The dispute between Italy and India on the Enrica Lexie incident has finally been decided by the Award handed down on 21 May 2020 by the Arbitral Tribunal to which the Parties had referred the case. After having concluded that it had jurisdiction on the issue of the immunity of the two Italian marines involved in the case at hand, the majority judgment (by three votes to two) affirmed that under customary international law the latter enjoyed functional immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of India. This article will argue that the Arbitral Tribunal’s conclusions are unconvincing, first and foremost, considering that, based on State practice, it is not possible to affirm without reservations that a settled customary rule exists under international law conferring immunity to all State officials, and regardless of the type of functions they perform. In fact, immunity has often been recognized as applying only to certain categories of State officials, and on the basis of the governmental nature of the functions they perform on behalf of the State. Given the doubtful existence under customary international law of a clear rule establishing the functional immunity of all State officials, for all the acts performed in the exercise of their functions, this article argues that the Arbitral Tribunal should have firstly ascertained the existence of a specific customary rule on the immunity of the military abroad, together with the exact content of such rule and, secondly, whether this was applicable in the case of the Enrica Lexie. As current practice stands, military forces abroad are entitled to immunity only under specific circumstances, which do not seem to occur in the present case. In particular, this article maintains that the Italian marines were not entitled to functional immunity. While the acts they performed did indeed fall within their typical functions, they were exercised on behalf of a private subject and not on behalf of the Italian State.
