legality of measures of environmental ‘conditionality’ in the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] of the European Community [EC].1 The GSP is a GATT/WTO2 authorized scheme which permits developed nations to grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences in favour of developing countries.3 The objectives of the GSP are primarily development-oriented in that it aims to increase the export earnings of developing countries, promote their industrialization and accelerate rates of economic growth.4 A recent case taken in the WTO examined the legal contours of the grant of tariff preferences and it is in the light of this that this article will examine the so-called ‘special incentive arrangements’ of the reformed EC GSP which offers additional tariff preferences to developing countries on the ‘condition’ that they adhere to specified standards of environmental protection.

elni Review ◽  
2010 ◽  
pp. 18-22
Author(s):  
Thomas Ormond

The European Community regulation on shipments of waste which was adopted in May 2006 is now in application since 12 July 2007. Although one of the more voluminous instruments of EU environmental law – with 64 articles and 9 annexes – it was intended as a means of better legislation in comparison with the old Waste Shipment Regulation dating from 1993. The main purpose of the revision was to transpose recent changes of international law into EU legislation, as well as to harmonise, restructure and streamline the legal text in order to achieve greater clarity. Another objective, not least due to later insertions by the European Parliament during legislative proceedings, was to strengthen effective enforcement on various levels. However, against a rising tide of waste shipments or dubious “used goods” ending up as waste in developing countries, the EU regulation has yet to prove that it is an effective instrument of environmental protection on an international scale.


2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (S1) ◽  
pp. 220-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Grossman ◽  
Alan O. Sykes

The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European Communities’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area that has received little attention in recent years – trade preferences for developing countries. The idea for such preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging “unanimous agreement” in favor of the establishment of preferential arrangements. Tariff discrimination violates the most-favored nation (MFN) obligation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. I, however, and thus the legal authority for preferential tariff schemes had to await a GATT waiver of this obligation, which came in 1971. The waiver was to expire after 10 years, but the authority for preferences was extended by the GATT Contracting Parties Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, popularly known as the “Enabling Clause,” and now incorporated into the law of the WTO along with the GATT itself.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caf Dowlah

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—a system of differential and favorable trade arrangements toward less developed countries, adopted by the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)—has been around since the early 1970s. A primary objective of these schemes has been to promote industrialization and economic growth in less developed countries through trade rather than aid. The outcome of such programs has, however, been mixed. This paper identifies some of the underlying political and economic dynamics which led to the dismal performance of the GSP schemes of the United States in respect to the industrialization and economic growth of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The paper suggests that the effectiveness of GSP schemes could be significantly improved if they were brought under the binding WTO rules, if greater resources were directed to removing supply constraints in the LDCs, and if developed countries granted unwavering market access to LDC exports.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Federica Carugati

What are the sources of democratic stability? The evidence from three modern waves suggests that stability rests on economic growth, strong states, and liberal institutions. But can we secure democratic stability beyond liberalism? This question is relevant to those developing countries that have little hope, and perhaps little interest in liberal democracy. But it is also increasingly relevant to those developed nations where the achievements of the twentieth-century liberal order are being eroded. This article takes a fresh look at democratic stability by reviewing the evidence from the last two and a half millennia. Particular attention is devoted to the case of ancient Athens, which highlights the importance of alignment between shared norms and appropriately designed institutions. Athens’ case suggests that goods that we usually associate with modern liberal democracy do not necessarily rely on a given set of values and do not have a unique institutional manifestation.


Author(s):  
PALLAVI KISHORE

AbstractThis article examines conditionalities in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in light of the European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC – Tariff Preferences) case at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article largely undertakes this examination from the point of view of developing countries. It mainly examines the issue of discrimination in conditionalities since this was the principal question raised in the EC – Tariff Preferences case and makes suggestions regarding the regulation of conditionalities. In doing so, the article follows two trajectories: first, it makes suggestions for the WTO panels and Appellate Body, and, second, it makes suggestions for GSP donors, by analyzing the new European GSP + Scheme and by drawing inspiration from conditionalities in the loans granted by the World Bank.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-541 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Graham

On January 1, 1976, some 2,700 articles from 137 developing countries and territories became eligible to enter the United States free of import duties. By this overnight elimination of tariffs that had ranged as high as 28 percent, on articles as diverse as sausage and spacecraft, from countries as different as Brazil and Bangladesh, the United States became the twenty-third and most recent industrialized country to implement a “Generalized System of Preferences” (GSP), permitting imports from developing countries to enter at lower rates of duty than those applicable to the same products from industrialized countries.


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