Fiscal and Monetary Systems in the Mahdist Sudan, 1881–1898

1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-385
Author(s):  
Yitzhak Nakash
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Resource Control ◽  
Political Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Monetary Systems ◽  
Power Base

This article focuses on two major aspects of the Mahdist political economy, i.e., its fiscal and monetary systems. It attempts to integrate an analysis of their structure with that of the political behavior of the Mahdist rulers in order to show how the Mahdist rulers' political power and personal aspirations affected the development of both systems. In doing so, the article will be primarily concerned with the struggle of the successors of the Mahdi for resource control; it will examine the efforts of the ruling group to control and manipulate the fiscal and monetary systems in order to turn these—and indeed the economy as a whole—into a power base so as to preserve the established political order.

The Political Economy of Imperfect Competition

1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitai Etzioni
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Marginal Utility ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Power Base ◽  
The Stability

ABSTRACTEconomic actors command political power as well as economic power. It is used to the same effect to create monopolies and oligopolies. The two powers can be combined; e.g., aside from monopolies based only on economic power or only on government intervention, there are especially powerful monopolies that command both powers. The stability of the various power holders is related to the nature of their power base; pure economic power is particularly unstable. However, economic power can be more readily amassed than interventionist power, which violates norms, and has a sharply declining marginal utility. When the effects of interventionist power are added to those of economic power, economies such as America, which are often classified as quite competitive, turn out to be much less so.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 197-208
Author(s):  
Ismail K. White ◽  
Chryl N. Laird
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Social Ties ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Black Politics ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Political ◽  
Black Liberation ◽  
Political Unity ◽  
Black Institutions

This concluding chapter examines the broader implications of this research, both empirical and normative. It discusses the potential for this theoretical framework to further understanding of the political behavior of other social groupings in America. The chapter also considers the framework's applicability to understanding the political homogeneity of localized racial groupings. If the foundational mechanism of political power through unity is that identified by the framework—coracial social ties—then desegregation and the loss of black institutions are a fundamental challenge to the doing of black liberation politics. The chapter discusses what this might mean for the future of black politics. In so doing, it also engages arguments about the harms of coracial policing and weighs how to think about balancing those concerns against the reality that the political unity that has consistently enabled black political power relies on a process of social sanctioning. Finally, the chapter considers the questions future research might answer by engaging and applying this theoretical framework and charts a course for future progress.

Stagnating yields, unyielding profits: The political economy of Malaysia's rice sector

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie S. Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Financial Support ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Big Business ◽  
East Malaysia

Since the 2008 rice crisis, Malaysia's rice policies have been caught between government efforts to raise production and its support of the country's monopoly rice importer (Bernas). This article argues that when the politics behind the country's policies are revealed, the paradox is more apparent than real. The three principal policy components — gratifying Barisan Nasional's coalition partners in East Malaysia by expanding the acreage devoted to rice; buttressing the rural Malay economy by providing subsidies through a yield-enhancing programme; and relying on big business for financial support (Bernas's new owner is one of Malaysia's richest businessmen) — aim to serve the same end: to perpetuate UMNO's political power amid increasing electoral competition.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Prevention

2013 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Gough
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Climate Change Policy ◽  
Political Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Change Policy ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Environmental

Prevention in public policy is much discussed but rarely theorized. This article begins with a theoretical framework for reflecting on the political economy of prevention in advanced capitalist economies that integrates the analysis of preventive policies across the social, environmental and economic domains. The next two sections survey prevention initiatives in social policy and climate change policy, respectively. These mainly focus on the last three decades and are based mainly on UK evidence. The article then considers the relative absence of prevention in contemporary economic policy and management: today's neo-liberal economic and political order powerfully constrains preventive public policy. The final section outlines an alternative social political economy that prioritizes preventive and precautionary policy making.

Power and the Control of Capital

1994 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Winters
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Political Power ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Relationship

This essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial Asia and Latin America and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources. The stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders, the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints, and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who (or what) supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow.

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