Security Council

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-428

At the request of the United States the Council began consideration on March 26, 1956 of the extent of compliance by Israel and the Arab states with the Armistice Agreements and with the Security Council's resolutions of March 30, 1955, September 8, 1955 and January 19, 1956. The representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria took part in the Council's discussions. The Council had before it a draft resolution submitted by the United States in the preambular part of which the Council recalled the three earlier resolutions; noted that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned had been requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the armistice lines should be reduced; and noted with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps had not been carried out. Under the terms of the operative part of the resolution, the Council 1) considered that the situation currently prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council was such that its continuance was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; 2) requested the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the three earlier resolutions;

Author(s):  
Ellen Jenny Ravndal

This chapter explores all aspects of Trygve Lie’s interaction with the Security Council, beginning with his appointment process and the negotiation of the relative domains of the Council and the Secretary-General. This was a time when the working methods of the UN system were rapidly evolving through political negotiation and responses to external crises. It examines Lie’s personality and character, how he viewed his own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as crises arose, the legal and political tools he developed and exercised, and his changing relationship with individual permanent members and the six elected members. In the emerging Cold War, Lie’s position in the Security Council would be determined in particular by his relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking initiative in response to external crises in Iran, Palestine, Berlin, and Korea, Lie succeeded in laying foundations for an expanded political role for the Secretary-General.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102

The first emergency special session of the General Assembly, summoned by the Secretary-General in the light of the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 751st meeting on October 31, 1956, was held from November 1 through 10, 1956 (56Ist–563d, 565th, 566th–567th and 572d plenary meetings), under the presidency of His Excellency Ambassador Rudecindo Ortega (Chile). At the opening of the session the representative of France (de Guiringaud) criticized the principal substantive item of the provisional agenda of the session, which was the “question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on October 30, 1956”. Mr. de Guiringaud stated that in his view it was impossible for the letter of the representative of Egypt to the Security Council to be dealt with by the Assembly, since in the Security Council debate on the Egyptian complaint, no draft resolution had been presented, and consequently no vote had been taken; therefore, no lack of unanimity on the part of the permanent members of the Council had been demonstrated. As to the United States draft resolution considered by the Security Council, Mr. de Guiringaud held that it was within the framework of Chapter VI of the Charter, rather than Chapter VII. Therefore, he concluded, the conditions of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution had not been fulfilled, and he made a complete reservation on behalf of his government as to the convening of the special session of the Assembly and as to the validity of any resolution that might be adopted.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Yoo

In his speech before the United Nations (UN) in September 2002, President George W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further intransigence. When Iraq refused to fully comply with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq on March 19,2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. On May 1,2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time of this writing, the United States has assumed the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 789-828
Author(s):  
Keith Wilson

The United States is abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy a limited missile defence shield. Amongst other developments, this is prompting a reconsideration of the global security framework. However, a crucial element is missing from the current missile defence proposals: a clearly articulated concept of peaceful use, applicable both to outer space and to earth-space. The deployment of missile defence runs counter to emerging norms. It has effects going far beyond the abandonment or re-configuration of specific Cold War agreements. In a community of nations committed to the maintenance of international peace and security (cf. national or plurilateral security), sustainable meaning for widely used and accepted norms of peaceful use and peaceful purposes is at risk.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsuya Toyoda

In September 2015, the Japanese Diet enacted a series of laws – the Peace and Security Legislation – to enable the Japan Self-Defense Force to play an enhanced role in peace deployments overseas. The enactment of the new laws was made possible by a “new” interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. While the main objective of the introduction of the laws was aimed at strengthening the alliance with the United States, jsdf participation in peace operations was also an important consideration politically. This article suggests that the Japanese government will now need to convince the public that the new Peace and Security Legislation is compatible with Japan’s constitutionally mandated pacifism. In light of the prospect of an expanded participation of Japan in international peace operations this will be particularly important.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvonne Terlingen

When on October 13, 2016, the General Assembly appointed by acclamation António Guterres of Portugal as the United Nations’ ninth secretary-general, there was a sense of excitement among the organization's 193 members. For once, so it seemed, they felt they had played an important role not only in choosing the secretary-general but also in appointing a man generally considered to be an outstanding candidate for a position memorably described as “the most impossible job on this earth.” The five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council (Perm Five) still exercised the greatest power in the selection process, as they always had in the past. Yet the candidate chosen appears, surprisingly, not to have been the first choice of either the United States or Russia, two of the Perm Five that until then had effectively chosen the secretary-general between them in an opaque and outdated process. It is doubtful that António Guterres would have been appointed if the General Assembly had not embarked on a novel process to select him.


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